THE GENOESE LEVANTINE COLONIES AT THE BIRTH OF OTTOMAN IMPERIAL POWER: A FRAMEWORK FOR INQUIRY

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
ISTANBUL ŞEHİR UNIVERSITY

BY

PADRAIC ROHAN

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS
IN
HISTORY

MAY 2015
Approval Page

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in History.

Examinaing Committee Members

Assistant Professor Günhan Börekçi

Assistant Professor Kahraman Şakul

Assistant Emrah Safa Gürkan

This is to confirm that this thesis complies with all the standards set by the Graduate School of Social Sciences of Istanbul Şehir University:

Date Seal / Signature
I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

First Name, Last Name:

Signature:
The Genoese Levantine colonies originated during the era of the Crusades (eleventh through fifteenth centuries) in a complex dynamic with the Byzantine Greeks, the Turkic dynasties of Anatolia, and various Latin warlords. In the eastern Mediterranean, the Aegean, and the Black Sea, a Genoese feudal aristocracy traded with the Byzantine and Turkic dynasties, and many Genoese families became extremely rich. But the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 1453 signaled the beginning of the end of Genoese commercial dominance. Individual Genoese merchants continued to reside at Pera, just across the Golden Horn from Constantinople, and the Genoese colony of Caffa in Crimea held out until 1475. Chios continued under Genoese rule into the middle of the sixteenth century.

Despite the loss of their Levantine colonies, the Genoese had by this point become the most powerful bankers in Europe. My hypothesis is that capital
repatriation from the colonies to the western Mediterranean in the late fifteenth century contributed significantly to the success of Genoese banking in the sixteenth century. In examining Genoese and Ottoman sources for the fifteenth century, this study aims to lay the groundwork for close investigation of capital movement and economic networks between the Genoese Levantine colonies and the western Mediterranean.

Keywords: Genoese, Ottoman, Pera, Galata, Black Sea, Chios
ÖZ

Osmanlı Emperyal Gücünün Doğuşunda Levant’taki Ceneviz Kolonileri:
Araştırma İçin Bir Çerçeve

Rohan, Padraic
MA, Tarih Bölümü

Tez Danışmanı: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Günhan Börekçi

Mayıs 2015, 104 sayfa


Cenevizliler, Levant Bölgesi’ndeki kolonilerini kaybetmesine rağmen, bu noktaya gelene kadar Avrupa’daki en güçlü bankerler haline gelmişlerdi. Hipotezime göre, 15. yy. da kolonilerden Batı Akdeniz’e sermaye gönderilmesi,

Anahtar Kelimeler: Cenevizliler, Osmanlılar, Pera, Galata, Karadeniz, Chios
Acknowledgements

I must acknowledge first the support of my parents, Nan and Patrick Rohan. I would like to thank my advisor Günhan Börekçi for his guidance throughout this process. I'm grateful too for the support of the members of the committee, Kahraman Şakul and Emrah Safa Gürkan. Engin Deniz Akarlı, Abdulhamit Kırmızı, Coşkun Çakır, Mehmet Genç, Yunus Uğur, and Abdurrahman Aţçıl provided much moral support and invaluable instruction. I'm grateful too for the guidance of Francesca Trivellato, Natalie Rothman, and Carlo Taviani; and for the invaluable criticism and moral support of Burcu Gürkan, Hardy Griffin, and Yakoob Ahmed. I consider myself extremely indebted to the entire Şehir community for the opportunity to study with and learn from this group of people.
# Table of Contents

Abstract ................................................................................................................ iii

Öz .......................................................................................................................v

Acknowledgements ......................................................................................... vii

Table of Contents ........................................................................................... viii

Introduction ....................................................................................................... 1

CHAPTER

I. Mediterranean Economic Networks and Genoese Colonial Administration before the Ottoman Conquest of Constantinople ................................................................. 16

   I.1 The Ill-Defined Boundary between Commerce and Piracy ............... 17

   I.2 The Evolution of the Rule of Law ...................................................... 22

   I.3 Breakdown in the Rule of Law ...................................................... 28

II. The Genoese of Pera/Galata after the Conquest: Correspondence between the
Ottoman Tahrir of 1455 and the Genoese Notarial Records ......................... 41

   II.1 The Context of the Ottoman and Genoese sources ...................... 42

   II.2 The Analysis of Halil İnalcık ........................................................ 46

   II.3 New Findings and Connections ................................................... 50

III: Economic Networks after the Conquest and the Disintegration of Genoese
Colonial Administration .................................................................................... 64

   III.1 Change and Continuity in Economic Networks ......................... 65

   III.2 The Repatriation of Holy Relics .................................................. 74
III.3 The Disintegration of Genoese Colonial Administration .......... 76

Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 85

APPENDICES

A. Glossary ........................................................................................................... 89
B: Map of the Genoese Colonies ........................................................................ 94
C: Investors in the Cargo of the Ship of Nicolo Gentile ................................. 95
D: Correspondence between the Ottoman and Genoese Documents ............ 96
Bibliography......................................................................................................... 97
Introduction:

Sources, Studies, and Approaches

The Genoese Levantine colonies originated during the era of the Crusades (eleventh to fifteenth centuries) in a complex dynamic with the Byzantine Greeks, the Turkic dynasties, and various Latin warlords. In the eastern Mediterranean, the Aegean, and the Black Sea, a Genoese feudal aristocracy traded with the Byzantine and Turkic dynasties, and many Genoese families became extremely rich. But the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 1453 signaled the beginning of the end of Genoese commercial dominance. Individual Genoese merchants continued to reside at Pera, just across the Golden Horn from Constantinople, and the Genoese colony of Caffa in Crimea held out until 1475. Chios continued under Genoese rule into the middle of the sixteenth century.

Despite the loss of their Levantine colonies, the Genoese had by this point become the most powerful bankers in Europe. Genoa in the sixteenth century was the leading financial city in the world.¹ My hypothesis is that capital repatriation from the colonies back to Genoa in the late fifteenth century contributed significantly to the success of Genoese banking in the sixteenth century. In

examining Genoese and Ottoman sources for the fifteenth century, this thesis aims to lay the groundwork for close investigation of capital movement and merchant networks between the Genoese Levantine colonies and the western Mediterranean.

In this introduction, I first analyze the strengths and limitations of the Ottoman and Genoese documents utilized in this study; second, I examine the scope and biases of the relevant secondary literature; third, I examine the flaws in our historiography, and the the assumptions embedded in our views of modernity and the rise of Europe, and finally, a summary of each chapter is given.

The Sources

This thesis examines the Genoese Levantine colonies in the fifteenth century using a variety of published primary sources, especially the Genoese and Ottoman documents. Used in conjunction, these sources help us to understand the social and economic history of the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea in the late medieval and early modern periods in a way that neither could do separately. The 1455 *tahrir* register (a type of tax survey) of Istanbul, published by Halil İnalcık, is the most important Ottoman document of the period, and the 1477 register also contains valuable information about the Genoese exiled to Istanbul after the Ottoman conquest of Caffa. The 1455 *tahrir* is the most detailed and reliable extant source concerning the population of Istanbul, the condition of its buildings, its churches and monasteries, and the efforts to repopulate the city.

The *vakıf* (from the Arabic *waqf*, pious foundation) *tahrir* registers are

---

another valuable source for this period, recorded the holdings of Aya Sofya Mosque, mostly Byzantine religious buildings converted to Muslim use. The vakıf tahrir register of ca. 1472 is incomplete, but ends with a reference to 286 buildings whose revenues were allocated to the foundation. The register of circa 1481 lists no names of owners or rentors, but the foundation's holdings have grown spectacularly. In Galata new quarters are named: twenty quarters now have Turkish names, thirteen have Italian names, eight Greek, six Armenian, and eleven are neutral. All fifty-eight of these Galata quarters show up in mid-sixteenth-century sources, and no additional ones emerge. Another vakıf tahrir register of 1489 is also extant. These registers, in conjunction with the Genoese sources, are valuable tools in tracing the transition from Genoese Pera to Ottoman Galata.

Yet the limitations of these registers must be kept in mind. Heath Lowry, one of the foremost authorities on the subject, has examined the assumptions of those who have worked on the tahrir registers, and warns of the dangers of using these sources uncritically. Besides the common mistake of examining these sources in isolation, many scholars have assumed that accurate census data can be derived from these registers. According to Lowry, inconsistencies mar the tahrir registers, but very few historians appreciate this because most are too specialized to take the long view. The Ottoman bureaucracy intended these registers to list all sources of taxable revenue of only the holders of timar fiefs. Sources of income outside the timar system were excluded: tax-free income from private property and that derived from a vakıf; all sources of tax revenue intended for the central government; villages providing a specific service, such as salt-workers; customs
dues; poll-tax paid by non-Muslims; and most taxes levied on livestock. These registers alone do not provide the basis for any quantitative study – they must be used in conjunction with other sources. *Tahrir* registers from the early period are generally more useful and reliable than those from later periods, and illuminate far more for non-Muslim populations than for Muslim populations.³

The Genoese notarial records of the fifteenth century are particularly abundant, and almost completely unpublished.⁴ The sources I utilize most frequently are as follows:

1. Portions of the diplomatic codex of San Giorgio, which governed the remaining Genoese possessions in the Black Sea after the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople.⁵

2. Decrees of the Genoese administration of Caffa in the first half of the fifteenth century.⁶

3. A survey of fifteenth-century Genoese notarial documents from Pera, Mytilene, and Chios.⁷

4. The letters of the Genoese merchant Giovanni da Pontremoli for the crucial years after the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople.\(^8\)

5. Early fifteenth-century directives of the Genoese Signoria to the various Levantine colonies, including Famagusta on Cyprus, Caffa in Crimea, Chios, and Pera.\(^9\)

6. A variety of documents on Genoese Pera and Ottoman Galata from the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.\(^10\)

The notarial acts for Chios in the years 1453-54 alone are almost completely unpublished.\(^11\) These acts are essential to understand the situation in the last months of Byzantine rule, and are perhaps more valuable than the acts of Pera in the same period. Refugees fleeing the Ottoman advance kept copious records, which illustrate thriving economic networks between Chios, Rhodes, Crete, and Sicily. Yet any quantitative analysis based only on published Genoese sources would be fatally skewed. The historian Michel Balard recognized that, even if we had access to all extant notarial deeds, the usefulness and reliability of quantitative results based on this material has limits. Though notarial deeds are abundant in the fifteenth century, they become less satisfactory as a source without the private account books that have rarely survived.\(^12\) This thesis is therefore necessarily

---


10 Luigi Tommaso Belgrano, *Prima serie di documenti riguardanti la colonia di Pera*, vol. XIII (Genoa: Atti della Societa’ Ligure di Storia Patria, 1877) and *Seconda serie di documenti riguardanti la colonia di Pera*, vol. XVII (Genoa: Atti della Societa’ Ligure di Storia Patria, 1884).


impressionistic, even as I attempt to construct a framework with which to eventually quantify capital movement from the Genoese Levantine colonies.

**Studies**

For the Genoese Levantine colonies, the terms we use for areas of study and historical periods shade into each other. Crusader warlords, usually referred to as Latins or Franks, carved out fiefs in the eastern Mediterranean basin, interacting with each other and with the fragmenting Byzantine empire and the consolidating Turkic dynasties. Are we studying the Crusades, or feudalism, or Islam, or the Greek Byzantine empire, or the rise of the Turkic dynasties in Anatolia in the post-Mongol era? Many recent studies, especially those of Nevra Necipoğlu, Kate Fleet, and Elizabeth Zachariadou, examine the interactions at these boundaries.¹³

To confine ourselves to one area of study is to neglect complex interrelationships which must be understood if we are to put any one of these areas of study in its proper context. Likewise, in the traditional divisions between economic, social, political, and religious history, the closer we get to the boundaries of each discipline, the more we notice continuity across the boundaries. A durable historiographical frame must acknowledge the fuzzy and ill-defined boundaries between the economic, social, and political spheres. For example, a study of equity, credit, and insurance agreements in Genoa between the twelfth and fifteenth centuries has contributed to our understanding of long-term social

changes, from feudal warrior aristocracy to global finance aristocracy.\textsuperscript{14} Debating the Genoese role in the Crusades, David Abulafia disagrees with scholarly consensus that the Genoese were motivated solely by opportunities for riches, and claims that religious fervor was equally if not more important.\textsuperscript{15} These two motives need not be mutually exclusive, and I would argue that there is no such thing as purely economic or purely religious motives.

The secondary literature must be scrutinized and cross-checked, for all works are embedded in a particular historiographical tradition, and all have their biases and prejudices. For example, in the late sixteenth century the Italian Francesco Sansovino wrote an account of the Ottoman conquest of Constantinope, which is the basis of the so-called anonymous Greek chronicle of the following century.\textsuperscript{16} Sansovino claimed that Pera had been sacked by the Ottomans, and presented as evidence an Italian version of a letter by Leonardo of Chios.\textsuperscript{17} The Florentine envoy to Genoa likewise reported to the Genoese government that the podesta had been dragged through the streets, and that the Ottomans had confiscated Genoese property in Pera and taken it to Edirne.\textsuperscript{18} These accounts continue to circulate today.\textsuperscript{19} Yet there is no evidence that the sack of Pera, or the

\textsuperscript{17} Yet Leonardo said not that Pera had been sacked, but that the land walls and towers of Galata had been torn down. See Setton, \textit{The Papacy and the Levant}, vol. II, p. 134 fn. 90.
\textsuperscript{18} İnalçık, \textit{The Survey of Istanbul 1455}, p. 476.
abuse of the podesta, ever took place. In volume two of *The Papacy and the Levant*, Kenneth Setton does not mention it, despite an exhaustive analysis of the western sources for the siege and conquest. The podesta wrote to his brother less than a month after the conquest, without any hint of an attack on his person.20 The Latin, Greek, and Ottoman chronicles are silent. Nicolo’ Barbaro’s account is full of anti-Genoese sentiment,21 and he would have had no reason to suppress their humiliation; likewise, the Ottomans would have had no compunction about reporting and justifying the sack and abuse had they taken place.

In sum, the wealth of the Genoese and Ottoman archives deserves much closer study, particularly in cross-disciplinary work. The Genoese notarial records and government ledgers, particularly for the eastern colonies of Pera, Caffa, and Famagusta, will help to illuminate the economic, social, and cultural history of the Ottoman society in the fifteenth century. Likewise, the Ottoman surveys, particularly those of 1455 and 1477, illustrate the continuity as well as the change in the economic networks in which the Genoese played such an important role. The Genoese sources assist in refining Ottoman historiography, and the Ottoman sources complement and refine, and sometimes refute, western historiography. Used in conjunction, these sources help to excise the flaws in our various theoretical frames.

*Approaches*

This study must grapple with the intersecting historiographical challenges

21 Ibid., p. 119.
of modernity, capitalism, and Islam. In some ways, Genoa and the Genoese illustrate the European transition from a feudal warrior aristocracy to a global finance aristocracy; but this characterization imposes a teleology on a complex and uncertain process. Recent research has highlighted the false contrast between markets and feudalism. Though the Genoese were on the main line of this societal evolution, a close study of Genoese development casts grave doubt on the assumptions and teleologies inherent in our perception of the transition to modernity, and highlights the limitations of any model based on a division between pre-capitalist and capitalist economies. In Genoa, extant commercial records go back at least nine centuries; and Genoese piracy, usually associated with the Crusades, was common into the late fifteenth century.

Norbert Elias mapped the transition in Europe from a feudal warrior aristocracy to a courtier class dependent on the coalescing great courts; but we do not yet have as precise and elegant a model with which to map the development of bourgeoisie formations, the increasing sophistication of the mercantile and financial elite, and the spread of the European colonies. The mapping of the evolution of the finance aristocracy is critical to the investigation of cultural and institutional transformation, and must be included in any study of the rise of Europe. The evolution of the finance aristocracy is more complex than the transition from military aristocracy to courtier class. Many from the feudal warrior aristocracy made the transition to the mercantile and financial elite, at least for a

22 Doosselaere, Commercial Agreements and Social Dynamics in Medieval Genoa, pp. 3-5.
time. In the churn within the mercantile and financial elite, many different classes
cycled in and out of this evolving system, the components of the system and the
system itself in a dynamic relationship, each influencing the other. A study of
Genoese-Ottoman interaction can contribute to this investigation, as the eastern
colonies were an essential part of Genoese economic history.

The study of Italian-Ottoman dynamics offers a sobering lesson in how
both ancient Christian prejudice and modernist assumption have prevented
historians from placing Muslim and specifically Ottoman history in a global frame.
This prejudice and assumption extends to some western historians who romanticize
the Ottomans. For example, Jason Goodwin began a book with the statement, “the
Ottoman empire lived for war.” The same argument could be made about
European crusaders, and such a characterization could describe virtually any state
in early modern Europe. Daniel Goffman criticized Goodwin for propagating this
assumption, and then claimed that the Ottomans, unlike the Byzantine, Latin, and
Habsburg empires, did not use religion to legitimize themselves and mobilize their
population for war. Differences exist in the legitimating role of religion between
the early modern Christian and Muslim spheres, but so do similarities. In the Celali
uprisings and in war with the Safavids, a coalescing Sunni identity animated
Ottoman policy.

Disjointed historiographical traditions clash in the eastern Mediterranean,

26 Daniel Goffman, The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2004), p. 7. On the following page, Goffman seems to contradict himself with
the statement that Ottoman legitimacy was rooted in Islam.
27 Caroline Finkel, Osman's Dream: The History of the Ottoman Empire (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse
University Press, 2005), pp. 95 and 180-87; Halil İnalcık, The Ottoman Empire, The Classical
Aegean, and Black Sea regions in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. In attempting to construct a more coherent frame, Ottoman sources must be compared with Italian sources whenever possible. The rise of Europe is usually framed by the east-west divide, the periodization of colonialism and post-colonialism, and debates on capitalism. If we assume that these subjects are internally unified, then we restrict ourselves to a narrow and inadequate examination of capitalism, industrialization, religion, and colonialism. Our theoretical frame must account for the dynamic relationships between these concepts, and must reject any underlying assumption of progress. Societal evolution need not tend towards a positive direction, and need not preclude discontinuities, ruptures, and shifts in the historical process. Indeed, discontinuities, ruptures, and shifts can only be recognized as such by following processes through time.

Scholars working on the history of western Europe often neglect the Genoese Levantine colonies after 1453 and emphasize the so-called Genoese century starting in 1557. These Levantine colonies are usually assumed to have been swallowed up by a rising imperial Ottoman power, yet studying the capital flows from these colonies could yield rich and fruitful lines of inquiry, and assist in the construction of a more coherent historiographical frame. Such an approach, though focused primarily in the Genoese archives, must include Ottoman sources as well.

Genoese financial records are among the most valuable sources for Ottoman economic history of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, yet Suraiya
Faroqhi warns of the dangers of using European archives to elucidate Ottoman history. This approach is more demanding than conventional studies of European-Ottoman relations, since one needs to know a great deal about the Ottomans to ask the right questions of European archives.\(^\text{28}\) In addition, Faroqhi notes, extensive European archives can give an inflated view of Europe's importance for the Ottomans, while Safavid archives, for example, have been destroyed for the most part.\(^\text{29}\) We cannot assume that Ottoman trade in the Black and the Aegean Seas was greater than its eastern trade. Indeed, Halil İnalcık contends that taxes on Iranian silk imports were among the foundations of Ottoman finances in the fifteenth century.\(^\text{30}\)

From the Crusades to the height of Ottoman power, the medieval period blends into the early modern. 1453 is often called the beginning of the early modern period, and the term *modern* poses a massive theoretical challenge. Embedded in the term are the assumptions that we are or should be somehow better than we were, that this period is somehow fundamentally different from previous periods. But our theoretical frame must encompass fundamental continuity as well as change. For example, the historiographical debate on the origins of capitalism has reached a consensus about the importance of long-distance trade in the medieval and early modern world,\(^\text{31}\) but continues to be

---

29 Ibid., p. 9.
marred by Eurocentric and modernist assumptions. Any attempt to characterize capitalism as inherently free-market or democratic founders on the most elementary survey of the medieval and early modern Italian merchant republics, in which an oligarchy steered state policy towards their own exploitative commercial interests.\textsuperscript{32} The accumulation of capital and the sophistication of economic networks are neither a European nor a modern phenomenon.\textsuperscript{33}

Sophisticated trade networks and technological advance proceeded in lockstep, and the rise of Europe is just the latest in a string of disruptive innovations that have arisen time and again in human history. We cannot be neutral about this disruption that has transformed human society, ushering in prosperity and suffering alike; but we can acknowledge the theoretical middle ground, rejecting the apologist or rejectionist poles. A welter of causes and geopolitical contingencies contributed to the rise of Europe, and we cannot characterize this complex process as inherently good or inherently bad. The Genoese and the Ottomans interacted at the nexus of the birth of Ottoman power and the rise of Europe, and excising the flaws in our theoretical frame helps us to assess more accurately our sources and the limits of these sources.

\textit{Chapter Summaries}

Chapter One, Mediterranean Economic Networks and Genoese Colonial Administration before the Ottoman Conquest of Constantinople, consists of three

\textsuperscript{32} Abulafia, \textit{The Great Sea}, p. 277; Doosselaere, \textit{Commercial Agreements and Social Dynamics in Medieval Genoa}, p. 119.

parts. The first part examines the commercial networks of the Mediterranean and Black Sea in the early fifteenth century, including Ottoman-Genoese trade agreements, Catalan-Genoese interaction, and the piracy that preyed on these commercial networks. The second part analyzes the evolution of the rule of law, especially in the Genoese attempts to regulate of piracy in the eastern colonies. The third part traces the breakdown in the rule of law in the eastern colonies against the backdrop of a rising Ottoman power, especially focusing on the conflicts of interest of the Genoese mercantile aristocracy, who often served the Greek emperors of Constantinople and Trebizond and the Ottoman sultans, and profited at the public expense.

Chapter Two, The Genoese of Pera-Galata after the Conquest: Correspondence between the 1455 Ottoman Survey and Genoese Notarial Records, consists of three parts. In the first part, I sketch the content and the context of the Ottoman and Genoese sources; second, I review the analysis of Halil İnalcık and his comparative study of these sources; and third, I present new findings and connections between the Ottoman tahrir of 1455 and the Genoese notarial records.

Chapter Three, Economic Networks after the Conquest and the Disintegration of Genoese Colonial Administration, consists of three parts. First, I examine change and continuity in economic networks after the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople. Capital flows from the Genoese Levantine colonies were overwhelmingly private, while public money flowed east to defend the colonies. Thus, an analysis of change and continuity in economic networks through the
fifteenth century must take into account the disintegration of Genoese colonial administration. Second, I note the repatriation of holy relics from the churches of Pera back to Genoa in 1461, after the Ottomans took Trebizond. This movement illuminates the Genoese realization that the Ottomans would not be dislodged, and perhaps gives a clue to other types of capital movement. Third, I analyze the disintegration of Genoese colonial administration, including the attempts to assist the remaining Black Sea colonies and the continuing Genoese piracy.
Chapter I

Mediterranean Economic Networks and Genoese Colonial Administration before the Ottoman Conquest of Constantinople

In the long history of Mediterranean and Black Sea economic networks, piracy and commerce still had not completely differentiated by the fifteenth century. A kaleidoscope of merchants did business with each other and also plundered each other from one end of the Mediterranean to the other, while governments made intermittent war and peace. Governments alternately reined in or sanctioned the actions of their subjects, sometimes punishing their own merchants and contractors for violence against foreigners, sometimes granting the legal right of reprisal against foreigners. Genoese colonial administration was riven by the tension between the government in Genoa and colonial officials. Many office-holders in the colonies were displaced by central directive, and those in Genoa exploited the wealth of the colonies. Yet at times those in the mother city were more judicious in acting for the common good, while colonial officials enriched themselves at the public expense.

This chapter is divided into three parts: first, I trace the ill-defined boundary between commerce and piracy; second, I examine the evolution of the

34 See, for example, Balletto, Liber Officii Provisionis Romanie. Most of the directives sent to the colonies concerned appointments to government office.
rule of law, especially in the regulation of piracy and in the administration of the eastern colonies; and third, I examine the breakdown in the rule of law in the eastern colonies.

I.1. The Ill-Defined Boundary between Commerce and Piracy

In examining the economic networks of the fifteenth century, our analytical lens must encompass both commerce and piracy. The sophisticated trade between the eastern Mediterranean, the Black Sea, and the European Atlantic made an elite mercantile and capitalist class wealthy, and an array of pirates preyed upon this traffic, sometimes with the support of their governments.

The Basque Pedro de Larraonda, often called Pedro de La Randa in Catalan and Italian documents, was a merchant who turned to piracy. He had several ships and took service with the Florentine company Alberti, operating out of Bruges. He is attested in Bruges, Southampton, Cartagena, Alexandria, and Constantinople. In 1398, while transporting merchandise for the Florentines, he was captured by pirates, and to save part of his cargo he had to swear on the bible that the cargo did not belong to the Genoese or Florentines. He held the Catalans responsible for this incident. He lost his ship, but the pirates paid him half its value. He later became a pirate himself, preying on Catalan ships off Naples.

Catalans and Maiorcans in the eastern Mediterranean might have been predator or prey. They were active in the commercial networks of Chios; for

36 Ibid., p. 333
37 Ibid., pp. 334 and 347.
example, on 6 October 1403, the legal representative of Enigi de Faro, the former
captain of Smyrna, paid eighty florins of Chios to the Maiorcan Pericono Ferrer.38
On 10 March 1405 on Chios, a Maiorcan merchant Gabriele Castagner bought a
male Bulgarian slave.39 On 25 September 1407, Mose, a Catalanian Jew resident
on Chios, sold to Juan Mallol, citizen of Barcelona, a female Bulgarian slave.40 Yet
there was also much piracy between the Catalans and Genoese. On 22 August
1394, Gregorio Cicala, captain of a ship departing Chios for Famagusta, and the
merchants who had invested in the cargo, agreed to bypass the ports of Rhodes and
Theologo, given the presence of two Catalan corsairs around Rhodes.41 In 1409, a
Genoese fleet captured seven Catalan vessels after having followed them to
Rhodes.42 In 1411, the Catalans attacked Chios, and soon thereafter Genoese and
Catalan fleets fought at the entrance to the port of Alexandria.43 In early 1424, the
Genoese Signoria praised the podesta and council of Chios for arming two galleys
against the Catalans.44 That same year, the Signoria sent to Chios to warn that
twenty-five galleys armed by the king of Aragon had left Catalonia. The same
warning was sent to Pera, Caffa, and Famagusta.45 On 14 January 1436, Iacopo
Doria paid the ransom of a ship captured in Rhodes by the Catalan Cristiano de
Cheralt.46

38 Silvia Jacopino, Giannina Pastorino, and Rossana Urbani “Catalogue of documents,” in Mostra
Documentaria Liguria-Cataluna, xii-xv secolo, ed. Gian Giacomo Musso (Genoa: Archivio di
134).
41 Ibid., p. 102 (doc. 48 on Chios).
42 Ferrer i Mallol, “Una Flotta catalana contro I corsari nel Levante (1406-1409),” p. 347.
43 Ibid., p. 352.
45 Ibid., pp. 36-7 (doc. 30, dated 26 June 1424).
In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the Catalans and Genoese intermittently warred over Sardinia.\textsuperscript{47} On 27 September 1407 at Syracuse, Battista Spinola testified before the Genoese consul regarding the expedition of Megollo Lercaro, which had been boarded by Catalans and forced to land at Syracuse rather than Catania.\textsuperscript{48} On 7 June 1408, the Genoese consul and merchants in Seville were warned of the danger of three armed Catalan ships.\textsuperscript{49} The Catalan governor of Cagliari in Sardinia wrote to Barcelona, probably in 1408, that three Catalan ships had been captured off Trapani in Sicily by a joint Genoese-Castilian fleet.\textsuperscript{50}

Sometime after 1417, the Genoese Guiraldo Polleri insured his ship for two months of navigation, but the insurers included the stipulation that the risk was not covered in Sardinian waters.\textsuperscript{51} In April 1425, the Signoria warned Chios that the Catalans had recently captured Genoese ships at Cadiz and elsewhere and conducted the ships to Barcelona.\textsuperscript{52} Overall, as these examples illustrate, piracy was not merely a string of isolated occurrences, but rather a prong in a large-scale policy.

Another important aspect of Genoese policy in this period were trade agreements with the Ottomans to exploit the resources of the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea region. In 1389, the Genoese at Pera concluded an agreement with Ottoman ruler Bayezid I (r. 1389-1402).\textsuperscript{53} In the next year, a

\textsuperscript{47} Ferrer i Mallol, “Una Flotta catalana contro I corsari nel Levante (1406-1409),” p. 325.
\textsuperscript{48} Jacopino et. al., “Catalogue of documents,” p. 93 (doc. 11).
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., p. 103 (doc. 50).
\textsuperscript{50} Ferrer i Mallol, “Una Flotta catalana contro I corsari nel Levante (1406-1409),” p. 345.
\textsuperscript{52} Balletto, Liber Oficii Provisionis Romante, pp. 82-3 (doc. 67, dated 7 Apr. 1425).
\textsuperscript{53} Gian Giacomo Musso, “Armamento e navigazione a Genova tra il tre e il quattrocento (appunti e documenti),” in Guerra e commercio nell'evoluzione della marina genovese tra XV e XVII secolo, (Genoa: Centro per la storia della tecnica in Italia del Consiglio nazionale delle ricerche, 1973), vol. II, p. 28 fn. 66, dated 26 Oct. 1389: “serenissimo principe et domino Basica Bey
Genoese notary recorded another agreement between the Genoese and the Ottomans regarding the copper mines of Kastamonu. Ottoman subjects were involved in this trade. At the end of 1403, Cagi Mustafa, an Ottoman subject of Bursa, delivered to Elia, a Jew of Chios, payment for thirteen crates of mastic. In 1404 on Chios, Michele Lomellino entrusted to ship captain Paolo Lercaro 3000 cantari of alum to transport to Flanders. He also sold to the captain himself another 1000 cantari of alum, to be delivered to Kalloni on Mytilene.

From the fragments preserved in the documents, a deep and sophisticated commercial network emerges. Elia was part of a commercial venture in Sicily with Tommaso Paterio and four others. Tommaso Paterio is attested in numerous Genoese notarial documents of Chios. He held ten of the twenty-four shares of the ship of Guiraldo di Pareto, and his brother Bernardo owned a twelfth of the maona of Chios. Tommaso was also recorded in a commenda contract in which he delivered 500 ducats to Antonio Ardimento de Bartolomeo, Antonio to receive a third of the profit. In 1405, he sold to ship captain Tommaso Squarciafico two loads of alum in exchange for an equivalent amount of oil and 3000 gold ducats. This alum was bound for Flanders, via Gaeta, Provence, and Catalonia. In the same year, Pietro Ntono of Savona leased his ship to Tommaso Paterio, Giovanni de Castelliono, and Barnaba de Pagana. They had a load of 500 cantari of cotton.

Jhalabi magno Amurato Amuratorum Turchie.”

54 Ibid, “potentis domini Solimani basa turchi domini Castamumi.”
55 Toniolo, Notai Genovesi in Oltremare: Atti Rogati a Chio da Gregorio Panissario, p. 105 (doc. 48, dated 31 Dec. 1403); p. 106 (doc. 49 same date).
56 Ibid., p. 126 (doc. 76, dated 24 Mar. 1404). The measure is specified as minuto of Mytilene.
58 Ibid., p. 130 (doc. 69, dated 24 Mar. 1404).
59 Ibid., p. 150 (doc. 92, dated 3 June 1404).
60 Ibid., p. 200-1 (doc. 133, dated 10 March 1405).
61 Ibid., p. 202-3 (doc. 152, dated 4 April 1405). See also pp. 203-5 (doc. 135 same date).
and gall nuts, to transport to Rhodes, Cadiz, and Southampton. This long-distance trade originating in the Levantine colonies was an important aspect of the evolution of capitalism.

Some Genoese merchants worked only the European Atlantic route. In 1445, the ship of Stefano Doria departed Maiorca for England and Flanders, transporting slaves, dates, and sulfur. But the Genoese were essential cogs in the entire route between Flanders and the eastern Mediterranean. For instance, on 7 June 1445, the ship of Filippo de Nigrono departed Southampton. After stopping at Cadiz, Malaga, and Sicily, the ship arrived at Chios on 8 November. In a three-years window from 1445 to 1448, many voyages are recorded between Chios, Southampton, and Flanders. The most common route included stops at Maiorca, Malaga, Cadiz, London, and Bruges. Many of these ships carried only alum, and in others the merchandise included slaves, saffron, dates, wool, cotton, almonds, mastic, all manner of spice, lead, copper, porcelain, rugs, wine, and sugar. Many voyages originated at Alexandria.

The captains and merchants generally belonged to the established alberghi, the kinship-based clans of the Genoese mercantile elite: Giustiniani, Gentile, Doria, Marini, and others. The manifest for the ship of Nicolo Gentile on the Chios-Southampton route survives. This ship was loaded with 11,200 cantari of alum, divided among at least fifteen merchants, among them Francesco Drapperio,
a merchant of Pera with interests in the alum mines of Phocaea who stayed after the Ottoman conquest (see appendix C). The entire cargo was directed to Spain, to be delivered to Antonio Bochardus, Paolo Doria, Oliverio and Gaspare Giustiniani, and Donaino de Marini.68 These names are critical in tracking capital movement between the eastern and western Mediterranean, and in a comparison of Genoese capital movement at a time of expanding Ottoman imperial power.

I.2. The Evolution of the Rule of Law

Before attempting to suppress piracy outright, governments attempted to limit and regulate it. The Genoese colonial administration developed a blend of techniques, including regulating and institutionalizing commerce, imposing fines on officials, and granting the right of reprisal. This development was characterized by a constant tension between center and periphery, between the government and the governed, between institutions and officials, and between the public good and private profit.

Documents from Narbonne condemning piracy date back to the early twelfth century.69 In the 1131 treaty between Genoa and Narbonne, in exchange for damages suffered by Genoese merchants from piracy, Narbonne granted reduced customs duties to the Genoese.70 In the thirteenth century, in response to Genoese piracy, Narbonne imposed new taxes on the Genoese and threatened to cancel all treaties.71

68 Ibid., p. 15.
70 Ibid., p. 33.
71 Ibid., p. 37.
In the early fourteenth century Genoa set up the *officium mercantie* (mercantile office) and the *officium Gazarie* (office of Gazaria, or Crimea) to regulate navigation and commerce from the Crimea to Flanders.\(^72\) The earliest legislation distinguished three zones in the east: Romania (the Black Sea region), Syria and Cyprus, and the African coast from Alexandria to Tunis.\(^73\) These offices decreed that ships plying the eastern trade had to be ready for war, and supervised the building of galleys in Liguria, Famagusta, and the Black Sea.\(^74\) Foreigners were prohibited aboard Genoese galleys, so that they could not observe Genoese seafaring techniques and routes.\(^75\) In Genoa and in the colonies, officials had to post bond of 1000 lire to prevent their negligence towards or collusion in piracy. The profits, however, were potentially much greater than this bond.\(^76\) The podesta of Pera had to post security of 1000 lire for every galley departing from Constantinople or Pera, to ensure that the rules of navigation were respected.\(^77\) Ships bound for Armenia and Cyprus were exempt from this requirement, but ships entering the Black Sea had to post an additional bond of 500 *hyperpyra*.\(^78\) The first extant mention of the *Officium Provisionis Romanie* dates to 1377, but its origins are unclear. It may have originally been a part of the office of Gazaria, which administered Genoese Crimea, or perhaps it was instituted during

\(^72\) Mario Buongiorno, *L'amministrazione Genovese nella Romania* (Genoa: Fratelli Bozzi, 1977), pp. 3-5 and 22.
\(^73\) Ibid., p. 45.
\(^76\) Ibid., p. 7.
\(^77\) Ibid., p. 13.
\(^78\) Ibid., p. 14.
the Chioggia war with Venice.\textsuperscript{79} Whatever the case, this office gained steadily in
importance into the early fifteenth century.\textsuperscript{80} At the end of the fourteenth century,
the offices of provision and the mint were created.\textsuperscript{81} The office of Gazaria required
the scribe of each ship to compose a comprehensive list of all merchants aboard.

The local mercantile office of Pera had the right to know (whether via the office of
Gazaria or from the ship owners themselves) the names of all merchants aboard
ships.\textsuperscript{82} Ship captains also had to guarantee that no debtors or criminals were
aboard.\textsuperscript{83} In the early fifteenth century, Genoese officials were prohibited from
traveling on Catalan and Castilian ships; in order to prevent collusion between
Genoese officials and Catalan merchants; and ordinary sailors could not disembark
at Pera and Famagusta as they could at Valencia, Cadiz, or Naples.\textsuperscript{84} Such an
oppressive requirement illustrates the great possibilities of the eastern colonies for
individual Genoese, and also illustrates the difficulties of governing these colonies.

The Signoria often punished Genoese for acts of piracy. On 9 October
1399, the Genoese Signoria condemned Sologro Di Negro and his partners, who
captured the ship and merchandise of Guglielmo Bernardo of Valencia, in violation
of the peace with Aragon.\textsuperscript{85} In 1425 or 1426, the podesta of Pera refused or
revoked a safe-conduct for Nicolo di Casale, against whom the Venetians had
complained.\textsuperscript{86} In early 1425, the Genoese colonies in Syria and Egypt had written

\textsuperscript{79} Balletto, \textit{Liber Oficii Provisionis Romanie}, pp. viii and xxii-xxiii.
\textsuperscript{80} Ibid., p. xi.
\textsuperscript{81} Buongiorno, \textit{L'amministrazione Genovese nella Romania}, p. 19.
\textsuperscript{82} Ibid., pp. 20-1.
\textsuperscript{83} Ibid., pp. 21-2.
\textsuperscript{84} Ibid., p. 14.
\textsuperscript{85} Jacopino et. al., “Catalogue of documents,” p. 97 (doc. 27).
\textsuperscript{86} Belgrano, \textit{Prima serie di documenti riguardanti la colonia di Pera}, p. 189 (doc. lxiv, dated 31
Jan. 1426); Balletto, \textit{Liber Oficii Provisionis Romanie}, pp. 61-2 (doc. 48) instead says 1425.
to Genoa to complain that the lord of Mytilene, or armed ships around Mytilene, were attacking Muslim shipping. The Genoese in Alexandria were suffering the consequences. 87 The Egyptian fleet retaliated in the waters of Cyprus, capturing Genoese merchants and taking their cargo. 88 The king of Cyprus himself was captured by the Mamluks. 89 In early 1427 in the wake of the Egyptian victory at Cyprus, the Signoria appointed a group of Genoese nobles to administer safety measures: Corrado Gentile, Cattaneo de Camila, Bartolomeo Doria, Cattaneo de Cataneis. 90

Franco Lomellini was consul of Caffa in 1431 and 1432. Informed by the consul of Soldaia of a Venetian shipwreck, Lomellini ordered the ships plundered and the treasure deposited in the treasury of Caffa. The Venetians retaliated on Genoese galleys in Crimean waters, and the Signoria ordered Lomellini to send the proceeds of the plunder to Genoa. Lomellini did not, and was fined fifty sommi. 91 On 30 May 1435 at Rhodes, Benedetto Doria acquired a ship captured in Rhodes by the Catalan Stefano Enterez from Angelo Giovanni Lomellini, who would be the podesta of Pera when the Ottomans took Constantinople. Doria stipulated that, should the Signoria order restitution to the original owner, he would refuse. 92 On 10 December 1436, Enrico Franck, representative of a society of German merchants, asked San Giorgio for the restitution of goods aboard a ship bound for Catalonia, which was captured by Genoese ships. 93 The response of San Giorgio is unknown.

87 Balletto, Liber Oficii Provisionis Romanie, pp. 74-5 (doc. 60, dated 12 Feb. 1425).
89 Ibid., p. 240 (doc. 213, dated 1 Feb. 1427).
93 Ibid., p. 96 (doc. 21).
On 19 January 1447, a Genoese court found in favor of Catalan merchants who had accused Genoese contractors of violating the peace.  

On the other hand, the Genoese administration often officially sanctioned piracy against a particular target. In 1348, the podesta of Pera passed sentence on two citizens of Ancona, who apparently owed 1953 gold florins and three grossi to two Genoese burghers. If payment was not forthcoming, then reprisals would be permitted upon the property of anyone from Ancona. In late 1426, the right of reprisal was conceded to Tommaso Docto, burgher of Caffa, who was acting as legal representative of Genoese citizen and merchant of Sinop Tommaso Carrega son of Bartolomeo. The Signoria acknowledged that this could provoke war, and stressed that this decision should be approved by forty of the leading citizens of Caffa. The Genoese claimed right of reprisal against Stephen, prince of Wallachia, who had confiscated property of the Giustiniani allegedly worth 4,500 ducats; against king Alexander I of Georgia (r. 1412-1442) and against Sinop and the Greek empire of Trebizond (Trabzon). Twice in 1447, Genoese merchants obtained the right of reprisal. The same Tommaso Carrega, was allegedly arrested in Sinop and plundered, and Genoa ordered Caffa to carry out the appropriate reprisal against Sinop, but also to observe the peace terms. The same instructions were sent to Pera. It is possible that Tommaso Carrega was twice plundered by pirates, but it is also possible that he profited from a spurious right of reprisal.

94 Ibid., p. 95 (doc. 16).
95 Belgrano, Seconda serie di documenti riguardanti la colonia di Pera, p. 936 (doc. iii, dated 12 Dec. 1348).
96 Balletto, Liber Oficii Provisionis Romanie, pp. 221-2 (doc. 197, dated 4 Dec. 1426). See also doc. 41.
Soon after, Antonio Adorno and Ansaldo Doria obtained in Caffa the right of reprisal against the inhabitants of Simisso.\(^99\) In 1448, the Genoese Signoria informed the podesta of Pera that Genoese citizens had the right of retaliation against the king of Poland and his subjects.\(^100\)

Grants of legal retaliation became more rare as the position of the Genoese Levantine colonies grew more precarious, and the available archival documents attest to the Genoese diplomacy to avoid provoking the Ottomans and Tatars. For instance, in 1423, the Ottomans in Samsun confiscated the property of a Genoese merchant who had died there, and the Genoese did not demand restitution, but rather gave the heirs a salaried position.\(^101\) The Genoese rarely utilized the right of reprisal after 1420, but were themselves often the victims of piracy. In the early 1430s, Nicolo Ratoni transported five slaves from Caffa to Pera. He attempted to avoid the Venetians, but near Pera an Ottoman, Musa Bey, took the slaves from him. At Gallipoli in 1449, the Ottomans confiscated twelve slaves from a single Ligurian merchant.\(^102\) When Genoese merchants plundered Ottoman property at Moncastro, the Ottomans retaliated against a Genoese merchant in Gallipoli, Luca Saccherio, who asked for the right of reprisal. He was denied.\(^103\) Yet these attempts to placate the Ottomans and rein in private initiative were insufficient to hold the Genoese colonial administration together. The dynamic tensions between center and periphery, between the government and the governed, between institutions and officials, and between the public good and private profit began to disintegrate.

\(^99\) Ibid., pp. 76-7 (doc. 62, dated 1 Mar. 1425).
\(^100\) Belgrano, *Prima serie di documenti riguardanti la colonia di Pera*, p. 211 (doc. cxxviii).
\(^102\) Ibid., p. 40.
\(^103\) Ibid., p. 39.
I.3. Breakdown in the Rule of Law

While Genoa itself was swallowed up by the French monarchy and the duchy of Milan, the Genoese aristocracy had hijacked the machinery of government. Individual Genoese often controlled Genoese finances, served other governments, reneged on their debts to the massaria (government treasury), and even plundered their fellow Genoese on the high seas. In a treaty between the Genoa and Constantinople in 1155, the Byzantine administration conceded that Genoese and Ligurians were subject only to their own consul, and another treaty of 1304 stipulated that the Genoese were not prohibited from relations with other sovereigns. In 1291, Nicolo Doria was head of the mint of the empire of Trebizond, and in 1314 the Genoese nobles Gavino De Mari and Sorleone Spinola were in Genoa as ambassadors of Alexios II, emperor of Trebizond (r. 1297-1330). A noble of Florence, Michele Alighieri, fulfilled the same function just before Trebizond fell to the Ottomans. While acting as ambassadors of the empire of Trebizond, both Doria and Alighieri were involved in the commerce of Trebizond, Caffa, and Sinop.

Pietro Maria of Savona had served the Ottomans in a war against Pera and other Genoese colonies, but in 1399 the Genoese thought his services valuable enough to pardon him. In February 1424, Genoa reprimanded the administration

105 Ibid., p. 590 .
106 Ibid., p. 591.
107 Ibid., p. 592.
108 Belgrano, Prima serie di documenti riguardanti la colonia di Pera, p. 179 (doc. xliv, dated 14
of Pera for its lack of diligence in investigating Genoese in the pay of the Byzantine emperor.\textsuperscript{109} Two months later came another reprimand from Genoa to any Genoese involved with Murad II, the Ottoman sultan.\textsuperscript{110} Someone from the Genoese administration of Pera had proposed to Murad that he donate 300 gold hyperpyra with which the Genoese would construct in Pera a tower bearing an Ottoman emblem. News of this filtered back to Genoa, and a letter was sent to Pera to reprimand the instigators and to warn of the provocation this would constitute. Genoa ordered that this letter be registered in the acts of the curia, so that such foolishness would not be repeated.\textsuperscript{111} Yet the ability of the center to impose its will on the periphery was decreasing.

Supplying the eastern colonies with grain was a constant preoccupation of the Genoese colonial administration, but a business opportunity for individual Genoese merchants and captains. During the blockade of Constantinople by the Ottoman sultan Beyazid I in the late fourteenth century, several Genoese officials of Pera had colluded with the Byzantine emperor to sell grain at famine prices.\textsuperscript{112} Caffa suffered at least three famines in this period: 1394-95, 1420-21, and 1455-56.\textsuperscript{113} In the early fifteenth century, the Genoese authorities of Caffa consistently prohibited the export of provisions to ensure the colony's food supply, and Genoese merchants consistently flouted the ban.\textsuperscript{114} The consul of Caffa and the four members of the \textit{Officium victualium} (office of food procurement) attempted to

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{109} Ibid., p. 185 (doc. lvii, dated 1 Feb. 1424).
\item \textsuperscript{110} Ibid., p. 187 (doc. lix, dated 15 Apr. 1424).
\item \textsuperscript{111} Balletto, \textit{Liber Oficii Provisionis Romanie}, pp. 31-2 (doc. 25, dated 15 Apr. 1424).
\item \textsuperscript{112} Necipoğlu, \textit{Byzantium between the Ottomans and the Latins}, pp. 159-160.
\item \textsuperscript{113} Karpov, "New Documents," p. 38.
\item \textsuperscript{114} Origone, “L'Amministrazione Genovese a Caffa nel Secolo XV,” pp. 237-315.
\end{itemize}
enforce the ban with fines and imprisonment. The price of grain was set by the authorities, for merchants could sell the grain elsewhere at higher prices. This interaction highlights a pattern of private profit at the public expense.

On 5 September 1422, the administration of Caffa ordered Bartolomeo Doria, Urbano de Nigro, Niccolino Grimaldi, and the family of Gregorio de Marini to send within three days to Giovanni Adorno and Gabriele Usodimare, official deputies of the administration, all provisions in their storehouses, which they had acquired despite the prohibition of the consul. There is no record of the result, but it was almost a ritual to defy the authorities and to break contracts to procure grain. The authorities themselves were often involved, either directly or through family members.

The famine during the consulate of Manfredo Sauli (1420-21) further illustrates the increasingly irreconcilable interests of center and periphery. Manfredo sent out expeditions in the Black Sea to procure grain. One captain, Giovanni di Santo Donato, had agreed to sail to Coppa, but instead sailed to Trebizond, and apparently returned without grain, or did not return at all. Sauli fined the captain 100 sommi, but his examiners later found fault with this decision.

Also during his term as consul, a Tatar fled to Caffa and converted to Christianity. The treaty between Caffa and the Golden Horde stipulated that each side return any runaway slave, but in this case he seems to have been a free man. Manfredo nevertheless handed the runaway to the khan, as the alternative would

115 Ibid., p. 243 (doc. 3).
have endangered Genoese commerce. For this he was fined heavily when he returned to Genoa.\textsuperscript{117}

Manfredo appears to have fiddled government accounts, and himself reneged on his debt to the \textit{massaria}. Pietro Montenigro's deceased brother Pietro Giovanni was a creditor to the \textit{massaria} of Caffa, yet Manfredo refused to settle the debt. Montenigro appealed to the Signoria, which on 30 January 1426 ordered payment.\textsuperscript{118} Yet Manfredo himself was heavily in debt to the \textit{massaria} of Caffa. Two years before, on 14 February 1424, the Signoria instructed Caffa to write off the debt of Percivalle Centurione, who had stood surety for Manfredo Sauli and now owed the \textit{massaria} 22,000 aspers.\textsuperscript{119} On 13 March 1424, the Signoria again intervened on behalf of Pellegrino de Prementorio, who had also pledged surety for Manfredo Sauli and now owed the \textit{massaria} of Caffa 16,000 aspers.\textsuperscript{120} Pellegrino de Prementorio and Percivalle Centurione had stood surety for the same loan, and another letter on the same day stipulated that the compensation could not exceed twenty soldi per lire or more than they pledged security for.\textsuperscript{121} This stipulation implies that more was happening here than mere debt forgiveness, and hints at a back story in which guarantors might profit at the public expense when a loan went bad.

On 29 January 1428, the administration of Caffa lent to the merchant Toma Dotto 300 \textit{moggi}, or 1200 \textit{quarte}, of millet, in exchange for which he

\textsuperscript{119} Ibid., pp. 12-3 (doc. 5, dated 14 Feb. 1424).
\textsuperscript{120} Ibid., pp. 28-9 (doc. 22, dated 13 Mar. 1424).
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid., pp. 29-30 (doc. 23, dated 13 Mar. 1424).
promised to repay 450 moggi, or 1800 quarte; he pledged also to sell the millet
given to him at under fifteen aspers per capicio.\textsuperscript{122} This transaction illuminates the
peculiar position of the Genoese government of Caffa: on the one hand, charging
its contractor an extortionate rate of interest, and on the other, attempting to
prevent this contractor from price-gouging.

In April 1436 the administration of Caffa again prohibiting the resale of
grain,\textsuperscript{123} and that same month prohibited export of any provisions.\textsuperscript{124} In May came
another prohibition of exports, whether by foreign or Genoese merchants. Ship
captains and all who embarked on any ship were to post surety to guarantee their
compliance.\textsuperscript{125} Combined with the high grain prices this year,\textsuperscript{126} it seems a
reasonable conclusion that government decrees were becoming less and less
effective. The authorities soon took to commandeering ships in port. In late 1440,
they ordered a Greek from Trebizond, whose ship was moored at Caffa, to unload
all his wheat, millet, barley, and other provisions to be sold in Caffa at a price
equivalent to that of Trebizond.\textsuperscript{127}

Attempts by Genoa to reform colonial administration were sometimes
counterproductive. On 13 March 1426, it was announced to all eastern colonies
that the duke of Milan had made Domenico de Mari commissioner of the colonies
with judicial powers to punish corruption. The letter contains dark references to

\textsuperscript{122} Origone, “L’Amministrazione Genovese a Caffa nel Secolo XV.” p. 290 (doc. 87). In a similar
transaction in 1440, Simone di Levanto acquired 150 moggi of millet from the government, to
be stored in the tower of Sant’Antonio, in exchange for which he pledged to pay, for every 100
moggi, 142 moggi of millet from the country of the Tatars or elsewhere. Paolo Gentile and his
partner stood as guarantor (Ibid., pp. 292-3 (doc. 90, dated 20 Apr. 1440)).
\textsuperscript{123} Ibid., pp. 308-9 (doc. 116, dated 16 Apr. 1436).
\textsuperscript{124} Ibid., p. 309 (doc. 117, dated 28 Apr. 1436).
\textsuperscript{125} Ibid., p. 310 (doc. 118, dated 7 May 1436).
\textsuperscript{126} Ibid., pp. 310-1 (doc. 119).
\textsuperscript{127} Ibid., p. 288 (doc. 84, dated 15 Nov. 1440).
negligence on the part of local officials, who were not punishing those who acted against the interests of Genoa. Yet the commissioner seems to have become part of the problem. On 18 January 1427, the Signoria ordered Pera to revoke all civil acts of Domenico de Mari, with the exception of the case of fifteen shares of Nicolo de Porta. The Signoria received a complaint from burgher of Caffa Battista de Gentile, who claimed that Domenico de Mari had extorted money from him, then bought a share of the Caffa compera. In September, Genoa ordered Caffa to confiscate this share. Battista de Gentile had been imprisoned by Domenico de Mari. In exchange for his release, Gentile had been compelled to deliver to Leonardo Spinola a quantity of silk, which the Signoria ordered Spinola to return. Partisans of Spinola now protested to the Signoria.

There is evidence that some Genoese subjects in the colonies preferred local courts to those of Genoa, as their business partners would render justice better than a distant and exploitative government. For example, on 19 February 1405, the aforementioned Jewish merchant Elia nominated legal representatives from the Giustiniani clan, charging them to obtain from Genoa the right to be tried on Chios rather than in Genoa, to defend himself against Federico Vivaldi and his son Vivaldino, and to recover what was owed him from them and others.

Yet there is also much evidence of colonial officials overexploiting the populace. In 1425, upon news that many Greeks and Armenians planned to move

129 Ibid., pp. 213-4 (doc. 190).
130 Ibid., pp. 293-4 (doc. 264, dated 1 Sept. 1427).
from Caffa, the Signoria ordered Caffa to compel them to stay. The Greeks and Armenians had to pledge surety, to be forfeited if they left without permission.\(^{133}\) The Signoria lamented the miscarriage of justice at Pera by Genoese officials, and exhorted the the local burghers to root out corruption.\(^{134}\) Lodisio di Pineto had obtained from the podesta of Pera a favorable sentence in a case against the Armenian Sava (or Sana), and apparently the miscarriage of justice was so gross that even Genoese officials of Pera complained to Genoa. As a result, many Armenians were attempting to leave Pera, and the Signoria instructed the podesta to prevent this.\(^{135}\) In 1427, Greek, Armenian, and Latin burghers of Famagusta had complained to Genoa of the exploitation of the Genoese administration, and the Signoria pleaded with the officials of Famagusta to keep these burghers on side.\(^{136}\) The complaints of citizens and burghers continued to flood into Genoa, that the administration of Famagusta was corrupted and the monetary policy was in shambles.\(^{137}\) The available archival documents show a steady deterioration in Genoese colonial administration, despite an awareness of the problem and concerted attempts to eliminate corruption.

Moreover, the Genoese in the colonies sometimes circumvented or invented central directives by forging official seals. For instance, on 14 November 1426, in a letter to Caffa regarding Samastri and relations with Trebizond, Genoa reminded the government of Caffa to heed only letters bearing the seal of the

---

134 Ibid., pp. 190-2, dated 16 Oct. 1427.
137 Ibid., pp. 201-2 (doc. 180), dated 13 Nov. 1427.)
Less than two weeks later, another letter to Caffa contained the reminder that designations to office must carry the official seal.\textsuperscript{139} The following year, documents bearing the seal of the officium provisionis Romanie proved false, and Cipriano de Cambiasio and Pietro Giovanni Lecavello obtained office under false pretences.\textsuperscript{140} In late 1427, Genoa again ordered Caffa to disregard any communication not bearing official seal, and the same order was sent to Pera and Famagusta, but not to Chios.\textsuperscript{141} These repeated attempts to remedy the abuse only illustrate its pervasiveness.

Perhaps the most important aspect of the breakdown of the rule of law is the conflict of interest between the Genoese mercantile and financial elite and the colonial administration. A select group of Genoese clans lent to the emperors of Trebizond, used their status as officials and ambassadors to profit at the expense of their own government, married into the royal family of Trabzon and received titles of nobility from them, and also served as admirals of the fleet of Trebizond. In 1382, Genoese lending to the Greeks of Trebizond is recorded.\textsuperscript{142} In 1418, the Genoese imposed a war indemnity of almost a million aspers on Trebizond. It was paid ahead of schedule.\textsuperscript{143} On 28 January 1425, Genoa wrote to the emperor of Trebizond, claiming that, contrary to the terms of peace, he was not providing funds for the reconstruction of the Genoese castle at Trebizond, and had not yet

\textsuperscript{138} Ibid., pp. 214-5 (doc. 191).
\textsuperscript{139} Ibid., pp. 217 (doc. 193, dated 16 Nov. 1426).
\textsuperscript{140} Ibid., pp. 278-9 (doc. 250, dated 20 May 1427).
\textsuperscript{141} Ibid., pp. 326 (doc. 293, dated 22 Dec. 1427).
\textsuperscript{143} Ibid.; see also Anthony Bryer and Heath Lowry, eds. Continuity and Change in Late Byzantine and Early Ottoman Society (Birmingham, UK and Washington D.C.: University of Birmingham and Dumbarton Oaks, 1986), pp. 63 and 92-3.
paid what he owed to Caffa. The letter warned of consequences, but the emperor seems to have ignored it, for Genoa repeated the demand and warning on 21 November of the same year.\(^{144}\)

The Di Negro family had been active in the Black Sea since the thirteenth century. Members of the family had been partners with the Zaccaria brothers, acted as consuls, and concluded treaties with the emperors of Trebizond.\(^{145}\)

Brothers Urban and Gerolamo Di Negro show up in the registers of the *massaria* of Caffa from 1421-26. In 1421, Gerolamo and his partners were appointed to bring a gift valued at 100 ducats to the Ottoman ambassador at Simisso (Samsun), recently conquered by the Ottomans. From 1424 to 1426, Urbano Di Negro was resident at Caffa, and he represented Gerolamo in an attempt to obtain 24,000 aspers from the *massaria* for damages caused by subjects of Trebizond. His claim rested on a pledge of emperor Alexios IV (r. 1417-1429) to Caffa, to reimburse any Genoese for damages suffered by his subjects.\(^{146}\)

In 1427 or shortly before, the son of the emperor of Trebizond was apparently welcomed with honors at Caffa, and the Genoese Signoria warned the the officials of Caffa to to take great care to maintain the peace with Trebizond.\(^{147}\)

In 1428, still acting as Gerolamo’s representative, Urbano requested from the Genoese commune the salary of the deceased Vani Monleone, who had been appointed consul of Trebizond but died on the way. Gerolamo had lent him 10,000 aspers of Trebizond, and Monleone had pledged property as surety for the loan.

\(^{146}\) Ibid., p. 595.
\(^{147}\) Balletto, *Liber Oificii Provisionis Romanie*, pp. 197-8 (doc. 177, dated 9 Nov. 1427).
According to Genoese law, the heirs of an official who died thus were entitled to half the salary, on condition that the official made it past Naples before expiring. The result of the case has not survived.

At least two Genoese captains served as admirals to the empire of Trebizond. Domenico de Alegro served as admiral of the fleet of Trebizond. In 1425, he captured a Greek ship bound for Simisso and carrying Venetian cargo. The ship was towed to Caffa and the merchandise unloaded. Soon thereafter, Venice lodged a complaint with Genoa against the seizure of a Greek ship on the pretext of reprisal against Simisso, conducted by Domenico de Alegro. Venice demanded that either the Venetian cargo be returned or Domenico de Alegro or his guarantors pay the equivalent. In a related incident, a Venetian in Samastri (Amasra) was robbed of 100 cantari of lead on the pretext of war with Simisso, and the Genoese Signoria ordered the consul of Samastri to restitute the cargo or pay the equivalent. There is no evidence that the colonial administration had the will or the ability to reign Domenico in. In 1429, he received honors from a pretender to the throne of Trebizond, yet also kept the goodwill of the emperor, demonstrating the value of Genoese financial, naval, and mercenary expertise.

In 1437, a group of merchants of Pera rented a ship from Merualdo Spinola, citizen of Caffa. The ship docked at Trebizond and proceeded to Vati (Batumi), then controlled by Trebizond. Gerolamo Urbano was then the admiral of the fleet of the empire of Trebizond, and he confiscated the ship for some probably

149 Balletto, Liber Officii Provisionis Romanie, pp. 77-9 (doc. 63, dated 2 Mar. 1425).
150 Ibid., pp. 79-80 (doc. 64, dated 2 Mar. 1425).
specious infraction on the order of John IV.\textsuperscript{152} He arrested Merualdo Spinola and confiscated the merchandise, and the ship ran into rocks and sunk. The merchants appealed to the consul of Caffa, who protested to the emperor. Antonio Spinola opened legal proceedings in Genoa, demanding reprisals against emperor. Genoa then turned the matter over to Pera.\textsuperscript{153} The issue dragged on until 1470, when a suit was brought against Teodoro, son of the now-deceased Gerolamo.\textsuperscript{154} Teodoro argued that his father had been a noble and subject of the emperor of Trebizond at the time, and that he had died in Trebizond, so Genoese authority did not extend to him.\textsuperscript{155} This argument was accepted by the Genoese commune.\textsuperscript{156}

Urbano was the intermediary between Trebizond and Genoa in 1438, in the conflict between Greek emperor Alexios and his son John IV (r. 1429-1459). Alexios was the son-in-law of the Genoese lord of Mytilene, Dorino I Gattilusio, and had bestowed on Gerolamo a title of nobility.\textsuperscript{157} He had attempted to enroll the Genoese colonies of Mytilene, Pera, and Caffa against his brother.\textsuperscript{158} Urbano played a key role in Genoese diplomacy, prevailing upon Genoa to prohibit any meddling by the colonies in the dynastic struggles of Trebizond.\textsuperscript{159} In 1441, Urbano was a tax contractor in Caffa with his partners Paolo Gentile and Simone di Levanto, administering two imposts.\textsuperscript{160} He and his partners had paid 80,000 aspers for a new drichtus on the commerce of Trebizond, conceded to them for five years.

\textsuperscript{152} Karpov, “New Documents,” p. 39.
\textsuperscript{153} Karpov, “Una famiglia nobile del mondo coloniale genovese,” p. 598.
\textsuperscript{154} Ibid., p. 590.
\textsuperscript{155} Ibid., p. 600.
\textsuperscript{156} Ibid., p. 601.
\textsuperscript{157} Ibid., pp. 595-6.
\textsuperscript{158} Ibid., p. 596.
\textsuperscript{159} Ibid., p. 597.
\textsuperscript{160} Ibid.
and nine months. The other impost was a *cabella*, an eleven percent wine duty, which apparently took in 173,922 aspers.\textsuperscript{161} In 1443, Genoa appointed him consul of the Genoese colony at Trebizond, and he also served at Trebizond's ambassador to Florence, Milan, and Genoa itself. In 1444, he entered the service of the duke of Milan, and contracted massive debts to the *massaria* of Caffa from 1445 to 1459.\textsuperscript{162}

In 1444, the podesta of Pera, Boroele Grimaldi, joined a hunting party which left Constantinople for Thrace. Many Venetian and Genoese nobles were in the company, as well as Ciriaco of Ancona. It seems that Genoa had helped the armies of Ottoman Sultan Murad II to cross the Bosphorus that same year.\textsuperscript{163} When Murad set out from Magnesia (Manisa) two years later, Ciriaco and Francesco Drapperio accompanied him beyond Pergamum (modern Bergama), then the Italians proceeded to New Phocaea, where Drapperio was involved in the alum trade.\textsuperscript{164} In the final siege of Constantinople by the armies of Mehmed II, the main Italian source, the Venetian chronicler Barbaro, castigated the Genoese at every opportunity.\textsuperscript{165} He charged that the podesta of Pera had revealed battle plans to Mehmed, and other sources tend to agree that the Genoese had been in communication with the sultan. Yet the Genoese general Giustiniani was at the heart of the defense of Constantinople, and the Genoese at Pera stood to lose their exorbitant privileges if the Greek emperors fell. The Genoese merchants traded

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[Ibid.]
\item[Ibid., p. 593.]
\item[164] Setton,*The Papacy and the Levant*, vol. II, p. 95
\item[165] Ibid., p. 119.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
with the Ottomans by day and with Venice by night, bringing information back and forth.\textsuperscript{166}

To sum up, throughout the first half of the fifteenth century, the messy boundary between commerce and piracy characterized the economic networks of the Mediterranean and Black Sea. Though commerce and piracy became more regulated, laws and institutions were often evaded or even used by the Genoese mercantile elite to continue to profit at the public expense. The breakdown in the rule of law in the Levantine colonies coincided with the submission of Genoa to larger European powers, and also coincided with the rise of the Ottoman Empire. The commercial networks of the the Mediterranean and Black Sea, and the movement of capital from the Genoese Levantine colonies to the western Mediterranean and the European Atlantic, must be understood in this context.

\textsuperscript{166} Fleet, \textit{European and Islamic Trade in the Early Ottoman State}, pp. 10-12.
Chapter II

The Genoese of Pera-Galata after the Conquest: Correspondence between the 1455 Ottoman Tahrir and the Genoese Notarial Records

After the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 1453, the Genoese never regained the privileges they had enjoyed under Byzantine emperors, yet many Genoese continued to live in Pera, or Galata as it became known. Galata quickly became the Ottoman entrepot for foreign trade. At least until 1472, the Genoese, both foreign merchants and dhimmi Ottoman subjects, were the majority in Galata.\(^{167}\) In the Ottoman system, non-Muslim subjects were generally known as dhimmi, paying a poll-tax in exchange for rights and recognition. In Galata, they had lower customs duties than foreigners had – two percent instead of four percent.\(^{168}\) Moreover, consortia of Greek, Muslim, Jewish, and Italian financiers acted as Ottoman tax-farmers; not only dhimmi subjects, but foreign merchants resident in Galata were often involved.\(^{169}\)

This chapter is divided into three parts: first, I sketch the context of the Ottoman and Genoese sources; second, I review the analysis of Halil İnalcık; and

\(^{168}\) Ibid., p. 287.
third, I present new findings and connections between the Ottoman tahrir of 1455 and the Genoese notarial records.

**II.1. The Context of the Ottoman and Genoese sources**

The 1455 tahrir register has recently been published by Halil İnalcık. A photocopy of the tahrir was given to him by the late Bekir Sıtkı Baykal. The original is gone missing, except for the part relating to state-owned houses held by the imperial treasury. The photocopy lacks some districts of Constantinople and Pera-Galata. The extant document has many gaps, and was divided into two parts, Galata and the city itself. Galata's residents became dhimmi subjects, and foreign merchants were not subject to the poll-tax. They were often noted as Frenk from Europe (Frengistan), the register often specifying whether they were Sakızlı (Genoese from Chios, or Gum-Island in Turkish, referring to the mastic industry there), Drabizonlu (from the Genoese colony at Trebizond, or Trabzon), Genoese (Cenevi, Djeneviz) or Venetians (Venedik). The register details who was subject to the poll-tax, and which houses had been confiscated for the imperial treasury to rent out. Dhimmi status was given not just to the Genoese residents of Galata, but also to the Greeks, Armenians, and Jews there. The Genoese, however, were not given millet status, unlike the Armenians and Greeks, because as Roman Catholics they were seen as complicit in the popes' hostility towards the Ottomans.

---


172 Ibid., p. 286. Millet means literally nation – in the Ottoman empire, a separate legal court under which various confessional communities (Muslims, Christians, and Jews) administered themselves. İlber Ortaylı, Son İmparatorluk Osmanlı (Istanbul: Timtaş Yayınları, 2006), pp. 87–89.
and towards Muslims in general.

The *tahrir* catalogues the residents and owners of the houses of Galata. Armenians, Greeks, Jews, Italians, and Muslims are noted. Occupations are sometimes mentioned, and if a person is non-Muslim, then tax status is mentioned: either subject to the poll tax or exempt from it, in which case this person is registered as a foreign merchant. Wealth is also recorded, on a scale of poor, middling, and rich. If an owner abandoned the property, then the survey records whether the property was confiscated for the treasury and rented out. The survey records whether the property was abandoned before or after the conquest it is often marked. In some cases, a widow continued in ownership of a property.

The 1455 *tahrir* has not yet been utilized to analyze Genoese-Ottoman relations, and has not yet been subjected to a thorough comparative study with the Genoese sources. Genoese notarial records are particularly abundant for the fifteenth century. 173 These documents deal with private commercial transactions of every description, as well as partnership agreements, investments, contracts of labor and apprenticeship, testimonies, and wills. The vast majority of the notarial documents of the fifteenth century are unpublished. Among those whose output has been partially published, Lorenzo de Calvi is attested in Pera in July 1450 and in September 1452. He fled to Chios after the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople on the ship of Giovanni Giustiniani Longo, and he was back in Pera a few months later, in July 1453, for a short time. In 1454, he refused the office of scribe for the curia of Caffa, and in 1457 he accepted office of scribe of the *massaria* of Caffa for a term of one year, to begin 1 September 1458. He was condemned for

fraudulent registration in June 1464, and was on Chios from 1470-1. He was still alive in Genoa in 1482. Another notary active in Pera was Domenico de Alsario di Lorenzo, often cited as de Algario. He was the scribe of Caffa curia from 1466-9, and was reelected to this office for a period of 26 months in July 1470. He was in Pera from 1476-1490, where he figures as the scribe in a controversy between the notary Nicola di Torriglia and Nicola's nephew Giovanni di Onzo. He was among the survivors of a shipwreck in the port of Carpi on 29 November 1469.

Another important notary in the colonies was Antonio di Torriglia, son of Giovanni, documented at Pera, Chios, and Caffa. He was active in Genoa until 1447, after which he resided in the Levant for more than a decade. He was active especially at Caffa, where he served as scribe of the curia and of the mercantile office. His cousin Nicola di Torriglia and Emmanuele Granello were also scribes and business partners. Another important notary is Bernardo De Ferrari, who drew up documents at Constantinople in 1442 as scribe of the consul of the Ancona merchant community. From 1443-7 he was active as a curial scribe in Pera. He transferred to Chios in 1450 and was active there until at least 1464, both on his own account and as scribe of the curia of the podesta. He was involved in the commerce of copper and perhaps also in that of slaves for the Genoese market.

Nicola di Torriglia is attested in many notarial deeds drawn up in Pera after 1475. He may have been active in Pera as early as 1451, and he was in the office of

174 Ibid., p. 8.
175 Ibid., p. 9.
176 Ibid.
177 Ibid., p. 10.
the chancellor in the months before the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople. In late 1453 and early 1454 he is attested on Chios, and then to Caffa as the scribe of the curia. From 1459-66 he resided at Caffa, active in his official capacity while trading on his own account. He served as scribe of the curia two years, then scribe of massaria for a year. In 1472, he became the head of the treasury. He was accused of prolonging disputes and of opposing the Greek bishop, and the directors in Genoa received many complaints regarding his behavior. He was deported from Caffa to Istanbul when the Ottomans conquered, and in Pera he lodged a long series of legal actions against his nephew Giovanni di Onzo. In 1480 he went to Chios. The acts mostly record trades, but also testimonies, compromises, loans, inventories, manumissions, sales of slaves, grain, and ships, sentences, and receipt of payments. Many of the Genoese merchants mentioned in these documents were members of the alberghi, which had formed over the course of the fourteenth century: Spinola, Franchi, Giustiniani, Grimaldi,Gattilusio, and to a lesser extent Salvago, Negro, Gentile, Lomellini, Doria, Adorno, Vivaldi, and Pallavicino.

Except in rare cases, it is difficult to definitively identify people mentioned in both Ottoman and Italian sources. Even in the case of the agreement between Mehmed II and the Genoese colony of Pera on 30 May 1453, whose Greek and Ottoman versions are extant, the mangling of names illustrates the difficulty. From the Greek version, the names of the Genoese envoys are transliterated Babilano Pallavicino, Marchesio de Franchi, and the dragoman Pagliuzzi; while from the

178 Ibid.
179 Ibid., p. 34.
Ottoman Turkish version, the names of the same envoys are transliterated Babilan Parvazin, Markese de Franko, and the dragoman Nikoroz Papuco. In the customs registers from Caffa published by İnalcık and Ostapchuk, only the first names of Italian merchants are generally recorded, sometimes followed by their fathers' names.

II.2. The Analysis of Halil İnalcık

İnalcık has tentatively linked a few Genoese named in the 1455 register with the Italian sources. Franceşko, referred to as a tax farmer in the 1455 tahrir, is likely Francesco de Draperiis or Draperio, a resident of Galata who was a tax farmer of alum mines under Murad II, and who became a dhimmi in Galata. In 1455, he accompanied the Ottoman fleet to Chios, and the Ottoman admiral demanded of the maona forty thousand ducats owed to Francesco for alum delivered to Chios. Many Genoese viewed Francesco as a traitor, and the debt may have been spurious. The tahrir records at least six houses owned by Franceşko the tax farmer. Some of these houses were unoccupied, but in one lived his men and a Venetian named Dimitri, exempt from the poll tax. Draperio was probably not his name, but rather his profession. In the tahrir, two quarters of Galata bear

185 İnalcık, The Survey of Istanbul 1455, pp. 224, 228, 230, and 240.
186 Vigna, Codice Diplomatico delle Colonie Tauro-Liguri 6, p. 221; Origone, Chio nel Tempo della Caduta di Costantinopoli, p. 53.
this name (Quarter Dhraperyo\textsuperscript{187} and Quarter Zani Drapora).\textsuperscript{188} The \textit{dhimmi} Zani Drapora (probably Gianni or Giovanni of the Draperi clan) owned a ruined house in Galata,\textsuperscript{189} and another house of Zani Portoma Drapora (possibly the same person) belonged to him and his two brothers Marko and Daryo (Marco and Dario).\textsuperscript{190} According to the \textit{tahrir}, this Drapora fled during the conquest, thereby forfeiting his share of the property, while his brothers resided here at the time of the survey.\textsuperscript{191} A house and three shops of Tomamiso were confiscated, presumably because he moved back to Genoa. One of the shops was rented for 150 Ottoman aspers per year to a rich Genoese exempt from the poll tax, Anton Drtori.\textsuperscript{192} This may be an Antonio Draperi.

The Langascos family crops up both in the 1455 \textit{tahrir} and in Genoese notarial documents. Andjelo di Lankashko is almost certainly Angelo di Langasco, and the \textit{tahrir} records him as a rich \textit{dhimmi} in Galata who owned at least four houses. Two were unoccupied, and at least one of these was in ruins;\textsuperscript{193} his mother and his slave lived in a third house, and a widowed \textit{dhimmi} named Ulyana lived in another.\textsuperscript{194} Just before the conquest, Angelo had loaned 100 hyperpyra to Inofio Pinello in Pera.\textsuperscript{195} He must have fled to Chios during the conquest, for he was there nominated legal representative of Marola, presumed widow of Micali Apacsi, on

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{187} İnalçık, \textit{The Survey of Istanbul 1455}, p. 239.
\item \textsuperscript{188} İnalçık gives Drapero or Drapezo, and \textit{Drapez} is the Greek term for mansion. Ibid., p. 471.
\item \textsuperscript{189} Ibid., p. 224.
\item \textsuperscript{190} Ibid., p. 250.
\item \textsuperscript{191} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{192} Ibid., p. 231.
\item \textsuperscript{193} Ibid., pp. 220, 226.
\item \textsuperscript{194} Ibid., pp. 222, 226.
\end{itemize}
condition that her husband was in fact dead. She must have escaped aboard a ship that slipped through the Ottoman blockade, leaving her husband to an unknown fate. In August of that year, just after the conquest, Angelo di Langasco is again attested in Galata. Along with Antonio de Carmadino, he became the legal representative in Pera of Raffaele Vigerio, taking over the mandate from Lorenzo Gattellusio.

The *tahrir* names one of the quarters of Galata after Pero di Lankaşko, likely Pietro di Langasco. A Pero di Lankaşko owned at least two houses in Galata, and a *dhimmi* named Piyer di Lakaşko owned another house, in which lived a blind widow named Marça, who was exempt from the poll tax. Pero and Piyer might be the same person, but it is also possible that there was more than one Pero or Pietro Langasco. In the quarter of Pero di Lankaşko, an unoccupied house is registered to Pero di Langaşko and his son Anton. A Pietro di Langasco is attested at Pera in 1444, standing as guarantor for a Genoese citizen, Francesco di Levanto, who purchased grain on credit from a Greek resident of Constantinople. Other members of the Langasco family are recorded in the *tahrir*. Maryadi Lankaşko was a widowed *dhimmi*, and Zani di Lankaşko (likely Gianni or Giovanni), a rich *dhimmi*, owned an unoccupied house. Another rich

199 Ibid., pp. 245, 272.
200 Ibid., p. 225.
201 Ibid., p. 272.
204 Ibid., p. 223.
A dhimmi named Luviz di Lankaško (likely Louis or Luigi) owned two houses in Galata, both unoccupied.\textsuperscript{205} Dimitri di Lankaško and his family fled during the conquest, and his house was confiscated and rented out by the Ottoman treasury.\textsuperscript{206} Most of the notarial deeds for fifteenth-century Pera have not yet been published, and further study is necessary to track these names.

Anton Gara was recorded in the delegation to Mehmed II in 1451 in Edirne, and appears as a dhimmi in Galata in 1455. In the quarter of Zani Dabdan, Anton Gara owned two houses.\textsuperscript{207} He owned another house in the Nikoroz Sikay quarter,\textsuperscript{208} and another in the Bona Zita quarter.\textsuperscript{209} The dhimmi Anton di Laštrego is mentioned in the tahrir as owner of an unoccupied house, and is found in Genoese notarial records as Antonio de Lastrego, blacksmith.\textsuperscript{210} Domeno di Bogamo had owned a house in Galata, but the house was confiscated. The tahrir records him as resident of Caffa.\textsuperscript{211} This is almost certainly Domenico di Bergamo, a burgher of Pera attested here after the conquest. On 25 August 1453, he declared that he had received from Giovanni di Semino di Matteo, Genoese citizen, 2578 Ottoman aspers for three barrels of caviar, and committed to restitute the sum within four months.\textsuperscript{212}

\textsuperscript{205} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{206} Ibid., p. 250.
\textsuperscript{207} Ibid., p. 219.
\textsuperscript{208} Ibid., p. 223.
\textsuperscript{209} Ibid., p. 226.
\textsuperscript{211} İnalcik, The Survey of Istanbul 1455, p. 266.
\textsuperscript{212} Roccatagliata, Notai Genovesi in Oltremare: Atti Rogati a Pera e Mitilene, vol. I, pp. 146-7 (doc. 59).
II.3. New Findings and Connections

Traces of the Genoese envoy Babilano Pallavicino and Tommaso Spinola surface in the following year on Chios, where they both are named in proceedings related to a will. Babilano is also attested in Pera in 1432 as a debtor of Emmanuele Cattaneo. In the quarter Zani Drapora, Marya Maryana, a widowed dhimmi, owned at least three houses. She could be the widow of one of the De Marini clan, attested at Caffa and Genoa (see Appendix D). Pagani, a dhimmi classified as poor, also lived in this quarter. With him lived two other men classified as exempt from the poll tax, and therefore likely foreign merchants. The name Pagana crops up repeatedly in the Genoese documents. At Galata on 6 June 1475, Argentina, daughter of deceased Silvestro De Franchi di Pagana, transferred legal representation from her husband to another man. In December of that year, the Benedictine Placido di Poggio, prior of the monastery of Santa Maria della Misericordia de Sisarna in Pera, and the monks Giorgio di Pagana and Bernardo di Camogli, nominated as their legal representative Cristoforo di Canevale, to settle disputes at Pera and Constantinople.

In the Dhraperyo quarter, Thoma, a rich dhimmi and the son-in-law of Franceşko, lived in the house of a certain Zorzi (likely Giorgio), brother of Luviz of Kanya or Fanya. This Francesco is likely the tax farmer of the Draperio clan,
as the Ottoman scribes rarely recorded such a relationship in the 1455 tahrir. Francesco Draperio's daughter had married into the Spinola family,\(^{219}\) and therefore Thoma could be Tommaso Spinola. The Spinola clan was one of the most powerful in Genoa and its colonies, and it is likely that the names Ispindora, Ispinora, Ispirtora, Ispitora, and Spinora in the 1455 register all refer to the name Spinola. In the Asuder Ermeniyan quarter, Toma Ispindora had a house. He left prior to the conquest, and his house was confiscated. At least two families inhabited this dwelling in 1455: an unnamed rich dhimmi with four sons, and Franceşko Dusteniya with his sons, paying an annual rent of 350 Ottomans aspers.\(^{220}\) It is possible this Toma Ispindora is the same Thoma married to the daughter of Francesco Draperio.

In 1443 in Pera, a Tommaso Spinola is attested as one of the arbiters in a dispute between a Greek and an Italian over a sale of slaves.\(^{221}\) Just before the conquest in March 1453, Tommaso Spinola son of Gaspare is attested at Pera. He was the legal representative of Giovanni Ieragi, citizen of Rhodes, and transferred his mandate to the merchant Simone di Levanto, a Genoese citizen and resident of Caffa.\(^{222}\) This Tommaso fled to Chios during the conquest, for he is attested there in numerous documents from June 1453 through March 1454. He became legal representative of Guirardo Spinola on 16 June 1453.\(^{223}\) He was involved in prolonged legal disputes on Chios regarding his banking activities in Pera. In

\(^{222}\) Ibid., p. 106 (doc. 33, dated 2 Mar. 1453 at Pera).
\(^{223}\) Roccatagliata, Notai Genovesi in Oltremare: Atti Rogati a Chio, pp. 8-10 (doc. 5).
December 1453, he and Andrea Campofregoso nominated two arbiters to resolve a dispute. One of the arbiters was Antonio Spinola.\textsuperscript{224} A Spinola acting as arbiter in a dispute in which one of the parties was also a Spinola may have constituted a conflict of interest, yet they could not reach a decision, and nominated a third arbiter.\textsuperscript{225} In January the arbiters reached a decision,\textsuperscript{226} and Andrea Campofregoso promised to pay Tommaso Spinola 408 hyperpyra and 5 carati of Pera within two years.\textsuperscript{227} In turn, Tommaso promised to pay Andrea Campofregoso forty-eight hyperpyra and five carati, interest from a bill of exchange, and also to pay seventy-four hyperpyra and twenty-two carati, the balance of a debt of 1113 hyperpyra and two carati.\textsuperscript{228}

The bill of exchange, third-party insurance, and public finance either originated in Genoa or else spread from here.\textsuperscript{229} The bill of exchange was used to evade the church ban on usury. Italian merchants used the bill of exchange, a promissory note between two parties for a coin payment within a few months. The owner of the bill often used it as currency, signing it over to a merchant. During its short life, a bill of exchange passed through many hands, accumulating a list of names. At the end of the few months, the current holder presented the bill for coin payment from the issuer. If the issuer reneged, he was immediately bankrupt, and responsibility for payment passed to the next, and possibly through the list of people, each bankrupt if unable to pay. These bills facilitated a complex

\textsuperscript{224} Ibid., p. 101 (doc. 64, dated 28 Dec. 1453).
\textsuperscript{225} Ibid., pp. 121-2 (doc. 76, dated 9 Jan. 1454).
\textsuperscript{226} Ibid., pp. 136-42 (doc. 85, dated 22 Jan. 1454).
\textsuperscript{227} Ibid., pp. 151-3 (doc. 91, dated 25 Jan. 1454).
\textsuperscript{228} Ibid., pp. 159-61 (doc. 95, dated 29 Jan. 1454).
international trade, and merchant fairs by the sixteenth century had become clearing houses, where bills of exchange from all over Europe were settled.\textsuperscript{230}

As mentioned above, Tommaso Spinola is attested on Chios in February 1454 in the proceedings of a will. That same month, he paid the dowry of Caterina, daughter of Raffaele Cassina, who was marrying spice merchant Cosma di Ovada de Elianis. Tommaso paid 828 silver hyperpyra of Perato Cosma, and also 175 silver hyperpyra to Cosma’s brother Adornino for the purchase of land in Caffa.\textsuperscript{231} Adornino then recognized his debt to Tommaso of sixty-nine gold ducats of Chios to pay in three installments.\textsuperscript{232} In another document, Tommaso produced a witness in a dispute with Bartolomeo Portunario, former scribe of the bank of the Spinola in Pera. The witness Giovanni di Sarzana testified that Bartolomeo was registered as a creditor and debtor of the bank.\textsuperscript{233} Another witness produced by Tommaso, Lorenzo Spinola son of Damiano, had procured credit for the bank in Pera, and declared that Bartolomeo had demanded of Tommaso 160 hyperpyra for a debt of 119 hyperpyra.\textsuperscript{234} The background of this story is unclear, but Tommaso likely suffered heavy losses in the conquest. Further documents corroborate this. Tommaso and his son-in-law Napoleone Vivaldi nominated as legal representatives Pasquale Pinello, Giacomo Spinola, and Barnaba Grimaldi, in order to recover 2000 hyperpyra paid at Pera for two bills of exchange drawn on Genoa. The bills


\textsuperscript{232} Ibid., pp. 174-6 (doc. 104, dated 5 Feb. 1454).

\textsuperscript{233} Ibid., pp. 171-3 (doc. 102, dated 5 Feb. 1454).

\textsuperscript{234} Ibid., pp. 173-4 (doc. 103, dated 5 Feb. 1454).
appear to have been cashed by Pietro di Gravago, Inofio Pinello, Andrea Campofregoso, and Egidio de Carmadino. Another bill of exchange drawn on Genoa for 1050 hyperpyra was paid out in Pera by Napoleone to Antonio Garra, Cristiforo Palavicino, Luciano de Gaieno and Guirardo Spinola. In March, Tommaso nominated Luca Cattaneo as legal representative to recuperate 633 hyperpyra and eight carati from a bill of exchange drawn on Barnaba Centurione but not paid to Dario Vivaldi in Genoa.

Several other members of the Spinola clan are mentioned in the 1455 register. Rich dhimmi Pero Spinora had left before the conquest to return to Italy (Frengistan), but his wife continued to reside in the house and pay the poll tax. This Pero may be Pietro Spinola, whose ship in 1460 the directors of San Giorgio commandeered in the port of Genoa. Passage through the Bosphorus had become so dangerous that ship-owners refused to go, and the government took to commandeering ships. The tahrir also records that Brabka Ispinora (perhaps Barnaba), a Frenk, before the conquest owned nine adjacent shops now confiscated by the Ottoman treasury. Among those renting these shops was a Karlo Konfroti, who is almost certainly Carlo Confortino, attested in Galata after the conquest. In July 1453 he borrowed 1000 hyperpyra from Benedetti Salvaigo, to be

237 Inalcik, The Survey of Istanbul 1455, p. 266.
239 Inalcik, The Survey of Istanbul 1455, pp. 252-3. The text seems to say that the shops were at the time in the possession of the podesta (bedostan). Perhaps a portion of the shops’ income was in the podesta’s gift. Whatever the case, this is likely the origin of the Ottoman term bedestan, or covered bazaar.
repaid upon request.\textsuperscript{241}

A house in Galata is registered to Dorya Ispinora (likely Dario), who left during the conquest and then returned and registered as a *dhimmi*. When he left again, the house was confiscated. In 1455, a paralyzed widow exempt from the poll tax resided in this house.\textsuperscript{242} The house of Irena Ispitora, who also left during the conquest, was likewise confiscated.\textsuperscript{243} Lorenc Ispirtora (likely Lorenzo), likewise registered as owner of a house in Galata, fled during the conquest, and then returned but refused *dhimmi* status. He left again and the house was confiscated.\textsuperscript{244}

As noted above, Lorenzo Spinola was attested on Chios in 1454. The documents also place him on Chios in October 1453, lending in silver hyperpyra of Pera.\textsuperscript{245} Lorenzo owned a ship that ended up with Giovanni di Onzo, nephew of Nicolo di Torriglia. A document stemming from the prolonged dispute between Giovanni and Nicolo, issued on 17 August 1479 at Pera, notes that Lorenzo was deceased.\textsuperscript{246}

A large house, perhaps three houses together, belonged to Anton Ispinora (Antonio). According to the *tahrir*, it was confiscated when he left during the conquest.\textsuperscript{247} As noted above, Antonio is well attested after the conquest on Chios, where he acted as arbiter in Tommaso Spinola’s dispute. He also acted as arbiter in a prolonged dispute between Giovanni Caneta and Aron Maiavello. This complicated dispute casts light on life in Genoese Pera immediately before the

\textsuperscript{242} İnalçık, *The Survey of Istanbul 1455*, p. 250.
\textsuperscript{243} Ibid., p. 274.
\textsuperscript{244} Ibid., p. 272.
conquest. On Chios in August 1453, the office of the podesta ordered Giovanni Sacco to deliver to Raffaele Vegerio a sky-blue velvet dress. Vegerio claimed to have bought the dress from Michele Natono in Pera before the conquest. Sacco disputed Vegerio's claim, and Giovanni Caneta appeared to testify in support of Vegerio. Caneta declared that Vegerio had given six and a half _vegete_ of wine to Natono in exchange for the dress, and that Natono had apparently sold this wine after the conquest. Francesco Forche, another witness for Raffaele Vegerio, confirmed Caneta's version and declared that he had learned from Vegerio and Natono of the exchange of this dress for around six _vegete_ of wine.²⁴⁸

Vegerio in November brought a case against Caneta, to recover a debt of 280 hyperpyra for the load of wine.²⁴⁹ Unpublished documents may illuminate the result, but the published documents jump ahead to 20 December, when Antonio Spinola and Ambrogio De Franchi de Burgaro, the two arbiters in a dispute between Caneta and Aron Maiavello, heard testimony. Antonio di Petra declared that his friend Battista Drago had bought barrels and salt for Maiavello in Pera, and also confirmed Maiavello's investment in a shipment of salted fish.²⁵⁰ Giovanni di Crovara, a witness produced by Caneta, declared that he had heard of the participation of Maiavello only in the shipping venture of Caneta but that Maiavello did not participate in the shipment of fish. Apparently the fish were conserved in Maiavello's storeroom in Pera, and at least some of the _vegete_ of wine in question went missing from this storeroom.²⁵¹

²⁴⁹ Ibid., pp. 62-63 (doc. 40, dated 14 Nov. 1453).
²⁵⁰ Ibid., pp. 87-8 (doc. 54, dated 20 Dec. 1453).
²⁵¹ Ibid., p. 89 (doc. 55, dated 20 Dec. 1453).
Geronimo Italiano, a witness produced by Caneta, declared that he had learned that Maiavello had a stake in the ship and also in the shipment of fish, although the extent of this stake was unclear.\textsuperscript{252} Giovanni Sacco confirmed this testimony.\textsuperscript{253} Battista Drago, a witness produced by Caneta, declared that he had acquired barrels and salt for Maiavello and that he delivered this merchandise to the men of the ship of Caneta.\textsuperscript{254} Francesco Forcherio, another witness produced by Caneta, confirmed Maiavello's participation. This is likely the same Francesco Forche who testified for Raffaele Vegerio in August. In any case, he claimed that Maiavello had a two-ninths stake in Caneta's ship and a stake of one-third in Caneta's fish shipment. He also claimed that a woman who was in debt to Maiavello had delivered to Caneta a load of fish for Maiavello.\textsuperscript{255} Maiavello now called Francesco Forcherio as his own witness, and Forcherio declared that Caneta owed Maiavello an unclear sum of money.\textsuperscript{256}

Antonio Spinola and Ambrogio De Franchi de Burgaro heard more testimony two days later. Tommaso di Capriata, a witness produced by Maiavello, described events in Pera after the conquest. He lived in Maiavello's house in Pera, and Caneta and Forcherio lived here too. He denounced a series of fraudulent dealings.\textsuperscript{257} A few days later, Pietro Iofeto, a witness produced by Caneta, declared that he sold to Caneta empty barrels, without reducing from the price the sum that he owed to Maiavello.\textsuperscript{258} The following day, Costa Alopagi, a witness produced by

\textsuperscript{252} Ibid., pp. 89-90 (doc. 56, dated 20 Dec. 1453).
\textsuperscript{253} Ibid., pp. 90-1 (doc. 57, dated 20 Dec. 1453).
\textsuperscript{254} Ibid., p. 91 (doc. 58, dated 20 Dec. 1453).
\textsuperscript{255} Ibid., pp. 92-3 (doc. 59, dated 20 Dec. 1453).
\textsuperscript{256} Ibid., pp. 93-4 (doc. 60).
\textsuperscript{257} Ibid., pp. 95-8 (doc. 61, dated 22 Dec. 1453).
\textsuperscript{258} Ibid., pp. 98-9 (doc. 62, dated 27 Dec. 1453).
Maiavello, declared that he delivered to Caneta on the order of Maiavello a load of fish valued at six hyperpyra, to partially pay off a debt.\textsuperscript{259} On 31 December, Adam Cangio, a witness produced by Caneta, declared that Maiavello had been worried for the fate of the ship, moored at Pera, and for the load of fish, threatened by the Ottoman bombardment.\textsuperscript{260} The published sources do not disclose the result, but unpublished documents in the Genoese archives will likely augment the fragments of these legal proceedings.

The \textit{tahrir} mentions Domenigo Iskarsafigo, a poor \textit{dhimmi}, as a house-owner, and states that he and his wife departed during the conquest.\textsuperscript{261} It also mentions the two houses owned by Berthoma Iskarsifico, a poor \textit{dhimmi}. In the first house lived his mother Varna, a widowed \textit{dhimmi}, and a man named Andriya, who was classified as poor and exempt from the poll tax. In the second house lived Marto, a widowed \textit{dhimmi}.\textsuperscript{262} The family name is almost certainly Squarsafico, well attested at Pera, Chios, and Caffa. In the published documents there is no mention of Bartolomeo or Domenico Squarsafico. Though the two are classified as poor in the Ottoman sources, they own real estate, and they may surface in the Genoese archives. In 1454, an Andrea Squarciafico was given the right to assume the consulship of Caffa.\textsuperscript{263} An Acellino Squarciafico was also elected to the government of Caffa, but he may have declined the appointment.\textsuperscript{264}

In a deed drawn up in Galata on 26 June 1480, Luchino Squarsafico, a

\textsuperscript{259} Ibid., p. 99 (doc. 63, dated 28 Dec. 1453).
\textsuperscript{260} Ibid., p. 101 (doc. 65, dated 31 Dec. 1453).
\textsuperscript{261} İnalçık, \textit{The Survey of Istanbul 1455}, p. 223.
\textsuperscript{262} Ibid., p. 225.
\textsuperscript{263} Vigna, \textit{Codice Diplomatico delle Colonie Tauro-Liguri} 6, p. 15.
\textsuperscript{264} Ibid., p. 688.
former burgher of Caffa, appears as a witness in the prolonged disputes of Nicola di Torriglia.\textsuperscript{265} From another deed drawn up at Galata in 1490, Luciano's wife's lineage shows the interconnections between the Genoese Levantine colonies. Her name is Primofiore, her father was Demetrio de Telicha, and her aunt was Theodoroca de Telicha, former inhabitant of Soldaia. Primofiore was widow of Giovanni Battista Campofregoso. The deed states that her paternal grandfather had ceded rights against debtors in exchange for the payment of a dowry of 400 sommi of silver (Caffa measurements). The deed also relieves Nicola di Torriglia of debts to Theodoroca, except for 150 Genoese lire to be paid in three installments by 1 January 1492. The mother of Primofiore, Catimyhia, daughter of deceased Geronimo de Alegro and widow of Dimitri, renounces all rights against the debtors of the deceased Theodoroca.\textsuperscript{266}

A series of documents from Galata regarding the inheritance claims of the Squarsafico family mention Luciano, his deceased mother Dominigina daughter of Luca di San Francesco, and his maternal grandmother Giovannina daughter of Angelo di Montenero;\textsuperscript{267} also mentioned is Serafina, widow of Bartolomeo di Sant'Ambroglio, whose mother Giovannina was Luciano's grandmother.\textsuperscript{268} This act was drawn up in Istanbul itself, not in Galata. This makes sense, as many among the Genoese community of Caffa were settled near Edirnekapi in 1475. Lorenzo Squarsafico son of Giuliano was the brother of Luciano, for he too claimed a share

\textsuperscript{266} Ibid., pp. 273-8 (doc. 124, dated 1 Feb. 1490).
\textsuperscript{267} Ibid., pp. 261-4 (doc. 120, dated 1 Mar. 1482 at Pera),
\textsuperscript{268} Ibid., pp. 264-7 (doc. 121, dated 6 Apr. 1482 at Constantinople).
of the estate of his mother Dominigina and of her mother Giovannina.\textsuperscript{269}

The \textit{tahrir} records several people living in the home of Anton di Festacon, a rich \textit{dhimmi}. I am unable to connect Festacon with an Italian name or occupation mentioned in the Genoese notarial records. In this house lived Markez di Franko, a rich \textit{dhimmi}; his brother Lujad; Kriba or Friba Saraveyko; Yani Knori; Domeno and Zani Pasere; and three rich Genoese merchants exempt from the poll tax: Akosten Larka, Corma Masura, and Cormo di Frank.\textsuperscript{270} Markez di Franko, mentioned above in the embassy to Mehmed II immediately after the conquest, may simply be the podesta Angelo Lomellino, whom the Ottomans called Lord of the Franks.\textsuperscript{271} Akosten Larka is almost certainly Agostino Lercari, who is absent from the published Genoese documents. The Lercari were a noble clan active in Genoese administration and commerce throughout the Levantine colonies. Antonio Lercari served as consul of Caffa immediately after the conquest of Constantinople, and was later investigated for corruption.\textsuperscript{272} At the end of May 1454, Giovanni Lercari commanded a convoy of seven ships that left Chios for Genoa.\textsuperscript{273} In September that year, Acellino Lercari left Caffa to try to run the Ottoman blockade of the Bosphorus. Many citizens and merchants left with him.\textsuperscript{274} Gherardo Lercari at least twice served as consul of Trabzon before the city fell to the Ottomans in 1462.\textsuperscript{275} In December 1475 in Galata, Nicola di Torriglia

\textsuperscript{269} Ibid., pp. 267-71 (doc. 122, dated 21 Nov. 1482 at Pera).
\textsuperscript{270} İnalçık, \textit{The Survey of Istanbul 1455}, p. 219.
\textsuperscript{271} Belgrano, \textit{Prima serie di documenti riguardanti la colonia di Pera}, pp. 226 (doc. cxviii, dated 30 May 1453); and 227.
\textsuperscript{275} Ibid., p. 722 (doc. cccxxxviii); p. 833 (doc. cccci, dated 13 April).
nominated as his legal representative Goffredo Lercario, a Genoese citizen, to look after his business interests in Chios and elsewhere.  

The *tahrir* records a house of Domeniko di Franko, a middling *dhimmi*. This was likely one of the Di Franchi clan, another common Genoese name in the colonies. Andriya di Koro owned two houses, and left with his family during the conquest. He soon returned, but when the poll tax was imposed, he abandoned the city again and his properties were confiscated. One of the houses was rented by Korna, a merchant exempt from the poll tax. He paid an annual rent of five gold pieces. In the quarter of Anton di Garzon was the house of Zorzo (likely Giorgio). He was from Ancona, and old and paralyzed. Anton Draga, extremely elderly, owned two houses and was exempt from the poll tax. In one of his houses lived Marina, a widow and exempt from the poll tax. Zani Mesina is recorded as the owner of two houses. He could be named Gianni or Giovanni from Messina, on the straits between Sicily and mainland Italy. He was enslaved after the conquest and paid a ransom, then left for Italy (Frengistan). His properties were confiscated.

Many people from Trabzon and Caffa are recorded in the *tahrir*. Yorgi from Trabzon, a poor *dhimmi*, owned a house, in which lived his son-in-law Mihal and Luca, a rich “Frenk”, both exempt from the poll tax. Andriya of Trabzon...

owned several houses,²⁸³ and several more from Trabzon are recorded in Galata.²⁸⁴ Pero di Femegaște (Famagusta) owned a house in Galata, but a Frenk named Domeniko Nefetro had contested his ownership before the conquest.²⁸⁵ The name also crops up as Domenigo di Neferto, and he owned many properties here.²⁸⁶

In sum, the 1455 tahrir offers a valuable counterpoint to the Genoese sources. In contrast to the Christian perspective, both contemporary and later, the tahrir reveals much continuity between Genoese Pera and Ottoman Galata. Continuing İnalcık’s research, I have found the Spinola and Squarciafico clans listed throughout the tahrir of 1455, as well as a host of minor names. Much more work is needed to link the names in the tahrir with those in the Genoese sources. On the Genoese side, the extant notarial records and government accounts books of Caffa, Trabzon, Chios, and Famagusta have not yet been systematically exploited. On the Ottoman side, the tahrir of 1477 is a valuable source for the fall of Genoese Caffa in 1475, as many Genoese and Armenians were exiled to Istanbul and were recorded in this survey.²⁸⁷

In a letter dated 29 October 1454 to Battista Goastavino at Pera, the Genoese merchant Giovanni da Pontremoli expressed surprise that Battista was still there.²⁸⁸ On 30 January 1455, he wrote again to Battista Goastavino in Pera to urge him to return to Genoa.²⁸⁹ Western historiography has tended in this direction, ignoring that many Genoese found it well worth their while to remain after the

²⁸³ Ibid., pp. 244-5.
²⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 242.
²⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 243.
²⁸⁶ Ibid., pp. 258-61.
²⁸⁹ Ibid., pp. 38-9.
Ottoman conquest. In following up lines of inquiry indicated by a comparative study of the Ottoman and Genoese documents, the flaws in this historiography may be excised.
Chapter III

Economic Networks after the Conquest and the Disintegration of Genoese Colonial Administration

Just as the Latin conquest of Constantinople in 1204 gave the Italians a monopoly on the Black Sea trade, the Ottoman conquest in 1453 shut the Italians out. The surviving Genoese Levantine colonies struggled on under heavy tribute and increasing internal disarray, and the commune of Genoa ceded control of the Black Sea colonies to San Giorgio. The directors of San Giorgio immediately set about strengthening the fortifications these colonies and reforming their administration, but now to get to the Black Sea, the Genoese had to run the gauntlet of Rumeli Hisarı, the Ottoman castle at the narrowest point of the Bosphorus, involving great risk and expense. Some Genoese officials and couriers bound for Caffa now passed through Hungary and down the Danube. In 1455 one of the consuls-elect, Damiano Leone, went to Caffa overland, while his two colleagues went by sea. He arrived two months before the others.290

Capital flows from the Genoese Levantine colonies were overwhelmingly private, while public money flowed east to defend the colonies. Thus, an analysis of change and continuity in economic networks through the fifteenth century must take into account the disintegration of Genoese colonial administration. This

chapter has three parts: first, I examine change and continuity in economic networks after the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople; second, I note the repatriation of holy relics from the churches of Pera back to Genoa in 1461, after the Ottomans took Trebizond; and third, I analyze the disintegration of Genoese colonial administration.

III.1. Change and Continuity in Economic Networks

Just before the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople, the Catalans had taken the Genoese ship Squarzafica. The cargo was plundered, including the merchandise of a Genoese merchant, Luchino Fatinanti, insured by Baldassarre Adorno: textiles worth 625 ducats; a pound of pepper worth 200 ducats; two cases of sugar worth 80 ducats; two pounds of pepper and a case of cinnamon together worth 250 ducats; eighty-five caratelli of cotton worth 700 ducats; six pounds of pepper worth 550 ducats; and four bags of indigo worth 120 ducats.²⁹¹ Adorno had insured the merchandise on 6 March 1453, and the case was still being heard on Chios in June 1455.²⁹² Tommaso de Fornari was acting as the legal representative of Luchino Fatinanti, and perhaps Tommaso had acquired all or part of the rights to the insurance money.

Tommaso de Fornari is attested in the letters of Genoese merchant Giovanni da Pontremoli. The two were business partners, and Giovanni's letters in the six years after the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople give an indication of both change and continuity in economic networks. Among 166 of Giovanni's

²⁹¹ Origone, Chio nel Tempo della Caduta di Costantinopoli, p. 23.
²⁹² Ibid., p. 20-1.
extant letters, fifty-six are to north Africa, twenty-three to Corsica, twenty to Chios, and eighteen to Sicily. Only four are to Caffa, and two to Pera.  

He noted the rising Genoese investments in the south and in the Iberian peninsula, a trend accelerated by the Ottoman conquest. Yet he still believed there was money to be made in the eastern colonies.

On 6 July 1453, Giovanni wrote to Tommaso de Fornari on Chios, lamenting the taking of Pera and the capture of the ship of Squarzafrica by the Catalans. They had most likely invested heavily in its cargo. Giovanni had no news of Stefano de Pinu, his brother-in-law at Pera, whom he had loaned 3500 lire.

Stefano had fled to Chios, where Giovanni wrote to him on 30 October 1453, informing him of a sale of ermine and asking that the money be reinvested in pepper or other merchandise. On the same day he wrote again to Tommaso de Fornari on Chios, asking that proceeds from the sale of textiles be sent to Genoa via bill of exchange or that it be reinvested in pepper and cotton. Giovanni also informed Tommaso of an expedition carrying four bales of textiles from Genoa to Chios.

On 8 December 1453, Giovanni wrote again to Stefano on Chios, praising San Giorgio's assumption of power in Caffa, and declaring the acquisition of silk in Caffa or Chios a good investment. On the same day, he wrote to Nicola de Tacio on Chios. Stefano had apparently gone to Caffa, sometime between the Ottoman

294 Ibid., xxi.
295 Ibid., xxii-xxvi.
296 Ibid., p. 3.
297 Ibid., pp. 6-9.
298 Ibid., pp. 9-11.
299 Ibid., pp. 11-14.
conquest of Constantinople and the time of writing; and Nicolo was on his way there. On 1 April 1454, Giovanni wrote to Tommaso de Fornari on Chios, asking that 839 ducats and three *gigliati* be sent to Genoa via bill of exchange or else be reinvested.\(^{300}\) On 25 October 1454, he wrote again to Tommaso on Chios. He had received on 30 August Tommaso’s letter dated 1 June, and expressed doubt whether this letter would reach Tommaso on Chios. Stefano had returned to Genoa, and apparently Tommaso was also heading back, for Giovanni exhorted him to liquidate all holdings before departure and informed him that he had not sent more cloth from Genoa due to insecure passage.\(^{301}\)

On 8 November 1454, Giovanni again wrote to Tommaso on Chios, recommending that he send the proceeds of textile sales to Genoa via bill of exchange. Giovanni was still sending textiles east, and mentioned forty or fifty pieces of cloth in the letter.\(^{302}\) A few days later, he again wrote to Tommaso on Chios, saying that he had received Tommaso’s letter of 6 August. Giovanni was still waiting for the bill of exchange, and transit time between Genoa and Chios seems to have stretched to three months.\(^{303}\) A letter dated 12 November 1454 to Francesco de Promontorio on Chios contains more evidence of goods coming east.\(^{304}\) On 30 January 1455, he again wrote to Francesco on Chios, telling him to sell what Tommaso de Fornari had left him, and informing him that in Genoa the price of spices, cotton, and wax had risen.\(^{305}\)

\(^{300}\) Ibid., pp. 17-8.
\(^{301}\) Ibid., pp. 25-7.
\(^{302}\) Ibid., pp. 31-2.
\(^{303}\) Ibid., pp. 32-3, dated 12 Nov. 1454.
\(^{304}\) Ibid., p. 33.
\(^{305}\) Ibid., pp. 36-7 (doc. 25).
On 25 June 1455, Giovanni wrote at least four letters to Chios. The first was to Luciano de Rocha, in which he asked for the market conditions there before sending fifty pieces of cloth to exchange for silk. Giovanni mentioned that cloth was scarce in Genoa and the price had risen; but even so, Giovanni believed that Chios might offer a better opportunity. The second was to Francesco de Promontorio, who was now in Caffa. In the letter, Giovanni expressed hope that his textiles had been sold and the bill of exchange sent on. Giovanni declared that if the Levant stabilized, he would send another forty or fifty pieces of cloth. The third was to Nicola di Tacio on Chios, informing him of the death of Nicola’s brother-in-law Cristoforo aboard the ship of the Lomellini. The fourth was to Bartolomeo de Persio, in which he requested that Bartolomeo recover the insurance with the help of Nicola de Tacio for goods loaded on Lomellini's ship, and to send it to Genoa via bill of exchange. This may have been the ship of Gianotto Lomellini (see below), which was delayed on Chios early in 1455 and eventually made it through the Bosphorus and into the Black Sea to Caffa. If the insurance was to be paid out on Chios, then the ship had probably passed through there; and there is no other published record from early 1455 of disaster befalling a ship of the Lomellini clan.

Between the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople and that of Caffa, many Genoese speculated in the shares of the maona of Chios, the *compere* of San Giorgio, and in various tax revenues. Shares in the *compere* San Giorgio were

---

306 Ibid., pp. 49-50.
307 Ibid., pp. 51-2.
308 Ibid., pp. 52-3.
nominally valued at 100 lire each, but just after the conquest of Constantinople fell in value in June and July 1453. The shares rose again with the conviction that holding Pera was possible, and fell again upon the Ottoman conquest of Phocaea in 1456. In 1456, many members of the maona of Chios sold part of their rights. On 13 February 1456, Giovanni Giustinian son of Napoleone sold to Gregorio Giustinian a quarter of a carato grosso for 1500 ducats. On 11 December 1456, thirty shares of Francesco Giustinian olim Recanello were transferred to Giovanni Paterio. On 12 December 1456, Battista Bonise sold to Marco Lercaro (who acted in the name of Cosma Cattaneo, captain and part-owner of a ship) a drictus of one and a quarter percent of the cargo of this ship and of other ships departing for Genoa, for 415 gold ducats of Chios. Without further information, we cannot determine who benefited and who lost from these transactions. But these names will likely surface in future archival research, not only in the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea but also further west, in Spain and the European Atlantic.

Slaves, ships, and real estate were also sold off. On 2 October 1456 on Chios, Antonio Tacola “gaytanus” sold his ship to Benedetto da Spigno son of Giovanni, a Genoese citizen, for 1000 gold ducats of Chios. On 19 June 1473 at Caffa, Carlo Lercari and Battista Giustinian entrusted Angelo Giovanni Squarciafico to conduct eleven slaves from Caffa to Genoa by the land route.

311 Gabriella Airaldi, _Studi e Documenti su Genova e l'Oltremare_ (Genoa: Università di Genova, Istituto di paleografia e storia medievale, 1974), p. 162.
312 Origone, _Chio nel Tempo della Caduta di Costantinopoli_, pp. 49-50.
313 Ibid., p. 50.
314 Ibid., p. 21.
315 Ibid.
This must have been a huge expense, and is a measure of the desperation of the Genoese of Caffa just before the Ottoman conquest. In 1475, two sons of Marcus Doria, Micali and Manoli, sold their shop in the citadel of Caffa to a Greek for the high price of 6000 aspers.\(^\text{317}\) This was perfect timing for them, as Caffa was taken by the Ottomans later that year.

Many in the colonies who had fled the Ottoman advance ended up destitute in Genoa. In 1527, a Genoese merchant on Chios, Giovanni Besaccia, set up a trust in San Giorgio in Genoa, to support any poor and destitute who had been born in Pera or on Chios.\(^\text{318}\) Yet many Genoese continued to trade at Galata, and even as late as 1472, it was possible for a Genoese merchant to move east and get rich. Antoniotto di Cabella moved from Genoa to Caffa in 1472 and made a quick fortune. He left immediately before the sack of 1475, thus preserving his wealth. His will was drawn up in Pera in 1475, and stipulated settlements with debtors and creditors, with a careful separation of accounts between those of Pera and those of Genoa. His accounts are variously denominated in florins, Genoese lire, Venetians ducats, and silver aspers from Caffa, and he still had business connections with two nephews at Caffa, Gerolamo and Giacomo di Paolo di Cabella. He provided for his family back in Genoa.\(^\text{319}\)

In the second half of the fifteenth century, there was much depredation between the Genoese and the Ottomans.\(^\text{320}\) Ottoman corsairs plundered the sea route from Bursa to Chios, and Genoese pirates were active in the Black Sea and

\(^\text{320}\) Musso, *Genova, la Liguria, e la Oltremare tra Medioevo et eta' Moderna*, p. 90.
Aegean throughout the second half of the fifteenth century. On 22 March 1456, the ship captain Ambrogio de Benedictis was captured by the Ottomans in Pera and lost all his cargo. On Chios, he declared his losses: six female slaves, two child slaves, and twelve barrels of cinnamon. When the Ottomans took Phocaea in 1456, they took many prisoners for ransom; and Gregorio de Segnorio contracted a debt to Nicolo Forte of Savona for thirty gold ducats of Chios (1000 Ottoman aspers), paid in Phocaea for the ransom of his brother Bartolomeo. On 27 March 1476, the Savonese Niccolo Vazera drew up an inventory of merchandise plundered by Ottoman pirates from the ship of Lionello Gentile in the canal of Negroponte.

The Genoese also feared Catalan piracy against the Ottomans, for Genoese merchants often bore the brunt of retaliation. In June 1467, the Genoese government pleaded with Ferdinand to rein in his Catalan captains against Ottoman targets. From 15 May to 12 June 1477, a Genoese embassy was in Venice to protest an act of piracy in the waters near Cyprus. A Venetian fleet had intercepted and robbed a Genoese ship captained by one of the Pallavicino clan bound for Syria. The cargo included merchandise belonging to Ottoman subjects, and testimony in this case continued at least until 1480.

Throughout the fifteenth century, the Genoese and Catalans oscillated between outright war and uneasy truce, while both sides preyed on the other's

321 Ibid., pp. 90-4.
322 Origone, Chio nel Tempo della Caduta di Costantinopoli, pp. 21, 23.
323 Ibid., p. 61.
324 Musso, Genova, la Liguria, e la Oltremare tra Medioevo ed età' Moderna, p. 90.
325 Ibid., p. 73.
326 Ibid., pp. 72-3.
Ships leaving Genoa bound for the east had to pass hostile waters off Sicily, controlled by Aragon. Yet Catalans and Genoese also did business with each other. In 1496, an Ethiopian slave escaped from a Genoese ship. The owner of the slave was a Catalan, Jacopo Ballester, an inhabitant of Gozo near Malta. Genoese were also acting as tax contractors in Spain and doing business through Spain to Flanders and England. On 19 September 1474, Pietro Paolo de Marini made Giovanni Battista Gentile his legal representative for the exaction of his rights to certain tolls in Valencia and in the kingdom of Aragon.

The Ottomans now controlled the alum mines at Phocaea, but Chios continued a brisk transit trade in this resource so essential to the European textile industry. The alum price rose steeply, but in 1461 alum deposits were found at Tolfà near Civitavecchia, on the Mediterranean coast just north of Rome. The popes from 1463 forbade the import of alum from the east, and it was resolved to use the alum revenues of Tolfà solely for crusade against the Ottomans. In 1480 and 1481, Pope Sixtus IV (r. 1471-1484) warned the Genoese on Chios that engaging in the alum trade with the Ottomans would be met with excommunication, and ordered that alum on Chios be sequestered. Yet through the end of the fifteenth century, the Genoese, Venetians, and Florentines conducted a thriving trade with the Ottomans. For example, on 3 April 1487,
2217 cantari and sixty-two rotoli of alum departed Chios for Flanders and England.  

The Ottomans kept a tight rein on Italian merchants, preventing them from becoming independent colonies or gaining territorial rights, yet the eastern Mediterranean trade networks began to wither as the Portuguese exploited the new route around Africa. Both Egypt and Venice shared an interest in keeping Portugal from carrying spices directly to Europe, but neither could do anything about it. The Mamluks complained to the pope, and Venice encouraged the Mamluks to attack the Portuguese in the Indian ocean. The Genoese, however, had been active in the western Mediterranean and Atlantic at least since the twelfth century, as sailors, shipwrights, mercenaries, merchants, and bankers; and after the loss of the Genoese eastern colonies, the mercantile elite quickly infiltrated other markets. They were well placed to profit from the Iberian boom. 

The pepper supply underwent wide fluctuations in Alexandria, and the Mamluks attempted to force higher prices on Venetian merchants. Generally, the price of pepper rose in Alexandria while it fell in Lisbon. Through the fifteenth century, many Genoese came to Cadiz in Spain; and by the end of the century, the Genoese colony of Cadiz had its own chapel and adjacent Franciscan monastery, as

333 Musso, Genova, la Liguria, e la Oltremare tra Medioevo ed eta’ Moderna, p. 110.  
336 Doosseelaere, Commercial Agreements and Social Dynamics in Medieval Genoa, p. 174; Felloni, Genova e la storia della finanza, p. 11.  
well as its own cemetery. Francesco Terrile, a Genoese merchant active at Cadiz in the first half of the sixteenth century, exchanged letters with his son Gerolamo and also with Lorenzi Lomellini Sorba, their representative in Genoa. Most of these letters are from 1537-41. He was from the Levantine colonies, and in 1523 emigrated from Genoa to Cadiz. Terrile was well-versed in the mechanisms of international exchange, and had commercial interests in Genoa, Germany, Bohemia, Flanders, the Maghrib and the Canaries. He was in Cadiz to take advantage of the traffic between the West Indies and Flanders. The Lomellini family was on the island of Tabarca off Valencia by the end of the fifteenth century, and in 1547 a coral contract given to Francesco Lomellini and Francesco Grimaldi. The coral was sent to Genoa, worked there, and then exchanged for slaves on the northern coast of Africa. Lorenzo Sorba, himself a Lomellini, was part of this traffic.

III.2. The Repatriation of Holy Relics

An overlooked movement of capital is the slew of relics, books, and sacred objects from the churches of Pera that flooded into Genoa, especially in 1461, the year that Trebizond fell to the Ottomans. In late January of this year, the Genoese Signoria appointed six nobles to collect books and sacred objects of the churches of Pera and to distribute these among the churches of Genoa. This represented a

339 Ibid., p. 368.
340 Ibid., p. 371.
341 Ibid., pp. 370 and 374.
342 Ibid., p. 382.
343 Belgrano, *Prima serie di documenti riguardanti la colonia di Pera*, p. 274 (doc. cviii);
significant capital movement, and the Genoese churches were required to post bond. For example, the church of San Giovanni in Duomo accepted silver and crystal objects from churches of Pera, and posted twenty shares of compere San Giorgio as security. On 27 September 1461, Antonio Giustiniani-Longo and other nobles gave to the brothers of Nostra Donna del Monte in Bisagno 187 volumes and many holy relics, at least some of them from Pera. On 6 and 7 November 1461, Acellino Saivago and Lodovico Centurione gave the arm of Saint Anne and some books to the “frati del Monte” in Genoa. The arm of Saint Anne is now in the museum of the cathedral of San Lorenzo in Genoa.

The timing seems significant. Eight years before, Constantinople had passed to the Ottomans, but the Genoese at first saw the loss as a mere temporary setback. Almost a month after the sack of Constantinople, on 23 June 1453, the podesta of Pera, Angelo Giovanni Lomellino, claimed that the Ottoman conquest was due to the smallest bad luck, and the directors of San Giorgio on 3 February 1455 instructed officials in Caffa to prepare for war to recover Pera for Genoa. If in 1461 the authorities feared for the safety of precious religious objects in the churches of Pera, then some Genoese officials and merchants in the colonies may also have chosen this moment to repatriate private wealth.

Some of the new custodians of these religious antiquaries were reluctant to part with them. For example, Pellegro De Marini held many objects of the

Belgrano, Seconda Serie di documenti riguardanti la colonia di Pera, p. 989 (doc. xxii).
Belgrano, Prima serie di documenti riguardanti la colonia di Pera p. 277 (doc. clxi): “ventun luoghi di Compere a guarentigia di restituzione.”
Ibid., pp. 278-9 (doc. clxii).
Ibid., p. 280 (doc. clixiv).
Belgrano, Prima serie di documenti riguardanti la colonia di Pera, p. 284 (doc. ci).
Benedictine monastery of Santa Maria di Misericordia in Pera; many of these objects had been taken to Chios, where an extensive inventory was compiled between 1473 and 1478. In a letter dated 30 January 1481, the Genoese Signoria ordered the government of Chios to oversee the transfer of these objects from Pellegro De Marini to the representative of this monastery. Tracking down this representative would help to illuminate the connections between the noble families and officials overseeing these transfers and the ecclesiastical authorities. Santa Maria della Misericordia della Cisterna, in Genoa, granted power of attorney to the notary Cristoforo de Canevale to supervise its financial interests in Pera. These interests could be the income of the united monasteries of Santa Maria di Misericordia and of San Benedetto in Pera, which Pope Nicholas V had granted to the Benedictine monks in 1450. After the conquest, the Benedictines had difficulty collecting the income, and ceded it to the archbishopric of Genoa, whose agent seems to have subsequently been imprisoned for fraud. The funds were then assigned to the Catinani family.

III.3. The Disintegration of Genoese Colonial Administration

After the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople, the Latin refugees of Pera for the most part returned home, but some remained on Chios. Chios became the chief outpost in the Levant for the Genoese, and the maona of Chios warned

349 Belgrano, Seconda serie di documenti riguardanti la colonia di Pera, p. 994 (doc. xxiv).
350 Ibid., p. 996 (doc. xxv).
352 Belgrano, Seconda serie di documenti riguardanti la colonia di Pera, pp. 1000-1 (doc. xxviii).
This anonymous undated letter to Pera must have been written sometime shortly after 1560, when the income was 200 gold ducats (100 from rents and 100 from agriculture). Belgrano doesn’t recognize the name Catinani, but suggests Giustiniani or Cattanei.
353 Origone, Chio nel Tempo della Caduta di Costantinopoli, p. 47.
Genoa in autumn 1454 that Genoese ships and merchandise were more concentrated on the island, increasingly the likelihood of an Ottoman raid. The administration of Chios became a huge financial and military expense. Accounts on Chios came to be kept in Ottoman aspers, and the Ottomans commissioned the construction of ships here. In the case of Francesco Draperio and other dhimmi, connections with the Ottoman court were a source of wealth. For many officials, merchants, and mercenaries in the Genoese Levantine colonies, the disarray was an opportunity. The colonial administration was notoriously corrupt, and the directors repeatedly and futilely prohibited their officials from trading on their own account while in office.

In late 1453, the directors of San Giorgio ordered preparations for a fleet under the Lomellini brothers and Girolamo Doria for the relief of the Black Sea colonies. On 23 November, Giacomo Cicala and Damiano Leone were each charged to procure 200 soldiers, as well as their arms and supplies. Before the fleet left port, disagreement flared between the brothers Teramo and Gianotto Lomellini, and the directors seem to have intervened. Two ships sailed from Genoa sometime after 8 March 1454, captained by Gianotto Lomellini and Girolamo Doria. Meanwhile, a ship commanded by Acellino Lercari left Caffa on 28 September 1454, with many Genoese merchants aboard, to attempt to run

---

356 Vigna, *Codice Diplomatico delle Colonie Tauro-Liguri* 6, pp. 672 (docs. cccxxv and cccxxvi), 870-1, 876, and 938 (doc. cccxciv).
357 Ibid., pp. 499 and 657 (doc. cccxiv).
358 Ibid., pp. 15-6, 44 (doc. vi), and 47 (doc. ix).
359 Ibid., p. 52 (doc. xiv).
360 Ibid., p. 55 (doc. xviii).
361 Ibid., p. 67 (doc. xx).
the Ottoman blockade. The fate of this expedition is unknown, but an Acelinus Lercarius is noted in the proceedings of the directors of San Giorgio on 20 April 1461. More research is needed to definitively connect this Acelinus with the captain who departed Caffa in 1454.

The fleet commanded by Gianotto Lomellini and Girolamo Doria had arrived at Caffa in spring 1455, but the circumstances of the passage are cloudy. The Ottomans seem to have taken both captains into custody at Pera, while the crew fled to Chios. The correspondence of the captains has been lost, and we know nothing of the delay on Chios and the two voyages to Pera and Constantinople. A letter from Chios to Genoa on 18 March stated that not more than 100 soldiers were aboard the ships. Either Giacomo Cicala and Damiano Leone had not procured the agreed number of soldiers in Genoa, or most of them left en route. Giovanni da Pontremoli contended that Cristoforo had died in a shipwreck (see above), but it is possible that he died in the confusion and chaos as the captains were imprisoned at Pera. It is doubtful that Genoese vessels could have passed Rumeli Hisarı and into the Black Sea without Ottoman permission, and perhaps the Ottomans took all or part of the cargo before allowing the vessels to proceed.

In late 1454, the directors of San Giorgio began to organize another expedition for the relief of Caffa and Samastro (modern Amasra), another

---

362 Ibid., pp. 71-2.
365 Ibid., p. 174.
366 Ibid., p. 297-301 (doc. cxvii).
367 Also called Samastri. Karpov, “New Documents,” p. 34.
vulnerable Genoese fortress on the Black Sea.\textsuperscript{368} On 30 January 1455 in Genoa, Giovanni da Pontremoli wrote to Antonio and Gregorio de Pino in Caffa, informing them that Giovanni de Pino had embarked on the ship of Martino da Voltaggio. The brothers in Caffa had not heard from this relative for twelve years, and Giovanni urged them to extend credit to Giovanni de Pino when he arrived.\textsuperscript{369} On the same day, Giovanni wrote to Martino da Voltaggio departing for Caffa, to entrust Giovanni de Pino to his care.\textsuperscript{370} Two ships, one captained by Martino and another by Giacomo Leone, set out from Genoa in early 1455, with several hundred men aboard, including many speculators and merchants.\textsuperscript{371} They made landfall at Crete, where many of the crew died of disease; and a mutiny followed. Many merchants on board requested to be allowed to decamp with all their merchandise to Candia; it may have been their plan all along to disembark prior to running the Bosphorus.\textsuperscript{372} The fleet proceeded through the Aegean and more unrest broke out around Chios.\textsuperscript{373} The ships were shelled in the Marmara, and while running the Bosphorus, the cannons of Rumeli Hisarı hit Leone’s ship six times.\textsuperscript{374} While in a cove for repairs, the Genoese plundered an Ottoman ship out of Sinop bound for Istanbul, and then towed it to Caffa.\textsuperscript{375} When Martino Voltaggio arrived in Caffa, the consul of Caffa, Tommaso Domoculta, demanded a share of the spoils, and Voltaggio refused.\textsuperscript{376} Voltaggio

\textsuperscript{368} Vigna, \textit{Codice Diplomatico delle Colonie Tauro-Liguri} 6, pp. 126 (doc. lxiv), 134 (doc. lxvii), 150 (doc. lxii), 153 (doc. lxii), and 175.
\textsuperscript{370} Ibid., pp. 38-9.
\textsuperscript{372} Ibid., p. 178.
\textsuperscript{373} Ibid., pp. 178-9.
\textsuperscript{374} Ibid., pp. 178-81.
\textsuperscript{375} Ibid., pp. 181-4,197-8, and 303 (doc. cxii).
\textsuperscript{376} Ibid., p. 199.
claimed that the ship had 400 cantari of copper aboard, but there is reason to
believe this an underestimate.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 200. Vigna accepts a claim of 27,000 aspers, fruit, a quantity of lead, and 500 weight
of copper aboard (p. 181).} Voltaggio also claimed that his ship sustained
damage on the order of 2000 ducats while running the Bosphorus. The directors
of San Giorgio condemned many among the crew for this piracy, but not Voltaggio
himself.\footnote{Ibid., p. 194,197.} In the same year, Marino Cicala seized another ship out of Sinop,
bound for the port of Kalamita with a hundred Ottomans aboard. Domoculta
demanded that half the spoils be given to the state, and Cicala consented.\footnote{Ibid., p. 198: 300 sommi.} Two
more Ottoman galleys out of Kalamita were captured, but then given back to their
owners to placate the Ottoman ambassador, who had come to Crimea to meet with
the Tatar khan Hacı Giray (r. 1441-1466).\footnote{Ibid., pp. 198.} Regarding Voltaggio's spoils,
Domoculta dismissed the Ottoman merchant's claim that 27,000 aspers had been
aboard.\footnote{Ibid., p. 197.} The directors repeatedly demanded a full accounting of the spoils, which
was not forthcoming;\footnote{Ibid., pp. 430 and 500 (doc. cccxiv).} and then demanded that the copper shipment be sent to
Genoa.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 496 (doc. ccc).} It is difficult to believe that this order was taken seriously, especially after
the famine of 1455,\footnote{Ibid., p. 439 (doc. cclx), 433-4, and 599 (docs. cclix and ccxvi).} in which many Genoese merchants had fled Caffa.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 685 and 725 (doc. cccxl).} The
copper was sold by the government of Caffa,\footnote{Ibid., pp. 200 and 323 (doc. cxxxiv).} and the legal disputes dragged into
1457.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 216-9 and 381 (doc. clxv).}

During the famine in Caffa and in other Genoese territories on the Black
Sea littoral, Voltaggio’s ship and another belonging to Paride Mari were sent to Sicily to procure grain.\textsuperscript{389} They passed out of the Black Sea, apparently without incident. On the return, laden with grain, they were shelled while attempting to pass Rumeli Hisari. One ship was sunk and the other retired to Chios.\textsuperscript{390} In December 1455 a ship carrying the possessions of Demetrio Vivaldi, consul of Caffa in 1453 and 1454, arrived in Genoa. The cargo included his slaves.\textsuperscript{391} The famine had been the occasion of yet more piracy. The government of Caffa in 1455 sent out two ships to roam the Black Sea and find grain by fair means or foul.\textsuperscript{392} The next year, San Giorgio instructed the 1456 expedition of Cattaneo and Doria to take up to 8000 mina of grain from any ship they came across, even from Genoese ships; and to give the captain bills of exchange to be drawn upon San Giorgio.\textsuperscript{393} This state-sponsored piracy may have been necessary, but also undermined the ability of the government to impose its will.

The Signoria in 1449 had forbidden the rebuilding of the castle of Lerici at the Genoese colony of Mocastro (Akkerman, also known as Bielgorod\textsuperscript{394}) in the Crimea.\textsuperscript{395} The Genoese family who ruled Mocastro, the Senarega, disobeyed these orders.\textsuperscript{396} In 1455, the castle fell anyway; but despite vigorous protestations from Tommaso Senarega, San Giorgio feared open rupture with the Tatars and forbade any attempt to retake the castle.\textsuperscript{397} An unsuccessful attempt to retake the castle was

\textsuperscript{389} Ibid., pp. 216-7.  
\textsuperscript{390} Ibid., p. 218.  
\textsuperscript{391} Ibid., pp. 244-5.  
\textsuperscript{392} Ibid., p. 218.  
\textsuperscript{393} Ibid., p. 439.  
\textsuperscript{395} Belgrano, \textit{Prima serie di documenti riguardanti la colonia di Pera}, p. 218 (doc. cxxxix).  
\textsuperscript{396} Vigna, \textit{Codice Diplomatico delle Colonie Tauro-Liguri} 6, p. 185.  
\textsuperscript{397} Ibid., pp. 187-90.
nevertheless made later the same year. Nevertheless, Mocastro became one of the four main realms on the Black Sea littoral which had trade relations with Caffa; and the directors forbade war with these four realms. \(^{399}\) The order was ignored.

By early 1456, the cost in Genoa of renting ships bound for Caffa had tripled, and grain was scarce and dear even in Genoa itself. \(^{400}\) In March, two ships loaded with grain and soldiers departed Genoa for Caffa, captained by Carlo Cattaneo and Stefano Doria. \(^{401}\) The directors instructed the fleet to stop at Samastro to unload a fraction of the grain there, and to not allow any merchants to board the ships en route, except to procure bread and wine. \(^{402}\) Presumably the directors were concerned that their people would sell part of the grain in lucrative side deals. The directors were also concerned that the stipulated number of soldiers was not actually aboard (150 on Doria's ship and 100 on Cattaneo's). They sent ahead and ordered a head count immediately upon the fleet's arrival at Caffa. \(^{403}\) Yet the fleet never arrived. The ships were still moored at Chios in December, \(^{404}\) and legal action was taken against the two captains for dereliction of duty in 1457 and 1458. \(^{405}\) Cattaneo was in prison in early 1459. \(^{406}\)

In 1456 in the Black Sea, Genoese captain Matteo Pallavicini captured an Ottoman ship loaded with silk. The Greek emperor of Trebizond claimed a portion of the spoils; obtaining no satisfaction, he punished Matteo's brother Meliaduce,

---

398 Ibid., p. 217.
399 Ibid., p. 782.
400 Ibid., p. 425.
401 Ibid., pp. 428-9, 435, and 534 (doc. ccvi).
402 Ibid., p. 438.
403 Ibid., pp. 441-2 (doc. cclxii).
404 Ibid., pp. 665-6 (doc. cccxxviii).
405 Ibid., pp. 775-6.
406 Ibid., pp. 860 and 898 (ccccxviii).
resident in Trebizond. When Matteo arrived in Caffa, the consul there confiscated
the silk cargo. A frenetic diplomatic exchange ensued, as the directors of San
Giorgio attempted to mediate between the Pallavicini family, the government in
Caffa, and the emperor in Trebizond.\textsuperscript{407} The correspondence included many threats
by the directors to the Greek emperor.\textsuperscript{408} The Greek court at Trebizond was still in
debt to San Giorgio in 1458, and the new consuls to Caffa were instructed to
collect the debt, which the Genoese calculated at 17,077 Genoese lire. Wine,
hazelnuts, and other produce were acceptable in lieu of cash, but under no
circumstances were the consuls to precipitate an open break in relations with
Trebizond.\textsuperscript{409} Under heavy tribute obligations to the Ottomans, the Greek emperors
of Trebizond soon reneged on their debt.\textsuperscript{410}

Due to the difficulty and risk, many Genoese appointed to serve in Caffa
and its satellites refused to go. The directors accepted the excuses of some who
recused themselves, but rejected other excuses.\textsuperscript{411} The directors raised salaries and
lengthened the terms of office, and advertised the vacant positions for the Black
Sea colonies. The salary of the consul of Caffa was raised from 500 to 600 \textit{sommi}
anually.\textsuperscript{412} Nevertheless, so many candidates refused that five elections were
necessary for the position.\textsuperscript{413} In the spring of 1458, the ship of Lazzaro De-Marini
brought officials bound for Caffa as far as Chios, and the directors offered generous

\textsuperscript{407} Ibid., pp. 432-3 and 542 (ccxii).
\textsuperscript{408} Ibid., p. 543 (ccxii).
\textsuperscript{409} Ibid., p. 785.
\textsuperscript{410} Bryer and Lowry, \textit{Continuity and Change}, p. 63.
\textsuperscript{411} Vigna, \textit{Codice Diplomatico delle Colonne Tauro-Ligure} 6, pp. 728-33 (docs. cccxiv and cccxvi); see also the case of Gherardo Pinelli in Vigna, \textit{Codice Diplomatico delle Colonne Tauro-Ligure} 7, pp. 72 (doc. dxxi) and 73 (doc. dxxi).
\textsuperscript{412} Vigna, \textit{Codice Diplomatico delle Colonne Tauro-Ligure} 6, p. 752 (doc. ccclx).\textsuperscript{413} Ibid., p. 757 (doc. ccclxv, dated 26 Oct. 1458); p. 895 (doc. cccxxiv, dated 16 Jan. 1459); p. 897 (doc. cccxxvi, dated 14 Feb.); and p. 906 (doc. cccxxx, dated 5 Mar.).
conditions to any who would carry the officials from Chios to Caffa.\textsuperscript{414} Again in 1459, the directors paid for the passage of Caffa-bound officials to Chios.\textsuperscript{415} The rate for transport to Caffa was now so high that the directors were reduced to comandeering ships in port.\textsuperscript{416} A fleet of three ships set sail in 1460, and it seems that at least one reached Caffa, for on 23 May, a bond was posted in Caffa for the ship of Spinola to ensure its return to Genoa.\textsuperscript{417} It was later claimed that this fleet carried 500 soldiers.\textsuperscript{418}

Extant documents related to Caffa are scarce after 1460.\textsuperscript{419} Most officials seem to have got through, by land or sea; but in at least one case, an official was enslaved en route. A letter of 18 August 1460 mentions the kidnapping of Pietro Montenegro, a minor official of Cembalo (modern Balaklava in Crimea).\textsuperscript{420} More research is needed to determine how these officials arrived; if this can be ascertained, then it is likely that capital movements will be revealed as well.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{414} Ibid., pp. 773-4 and 823-4 (doc. cccclxxix).
\item\textsuperscript{415} Ibid., p. 859.
\item\textsuperscript{416} Vigna, \textit{Codice Diplomatico delle Colonie Tauro-Liguri} 7, p. 37 (doc. cccclxxviii); p. 45 (doc. cccclxxv); p. 51 (doc. ccccx).
\item\textsuperscript{417} Ibid., p. 74 (doc. dxxii).
\item\textsuperscript{418} Ibid., p. 11 and 79 (doc. dxxvii).
\item\textsuperscript{419} Ibid., p. 23.
\item\textsuperscript{420} Ibid., p. 80 (doc. dxxviii)
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Conclusion

The historiography of Ottoman-Genoese interaction is flawed, and in this thesis I have attempted to begin to address these flaws in a general manner. In the gap between the fall of the Genoese Levantine colonies and the height of Genoese financial dominance in Europe lies over a century of Genoese capital flows and of continuing Ottoman-Genoese interaction. These are neglected areas of study that yield rich lines of inquiry into the nature of the evolution of capitalism, of the rise of Europe, of early Ottoman economic, social, and cultural history, and of Muslim-Christian interaction in the late medieval and early modern periods. The Ottoman registers and Genoese notarial records, used in conjunction, proved invaluable in my exploration of the continuing Genoese presence in Pera-Galata. I have found numerous connections between the Ottoman tahrir of 1455 and the Genoese notarial records, and much more remains to be done, particularly on the register of 1477 and the Genoese and Armenian community exiled from Caffa to Istanbul.

Equally important, the Genoese are an essential and neglected part of the institutional transformation from a feudal warrior aristocracy to a global finance aristocracy. The Genoese trade fairs of the sixteenth century were effectively stock
exchanges at which trade and finance bills of exchange from all over Europe were negotiated.\(^{421}\) Italian merchants transported tens of thousands of tons of grain from the Baltic and Black Sea, using bills of exchange drawn on Nuremberg and Antwerp; and even as far away as Batavia and Canton, goods were bought with bills of exchange drawn on all the markets of Europe.\(^{422}\) “The system,” said Fernand Braudel, “was projected over the whole world, a vast net thrown over the wealth of other continents.”\(^{423}\)

In the sixteenth century, the globe’s financial hub was Genoa, whose main business lay in speculating in gold and silver and in lending to the king of Spain.\(^{424}\) Bankrupt and struggling to keep his possessions in the Netherlands, Naples, and Sicily, in 1575 Philip II declared void all his debts incurred over the previous fifteen years.\(^{425}\) But the Genoese were centuries ahead of the Hapsburg state: only they had the organizational efficiency and financial sophistication to deliver the gold and bills of exchange needed for the Hapsburg army occupying the Netherlands. Genoa placed an embargo on gold and bills of exchange to the Netherlands, and Spain could no longer supply its army or pay its soldiers, who mutinied and sacked Antwerp in 1576. The next year Philip capitulated and agreed to pay his Genoese creditors.\(^{426}\) The most powerful monarch of Europe had

---

421 Ibid., p. 73.
423 Ibid., p. 344. He speaks of “this extraordinary financial aristocracy devouring the known world” (Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World*, p. 343).
424 Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World*, pp. 321 and 393. Halil İnalcık says that from the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries, Genoa was the most economically advanced state in Europe. See his *Sources and Studies on the Ottoman Black Sea*, foreword; and Fleet, *European and Islamic Trade in the Early Ottoman State*, p. 18.
426 Ibid., pp. 510-11 and 535.
submitted to his Genoese bankers. But by the end of the sixteenth century, the main lines of societal evolution had arced beyond the Genoese, towards Flanders, the Netherlands, and England.

In following the fragmentary evidence of the movement of people and capital – whether from Genoa to the Levantine colonies, from the colonies back to the western Mediterranean and European Atlantic, or between the colonies themselves – fertile lines of inquiry are uncovered. Can any trace be found of the Genoese merchants who left Caffa with Acellino Lercari in 1454? During the 1455 famine and plague at Caffa, many Genoese merchants returned to the mother city, compounding Caffa's problems. Can traces of these merchants and their networks can be found? What of the grain shipments that never made it to Caffa? The directors sustained a heavy loss, but the grain seems to have been sold on Chios and the proceeds may have been repatriated by one or more of the families represented aboard the ships or in the government of Chios. Contractors supplied the directors of San Giorgio with mercenaries who either did not exist or who abandoned their duty en route. The copper and silk shipments plundered by the Genoese were confiscated, at least in part, by the government of Caffa; and traces of the sale of the copper and silk could point in interesting directions. Large quantities of armaments sent to Caffa likewise went missing from government inventories.

The interchange between Caffa on the Black Sea, Pera on the Bosphorus, Chios in the Aegean, and Genoa in the western Mediterranean must be studied

427 Vigna, Codice Diplomatico delle Colonie Tauro-Liguri 6, p. 496.
428 Ibid., pp. 574-86 (docs. ccxlii, ccxliii, and ccxliv).
429 Ibid., pp. 497-9 and 870-1.
with a unified analytic lens, mapping all elements of capital movement: troop movements, supply convoys, trade in holy relics, piracy, and commercial and financial transactions. After the Ottoman rise, the western Mediterranean and especially the Iberian peninsula received much Genoese investment. To gauge its significance, this capital movement must then be checked against other elements of the Genoese public debt. Institutional transformations and the evolution of the rule of law must also be considered, as we attempt to understand the Genoese adaption to and influence on a changing world, from crusading feudal warlords to a colonial merchant class to global bankers. The expulsion of the Sephardic Jews from Spain may also have created new opportunities for the Genoese, who were well-placed to profit from the flood of American silver into Spain.

430 Felloni, Genova e la storia della finanza, pp. 11-12.
Appendix A: Glossary

asper and sommo – The Italian sommo seems to have been equivalent to the Mongol saumah and Greek soma, a silver ingot.\(^{431}\) In the early fifteenth century, 300 sommi was equivalent to 2400 Genoese lire, so a sommo of silver was worth 800 lire.\(^{432}\) One authority contends that the Italian sommo was equivalent to 218.911 grams of silver, and that in the early fifteenth century such a quantity was used to make 200 aspers.\(^{433}\) In the Black Sea, local trade earned silver Tatar sommi, which were then changed at Pera into Byzantine gold hyperpyra. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, complex bills of exchange facilitated this traffic.\(^{434}\) Some of this silver was minted into dirhams by the Mongol khans of the Golden Horde and by the Ilkhanids in Anatolia. By the early fourteenth century, these dirhams, which Europeans called aspers, had become common currency all around the Black Sea.\(^{435}\)

cantaro (plural cantari) – Iron and other metals were measured by cantari.\(^{436}\) The

\(^{431}\) Bryer and Lowry, Continuity and Change, pp. 62 and 92-3.
\(^{434}\) Geo Pistarino, I Gin dell'Oltremare (Genoa: Civico Istituto Colombiano, 1988), pp. 256 and 325.
\(^{435}\) Pamuk, A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire, p. 24.
cantaro was usually equal to 100 local pounds, and varied widely.\textsuperscript{437} There is considerable confusion on the conversion of the cantaro to a modern measure. One authority puts it at between 100 and 770 lbs,\textsuperscript{438} but another says thirty to ninety kg.\textsuperscript{439} Another puts it much lower, perhaps less than a kilogram.\textsuperscript{440} For a better idea of how this measure worked in practice, on 15 November 1453 a barrel of green ginger weighing three cantari net was sold for eighty-seven gold ducats of Chios.\textsuperscript{441} On 22 November 1453, a load of five cantari of cinnamon was sold for twenty-nine and a half gold ducats of Chios per cantaro.\textsuperscript{442}

commenda – An investment contract which developed in the eastern Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{443} An investor in Genoa put up the capital and his partner engaged in long-distance trade and received a quarter or a third of the profits.\textsuperscript{444} For example, on 10 March 1405 on Chios, Antonio Ardimento de Bartolomeo received from Tommaso Paterio son of Raffaele 500 gold ducats, Antonio to receive a third of the profit.\textsuperscript{445} Less than a month later, Antonio Spinelli son of Gianotto delivered 500 lire to Nicolo de Marco in a commenda contract, Nicolo to receive a quarter of the profits.\textsuperscript{446}

\textsuperscript{437} Francesca Trivellato, \textit{The Familiarity of Strangers} (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2009), xii.
\textsuperscript{440} Origone, \textit{Chio nel Tempo della Caduta di Costantinopoli}, p. 36.
\textsuperscript{441} Roccatagliata, \textit{Notai Genovesi in Oltremare: Atti Rogati a Chio}, pp. 63-6 (doc. 41).
\textsuperscript{442} Ibid., pp. 76-8 (doc. 47, dated 22 Nov. 1453).
\textsuperscript{443} Doosselaere, \textit{Commercial Agreements and Social Dynamics in Medieval Genoa}, p. 22.
\textsuperscript{444} Abulafia, \textit{The Great Sea}, p. 278.
\textsuperscript{446} Toniolo, \textit{Notai Genovesi in Oltremare: Atti Rogati a Chio da Gregorio Panissario}, pp. 206-7 (doc. 136, dated 6 April 1405 on Chios).
compera (plural compere) – A purchase of variable tax revenues for a fixed sum of money, often named after the particular merchandise that would be taxed to pay the lender, perhaps salt or wine; or after the war that made the loan necessary; or after a Christian saint.\textsuperscript{447} Those who took over for a certain period a portion of the revenues of the commune (a compera) were known as comperisti. The oldest extant records of public debt are from Genoa in the mid-twelfth century, when government revenues were contracted out, usually to a consortium of creditors.\textsuperscript{448} The debt of the Genoese commune was not the public debt that we understand today, and may even be contrasted with the public debt of Renaissance Florence and Venice, which was managed by the commune. In Genoa, consortiums of creditors directly administered and managed the public debt.\textsuperscript{449}

grosso – A Genoese coin of high-grade silver, which decreased in value as inflation corrupted the money issue.

hyperpyra – Also known as the bisante, was the old Roman solidus that continued to be minted in Byzantine times.\textsuperscript{450} Portions of hyperpyra were called by the Italians carati.

lira – The Islamic dinar had circulated widely in the eastern Mediterranean,

\textsuperscript{447} Roccatagliata, Notai Genovesi in Oltremare: Atti Rogati a Chio, p. 19.
\textsuperscript{448} Ibid., p. 17.
\textsuperscript{449} I am indebted to Carlo Taviani for this crucial distinction.
\textsuperscript{450} Felloni, Genova e la storia della finanza, p. 78.
replaced in the thirteenth century by the gold Genoese lira, which was an improved version of the Arab quarter dinar, probably developed by Genoese with experience in Sicilian markets. The florin had the same intrinsic value as the Genoese lira and the ducat from Venice. For two centuries, florins from Florence, lire from Genoa (confusingly, sometimes called the florin in Genoa), and ducats from Venice circulated in the middle east, north Africa, and Europe.\textsuperscript{451} Before the decimal system was introduced, a pound sterling was equivalent to twenty shilling, which each were worth 12 pence. The lira – soldo – denaro denominations followed the same pattern (1 lira = 20 soldi = 240 denari), as did the ducat – gigliato – quarto series.

\textit{maona} – Originally an Arabic term. In 1234, Muslims destroyed the Genoese colony at Ceuta on the straits of Gibraltar. The sultan refused to compensate the losses, and the Genoese raised a fleet of 100 ships. All who had lost property at Ceuta had a stake in the \textit{maona}, a structure by which the commune contracted out the conquest in return for a loan.\textsuperscript{452} Genoese ship captains put themselves under the command of an admiral chosen by the commune, and all expenses were reimbursed by the commune. The expedition to Ceuta was successful, and duties were imposed on the people of Ceuta to recover expenses. All creditors were registered in special lists, and their shares were transferable. In 1236, for example, a certain Johannes sold to Balduino de Vindercio his stake in the \textit{maona} of fifty-eight bisanti. This model was used also in the conquest of Chios and Cyprus.

\textsuperscript{451} Şevket Pamuk, \textit{A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire}, p. 5; Felloni, \textit{Genova e la storia della finanza}, p. 79.
\textsuperscript{452} Sieveking, \textit{Studio sulle Finanze Genovesi nel Medioevo}, p. 52.
mina (plural mine) – A measure of grain, wine, and salt. On 7 December 1403, a ship was loaded with 750 sacks of grain equivalent to 1875 mine. Without knowing the size of the sacks, we cannot be more precise.

moggio (plural moggi) – The main late medieval and early modern Italian unit of measurement for grain. It was divided into four quarte, which further subdivided into sixteen capicii (singular capicīus or capicio). One authority puts the Genoese moggio at 281.51 kilograms. Like other measurements, it varied widely by region. The capacity of ships was sometimes measured in moggi, and a ship in the port of Pera just after the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople was listed at a capacity of 900 moggi. More often, however, the capacity of ships was given in cantari, widely used across the Mediterranean for bulk goods.

vegete – The most common measure for wine. One authority says that a vegete was equivalent to almost half a metric ton; yet Zachariadou and Bryer agree that we simply don't have enough data to link the vegete to a modern measure. In the fifteenth century, a transaction of seventeen vegeti of salted tuna sold for 170 Venetian ducats is recorded.

454 Origone, Chio nel Tempo della Caduta di Costantinopoli, p. 239.
457 Bryer and Lowry, Continuity and Change, p. 92-3.
The Genoese colonies in the Mediterranean and European Atlantic in the late fourteenth century. (Source: Codex Parisinus latinus (1395) in Ph. Lauer, Catalogue des manuscrits latins, pp. 95-6)
Appendix C

Investors in the cargo of the ship of Nicolo Gentile on the Chios-Southampton Route – departed 6 November (sometime between 1445-48), laden with 11,200 cantari of alum. (Source: Sandra Origone, *Chio nel Tempo della Caduta di Costantinopoli* (Genoa: Civico Istituto Colombiano, 1981), pp. 15.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Investors</th>
<th>Shares</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bartolomeo and Domenico Doria (two shares)</td>
<td>1452 cantari 33 1/3 rotoli</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bartolomeo Doria</td>
<td>1283 cant. 33 rot.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicolo de Marini</td>
<td>1525 cant. 33 rot.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paride Giustiniani and Pietro Praterio (for Francesco Draperio +1)</td>
<td>1339 cant. 2/3 rot. each</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pietro Praterio</td>
<td>1288 cant. 83 2/3 rot.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giovanni Specia</td>
<td>248 cant. 22 rot.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baldassare Adorno</td>
<td>100 cantari</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visconte Giustiniani</td>
<td>626 cant. 88 ½ rot.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cristofooro and and Nicolo Giustiniani</td>
<td>339 cant. 2/3 rot.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dario Vivaldi</td>
<td>84 cant. 79 2/3 rot.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lazzaro da Rapallo</td>
<td>100 cantari</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antonio Bocono</td>
<td>100 cantari</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix D

Correspondence between the 1455 *Tahrir* and the Genoese Notarial Records

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marya Maryana (widowed dhimmi)</th>
<th>De Marini?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pagani (poor dhimmi)</td>
<td>- Argentina, daughter of deceased Silvestro De Franchi di Pagana (1475) - monk Giorgio di Pagana (1475)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karlo Konfroti (renting a shop formerly belonging to Brabka İspinora)</td>
<td>Carlo Confortino, attested in Galata after the conquest (1453)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akosten Larka (rich foreign merchant living in home of Anton de Festacon)</td>
<td>Lercari or Lercaro? (Agostino)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Domenigo İskarsafigo (poor dhimmi) - Berthoma İskarsifico (poor dhimmi)</td>
<td>Squarciafico (Domenico and Bartolomeo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Toma İspindora (left before conquest) - Pero Spinora (left, but wife still in Galata) - Brabka İspinora (Barnaba?) - Dorya İspinora (Dario?) dhimmi - Irena İspitora (left during conquest) - Lorenc İspirtora (Lorenzo) - Anton İspinora (house confiscated)</td>
<td>- Tommaso Spinola (1443) - Tommaso Spinola son of Gaspare (1453 in Galata, 1453-4 on Chios) - Pietro Spinola, 1460 in Genoa - Lorenzo Spinola on Chios 1453-4 - Antonio Spinola on Chios 1453</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

96
Bibliography

Published Primary Sources:

Airaldi, Gabriella, Studi e Documenti su Genova e l’Oltremare (Genoa: Università di Genova, Istituto di paleografia e storia medievale, 1974).

Balletto, Laura, Liber Oficii Provisionis Romanie (Genova, 1424-1428) (Genoa: Universita’ degli Studi di Genova, 2000).

Belgrano, Luigi Tommaso, Prima serie di documenti riguardanti la colonia di Pera, vol. XIII (Genoa: Atti della Societa' Ligure di Storia Patria, 1877).

_____, Seconda serie di documenti riguardanti la colonia di Pera, vol. XVII (Genoa: Atti della Societa' Ligure di Storia Patria, 1884).


İnalcık, Halil, The Survey of Istanbul 1455 (İstanbul: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2012).


Musso, Gian Giacomo, “Armamento e navigazione a Genova tra il tre e il quattrocento (appunti e documenti),” in Guerra e commercio nell’evoluzione della marina genovese tra XV e XVII secolo, ed. Gian Giacomo Musso (Genoa: Centro per la storia della tecnica in Italia del Consiglio nazionale

_____, *Mostra Documentaria Liguria-Catalunya, xii-xv secolo* (Genoa: Archivio di Stato, 1969)


Roccatagliata, Ausilia, *Notai Genovesi in Oltremare: Atti Rogati a Pera e Milti, 2 vols.: Pera (1408-1490) and Mytilene* (Genoa: Università di Genova, Istituto di paleografia e storia medievale, 1982).

_____, *Notai Genovesi in Oltremare: Atti Rogati a Chio (1453-1454,1470-1471)* (Genoa: Università di Genova, Istituto di paleografia e storia medievale, 1982).


Toniolo, Paola Piana, *Notai Genovesi in Oltremare: Atti Rogati a Chio da Gregorio Panissario (1403-5)* (Genoa: Academia Ligure di Scienze e Lettere, 1995).


_____, *Codice Diplomatico delle Colonie Tauro-Liguri durante la Signoria dell’Ufficio di S. Giorgio (MCCCCLIII-MCCCCLXXV)*, vol. VII (Genoa: Atti della Societa' Ligure di Storia Patria, 1871-9).

**Secondary Sources:**


Bentley, Jerry H., “The New World History,” in *Companion to Western Historical*


Buongiorno, Mario, L’amministrazione Genovese nella Romania (Genoa: Fratelli Bozzi, 1977).

Van Doosselaere, Quentin, Commercial Agreements and Social Dynamics in Medieval Genoa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).


Felloni, Guiseppe and Guido Laura, Genova e la storia della finanza: dodici primati? (Genoa: Banco di San Giorgio, 2014).

Finkel, Caroline, Osman's Dream: The History of the Ottoman Empire (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2005).


_____, European and Islamic Trade in the Early Ottoman State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

Frank, Andre Gunder and Barry Gill, eds., The World System: Five Hundred Years or Five Thousand (London, Routledge, 1994).


_____, The Ottoman Empire, The Classical Age, 1300-1600 (London: Phoenix, 1994).

İnalcık, Halil and Donald Quataert, eds., An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), volume I: 1300-1600.


_____, “Una famiglia nobile del mondo coloniale genovese: I Di Negro, mercanti e 'baroni' del Grandi Comneni di Trebisonda,” in Oriente e


Ortaylı, İliber, Son İmparatorluk Osmanlı (Istanbul: Timas Yayımları, 2006).


Papagna, Elena, ‘Uno Sconosciuto Carteggio Marittimo-Mercantile Genovese nel


_____, *I Gin dell’Oltremare* (Genoa: Civico Istituto Colombiano, 1988).


