


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### Discourse of Left-Kemalists in Turkey: Case of the Journal, *Yön*, 1961-1967

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# Discourse of Left-Kemalists in Turkey: Case of the Journal, *Yön*, 1961–1967

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One significant although highly overlooked characteristic of Kemalism, the founding and official ideology of the modern Republic of Turkey, is its language of political communication. Kemalist political language, contrary to other totalitarian ideologies of the twentieth century, such as fascism or national-socialism, did not regard society-directed propaganda activities as core activities. The primary reason for this was the elitist understanding of society adopted by Kemalist ideology.<sup>1</sup> According to its common view, society is not a political category in that it does not conceive of society as a dynamic constituent composed of dissimilarities, classes, discrepancies, exchanges and tensions. Instead, Kemalism views society as a ‘classless unprivileged’ mass of people. Since society is not conceived of as a political category *per se*, one of the main components of political activity, propaganda activity toward society, is not deemed a top priority. For this reason, the Kemalist paradigm of communication is predicated on the ‘education of society’ instead of the ‘persuasion of society,’ and it conveys the message to the actors in this education process—the bureaucrats.

In this sense, the primary audience of the Kemalist paradigm of communication are government officials, particularly teachers and military officers, or, in other words, Turkish elites in as much as these elites are the primary actors in citizenship education. Even though schools and the army stand out as instruments of educating ideal citizens,<sup>2</sup> they do not stand out as fora of official ideology propaganda. Rather, the official expectation of these two institutions is, in accordance with the Kemalist paradigm, that they assume the duty of imposing a collective identity on society and of teaching the people their obligations to the state.

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<sup>1</sup> Mete Tunçay (1999) *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nde Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kuruluşu* [Emergence of One-Party State in the Republic of Turkey] (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Publications); and Taha Parla (1992) *Türkiye’de Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları, Cilt 3: Kemalist Tek Parti İdeolojisi ve CHP’nin Altı Oku* [Official Sources of Political Culture in Turkey: Ideology of the Kemalist Single-Party and the RPP’s Six Arrows, Vol. 3] (İstanbul: İletişim Pub.).

<sup>2</sup> Füsün Üstel (2004) *Makbul Vatandaşın Peşinde* [In Pursuit of the Ideal Citizen] (İstanbul: İletişim Pub.); and Birol Caymaz (2007) *Türkiye’de Vatandaşlık: Resmi İdeoloji ve Yansımaları* [Citizenship in Turkey: Official Ideology and Reflections] (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi).

The imperious language of communication appears in textbooks as part and parcel of this process, as well as in regulatory statutes, notices, parades and marching songs. This language is constructed in a vertical framework and views itself as the conveyor of singular and absolute truth. In the Kemalist paradigm of communication, publicity cannot find a place, since, as an omnipotent actor, it is an exercise in futility for the state to communicate its own activities to the masses who ought to be educated in the first place. The Kemalist paradigm of communication is shaped by the schools and barracks, as well as by means of the works by the intellectuals of the Republic. Right alongside Kemalist history, sociology, philosophy and literature, particularly periodicals, are of vital importance in terms of the construction of the Kemalist paradigm of communication.

In the Republic of Turkey, Kemalism, albeit formulized as the official ideology in 1935, was an ideological framework that emerged at the very beginning of the Republic. Even after 1935 its contour continued evolving. Within this process the major contributions to Kemalism were made through the journals *Kadro* (1931–1935) and *Yön* (1961–1967). The particular contributions made by these two journals can consequently and conspicuously be observed in the dominant forms of representation in contemporary Turkish political culture. These journals, along with their contribution to the formation of the Kemalist interpretation of modernism, also served to consolidate the imperious language of communication as well as to extend it.

The *Yön* journal was a medium of mass communication that, on the one hand, could be deployed by the radical Turkish left due to the socialist ideas of its pioneering publishers, but, on the other hand, could be perceived as one of the keystones of left-Kemalism on account of its dominant Kemalist tone. This article attempts to examine the founding cadre, cause, priorities, primary ideological principals and political objectives of *Yön* in association with the important socio-political developments of the time and to sociologically resolve its construction of the language of communication and disclose the ‘political conservatism’ in this language. Thus, it examines *Yön*, which has been referred to both implicitly or explicitly as ‘progressive’ in the history of Turkish political thought, but excludes the ‘progressiveness-reaction’ dichotomy and analyzes it from a different perspective. In order to do this, the journal’s ideas about democracy, nationalism, socialism, statism, Kemalism and contemporary forces will be set forth, its proposed ideology of modernization will be explicated and its contribution to the interpretation and popularization of Kemalism will be analyzed. The research basis is the data acquired by critical analyses of all of the issues of the journal published between 1961 and 1967, excepting a fourteen-month period when there was no publication.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> The most systematic and inclusive survey of *Yön* has been conducted by Hikmet Özdemir (1986) *Kalkınmada Bir Strateji Arayışı Yön Hareketi* [The *Yön* Movement: A Search for Strategy in Economic Development] (Ankara: Bilgi Pub.). This is the first academic study on the topic, and originally was a graduate thesis written under the supervision of Mümtaz Soysal, one of the founders of *Yön*. See also Özdemir’s 2000 compilation of writings by Doğan Avcıoğlu, *Doğan Avcıoğlu: Bir Jön Türkün Ardından* [Doğan Avcıoğlu: In the Memory of a Young Turk] (Ankara: Bilgi Pub.); Yalçın Küçük (1988) *Aydın Üzerine Tezler 1830–1980 Beşinci Kitap* [Theses on ‘The Intellectual, Vol. 5] (Ankara: Tekin Pub.); Hikmet Kıvılcımlı (1970) *27 Mayıs ve Yön Hareketinin Sınıfsal Eleştirisi* [May 27 and a Denominational Critique of the *Yön* movement] (İstanbul: Ant Pub.); Yıldız Serter (1978) *Türkiye’de İlerici Akımlar ve Kalkınma Davamız* [Progressive Movements in Turkey and the Case of Economic Development] (İstanbul: Cem Pub.); H. Bayram Kaçmazoğlu (1995) *27 Mayıs’tan 12 Mart’a Türkiye’de Siyasal Fikir Hareketleri* [From May 27 to March 12: Political Ideology Movements in Turkey] (İstanbul: Birey Pub.); Mehmet Arı (1994) *Türkiye’de Sol Milliyetçilik: Yön Hareketi*,

## The Founders and Primary Principles of *YÖN*

*Yön* flourished in the political and ideological climate that ensued after the military coup of May 27, 1960—a coup led by a group of left-oriented intellectuals determined to have a voice in contemporary and future Turkish politics. They adopted a primarily ‘third world’ Kemalist interpretation and attached the utmost priority to the economic development of Turkey. Accordingly, they propagated a development philosophy that defended state intervention as the solution for a wide range of problems, from social to financial. *Yön* first was published on December 20, 1961, and it continued to be published for approximately seven years, including the compulsory stoppage for fourteen months.<sup>4</sup>

The principal editor of *Yön* was Doğan Avcıoğlu<sup>5</sup> and the main financial backer was Cemal Reşit Eyüboğlu.<sup>6</sup> The ‘cadre’ was comprised of five people: Doğan Avcıoğlu, Mümtaz Soysal, İlhan Selçuk, İlhami Soysal and Cemal Reşit Eyüboğlu.<sup>7</sup> The first four of these were the leading writers in the journal as well, although only Avcıoğlu’s name appeared in credits and titles as ‘the grant holder and mandate manager’ until the eleventh issue. The names cited in the ‘the list of founders’ given in credits and titles after the eleventh issue were Eyüboğlu, Soysal and Avcıoğlu, with the latter still appearing in credits and titles as ‘the grant holder and mandate manager.’ However, Avcıoğlu continued to write most of the editorials. Özdemir groups *Yön*’s writers into four categories. The first group comprised the founding cadre (Avcıoğlu, Soysal, Selçuk and Soysal), while a second group included Niyazi Berkes, Şevket Süreyya Aydemir and Sadun Aren, each of whom, while not fully active, helped to shape the ideological learnings of the journal via their writing. The third group included names such as Cahit Tanyol, İdris Küçükömer, Fethi Naci, Rauf Mutluay, Adil Aşçıoğlu, Atilla İlhan, Mehmed Kemal, Erol Ulubelen, Çetin Altan and İbrahim Çamlı. The final group comprised Nimet Arzık, Hasan Hüseyin, Ayperi Akalan, Nijat Özön, Muzaffer Erdost, Memet Fuat, Samim Kocagöz, Aziz Nesin, Fakir Baykurt, Muammer Aksoy, Mustafa Ekmekçi, Selahattin Hilâv, Arslan Başer Kafaçoğlu, Mehmet Karabulut, Yaşar Kemal, M. Şükrü Koç, Melih

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### Footnote 3 continued

Birikim, 67, pp. 25–35; Kemal H. Karpat (1962) *Yön ve Devletçilik Üzerine*, I-II-III, *Forum*, 208, 209, 210; Kurtuluş Kayalı (1988) *Kalkınmada Bir Strateji Arayışı: Yön Hareketi*, *Tarih ve Toplum*, 9(51), pp. 61–63; Orhan Koloğlu (1977) *Tarihin Bunalımı ve D. Avcıoğlu ile Bir Söyleşi*, *Özgür İnsan*, 5(9), pp. 59–63; Elçin Macar (1992) *Doğan Avcıoğlu ve 12 Mart*, *İktisat Dergisi*, 332, pp. 28–32; Hikmet Özdemir (1987) *Jakoben Bir Aydının Yaşamından Çizgiler*, *Toplumsal Kurtuluş*, Hikmet Özdemir (1988) *Kalkınmada Bir Strateji Arayışı Yön Hareketi*, *Maliye Yazıları*, 14–15, pp. 189–191; Yayha Sezai Tezel (1978) *Türkiye’de Aydın-Bürokrat Tahakkümü İdeolojisinde Son Değişmeler*, *Toplumcu Düşün*, 4, pp. 304–309; Niyazi Berkes (1964) *200 Yıldır Neden Bocalıyoruz?* [Why are We Struggling for Two Centuries?] (Ankara: Yön Pub.); and İdris Küçükömer (1994) *Cuntacıliktan Sivil Toplumla* [From Military Junta to Civil Society] (İstanbul: Bağlam Pub.).

<sup>4</sup> Özdemir emphasizes that the circulation of journal was around 30,000 in the first years of the journal; however, it declined to around 10,000 by 1967; See Özdemir, *Kalkınmada Bir Strateji Arayışı*, p. 54.

<sup>5</sup> For the most detailed biography of Avcıoğlu, see Özdemir, *Doğan Avcıoğlu*, pp. 11–46.

<sup>6</sup> Eyüboğlu supported the weekly journal *Devrim*, regarded as the follow-up to *Yön*, which came out between the years 1967 and 1971; see İlhami Soysal (1988) *Yön Kurucusu Cemal Bey*, *Milliyet*, October 27, 1988.

<sup>7</sup> Hamdi Avcıoğlu also can be mentioned, as he shouldered *Yön*’s internal and external burden and also was Doğan Avcıoğlu’s brother; see İlhan Selçuk (1997) *Yeni Ufuklara Doğru Yol Alırken*, *Yön*, 222; and Soysal, “*Yön Kurucusu Cemal Bey*.”

Cevdet Anday, Hayati Asilyazıcı, Behzat Ay, Türkkaya Ataöv, Sırrı Hocaoğlu, Turan Güneş and Taner Timur.<sup>8</sup>

In its first issue, *Yön* published a manifesto signed by 146 individuals, most of whom were civil servants.<sup>9</sup> The manifesto offered a detailed explanation to the readers as to why the journal was being published and the principles to be followed during its literary life.<sup>10</sup> Another important text revealing the political and intellectual bases of the journal was ‘the declaration of association’ brought out by Sosyalist Düşünce Derneği (SDK) [Foundation for Socialist Thought], which had been established by the founding cadre of *Yön*.<sup>11</sup> These two texts can be analyzed to see the ideology and basic principles held by the journal.

As both aforementioned texts emphasize that the goal of the author is to develop the economy immediately. The only way to reach a state of developed civilization, fulfill social justice and to establish democracy is to develop immediately.<sup>12</sup> What is needed for a high rate of development is the presence of a political staff that believes in the importance of development.<sup>13</sup> However, this immediate development should be fulfilled in accordance with social justice principles and there should not be major divisions within society at the end of this process.<sup>14</sup> The government should act in such a manner as to make the development process as consistent with the principles a high development rate of social justice as possible.<sup>15</sup> As can be seen, the fact that development needs to be achieved in compliance with the principal of social justice requires a politicized governmental structure. Since the problems within society can increase daily, the existing process of change is not able to shape the development in a positive way. When this is the case, unplanned urbanization, for instance, can occur, and this situation causes the emergence of problems that will sap social security.<sup>16</sup> In order to have a proper and massive effect, ‘the parties which engage in a position to direct Turkish society should compromise on a clear development philosophy.’<sup>17</sup> Carrying out the development goal will eliminate social problems caused by economic recession, such as rapid population growth, urban migration, shanty towns, unemployment and famine.

In the declaration of association of SKD, it is stated that the issue of economic development was often raised after World War II, but the capitalistic development method imposed on the country has neither been able to provide a rapid increase in income nor has it been able to prevent the imbalanced distribution of income within society. In addition, the reading of recent history in the manifesto is also noteworthy. For example, it said that the state tried to create a ‘society without classes’ during the early years of the Republic, but later this mission was given up in favor of ‘the method to create clear-cut class

<sup>8</sup> Soysal, “Yön Kurucusu Cemal Bey.”

<sup>9</sup> The manifesto later was signed by 878 people; for the full list of the people who signed the manifesto, see Özdemir, *Kalkınmada Bir Strateji Arayışı Yön Hareketi*, pp. 301–327.

<sup>10</sup> (1961) Yön Bildirisi, *Yön*, 1, December 20, 1961.

<sup>11</sup> (1963) Sosyalist Kültür Derneği Kuruluş Bildirisi, *Yön*, 61, February 13, 1963.

<sup>12</sup> Yön Bildirisi.

<sup>13</sup> Sosyalist Kültür Derneği Kuruluş Bildirisi.

<sup>14</sup> Yön Bildirisi.

<sup>15</sup> Sosyalist Kültür Derneği Kuruluş Bildirisi.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Yön Bildirisi.

divisions' which created grounds for class conflicts. With respect to the multi-party period, the SKD manifesto stated that even the formal principals of democracy were ignored, and scholars at that time only had shallow discussions about the formal ways of the political system, while 'the suppressive regulations at that time prevented ideas from being generated.'<sup>18</sup> This period was terminated by the 27 May movement, which emerged 'as a result of the public reaction' to this multi-party system. 'This movement gave way to the start of an arousal and quest period for Turkish intellectuals.'<sup>19</sup> Scholars' horizons were expanded during that period and the intellectual shallowness prevailing in the former period began to disappear.

The SDK manifesto said that, consequently, the opportunity to think about social problems within a broader framework emerged at this time (the May 27 coup). Despite this, the political staff that supported development within a capitalistic order accepted the idea of a form of planned development. At that point, however, the governing structure was not sufficiently qualified to achieve the goals of rapid development in a socially judicious way. Thus, Turkish society was in need of a way to develop, and it would be socialism that would lead the way. Socialism is heralded as 'the only method to enable the underdeveloped countries to develop rapidly and in a socially judicious way' that makes reasonable use of human and natural resources, increases the sustainability potential of society through equality of opportunities and makes social justice possible.<sup>20</sup> In essence, socialism is 'the only way to a balanced development that is never exploitative and which takes place fast within a democratic structure.'<sup>21</sup>

Furthermore, the socialist development method anticipates 'a mixed socialist economy' under the leadership of the government and is formulized as 'new statism.' According to the *Yön* manifesto, it is inevitable that development led by the private sector in an underdeveloped country will be slow, troublesome and costly, and it will cause social injustice. 'Such development, because it subjugates the political power to the economic power on a large scale, is not democratic, either.'<sup>22</sup> Private enterprise, which acts in harmony with the principle of profit, does not feel the necessity to put any effort into development since it may profit from non-development as well. Thus, 'national wealth' is not utilized for benefit-based purposes, but rather for profit-based purposes. 'No underdeveloped country today can dare take this [risk].'<sup>23</sup> The aforesaid *Yön* manifesto gives examples of the 'prodigious growth in some industrial branches' in England and France, declaring that the understanding of new statism is perceived as 'conscious state intervention.'

According to this new understanding, an increase in national savings, the moving of a substantial part of the increase in national income to national savings, raising the efficiency of taxes, the holistic planning of the national economy, organizing farmers, directing idle labor to production and the development of a cooperative system in micro-industry can all only be achieved through state intervention. By implementing this new statism, injustice in the distribution of income will be eliminated, social security will be ensured, the exploitation of society will be prevented and the imbalance among regions of

<sup>18</sup> Sosyalist Kültür Derneği Kuruluş Bildirisi.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> *Yön* Bildirisi.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

the country will disappear: 'Statism is the basic interventionist tool which will prevent the democratic regime from being just a form and appropriate it to the masses.'<sup>24</sup> The potentially negative side effects of the development also will be eliminated through statism. This understanding of socialism is a 'nationalist' one. In the SDK manifesto, however, it is claimed that this nationalism is by no means 'deceitful or reactionary,' as

the nationalism of Turkish socialists is a nationalism that is dependent on and directed to the nation, explains what to do for the nation, [and] wants to create a nation comprised of Turkish people who respect and do not exploit each other, . . . [and] is directed toward the goal of establishing an independent Turkey with an internationally respected character, [is] self-confident, [and] counts its happiness as one of the indispensables of international peace and happiness.<sup>25</sup>

Besides being nationalist, Turkish socialism is also 'liberal' because it is meant to be 'cherishing the individual and labor.'

As both aforementioned texts discuss such concepts as socialism, nationalism, statism, democracy, etc., around the notion of development, and, accordingly, their concern with plotting the course of Turkish society and politics cannot escape detection. These manifestos highlight the fact that Westernization can only occur by attaining the production levels of the West and, accordingly, they touch on the topic of development, asserting that the socialist development method is the continuation of the national independence movement and, above all else, is a model possessing a national character. The editors promise to examine all the theses in these manifestos in future issues of *Yön*, a publication they proclaimed as a 'mission journal.'

### **Prior Areas of Discussion and Political Goals of the Journal**

In this section, the subheadings will reveal the political stance of *Yön*. In this sense, there will be analyses under subheads, such as Kemalism, socialism, statism, nationalism, democracy and the active forces. In this way it will be possible to see *Yön*'s place in the Turkish political arena and to discuss the impact of its language of political communication. It is useful to put forward the following formulation to identify the ideology and scope of *Yön* at the outset of this discussion: the domestic source on which *Yön* was based is Kemalism; the basic goal it put before Turkish society was economic development; the methods it suggested were socialism and statism; the concepts it called for to implement these policies and to acquaint Turkish society and politics with them were nationalism and democracy; and the actors it called upon to influence politics were the active forces.

#### *Kemalism*

Just like the journal *Kadro*, which was published between 1932 and 1935, *Yön* can be read as an attempt to reinterpret Kemalism in accordance with the conditions of its time

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<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> Sosyalist Kültür Derneği Kuruluş Bildirisi.

(the 1960s).<sup>26</sup> *Yön*'s relationship with Kemalism involved more than just a 'rational' relationship, but more 'a re-interpretation of Kemalism in accordance with the conditions of the current period.' In this sense, suggesting that Kemalism is solely an instrument utilized by *Yön* to gain legitimacy is an insufficient explanation. For, as can be seen on the pages of *Yön*, Kemalism was treated as an ideal state of reality—an existential perception of *Yön* intellectuals. It was standard practice to re-interpret Atatürk's ideas, words and actions on most subjects discussed in the journal and to offer these interpretations as ultimate references.

To the intelligentsia in *Yön* circles, implementation of Atatürk's ideas in the 1960s meant the fair construction of a socialist system.<sup>27</sup> Atatürk's theories reflect the basic principles of Turkish socialism and Turkish statism.<sup>28</sup> It is suggested that the non-capitalist development method adopted by *Yön* originated from Atatürk's principles. In Avcıoğlu's words, 'the non-capitalist development method is nothing more than the practice of Atatürk's statism and populism principles, which he found through great intuition.'<sup>29</sup> The main requirement to keep up with the pace of development in the present era, he continued, is to implement Atatürk's doctrines.<sup>30</sup> *Yön* writers defended the socialist and statist ideology they supported—opposition to private enterprise and an anti-imperialist demeanor—as indispensable aspects of the Kemalist attitude:

If we go on encouraging private enterprise against the public, who cannot even find bread to eat and live under the most primitive and shameful conditions, are we not underestimating Atatürk's principles of statism, populism, and revolutionism? Atatürk, who says 'One of the goals of our economic policy is to nationalize the economic institutions and enterprises which are directly related to our own interests,' believed in the necessity of an economic order which is for the interest of the public. He was against imperialism and capitalism. He knew that our economic development would be realized by nationalism. He also used the expression 'Nation's Government' while referring to the fact that nationalism should be a machine operating not for the interest of a state capitalism but for the interest of the public.<sup>31</sup>

*Yön* appeared to prefer to deliver its messages via Atatürk and attempted to justify the premises it made with its reading of history.<sup>32</sup> Before anything else, *Yön* writers endorsed the approach to the hypothesis that the situation Turkey now confronted was similar to the situation in the 1920s.<sup>33</sup> Just as the 'revolutionists' of the 1920s managed to get out of that

<sup>26</sup> Hikmet Özdemir points out the similarities and differences between *Yön* and *Kadro*; see *ibid*, pp. 273–276.

<sup>27</sup> For example, see Doğan Avcıoğlu, et al. (1962) Açık Oturum: Atatürk'ün Özlediği Türkiye'yi Kurabildik Mi?, *Yön*, 47, November 7, 1962. In the very open session, Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, to whom Atatürk entrusted the journal *Kadro*, claimed that Atatürk's principles meant 'national socialism.'

<sup>28</sup> See Şevket Süreyya Aydemir (1962) Türk Sosyalizmi ve Fikir Atatürkçülüğü, *Yön*, 7, January 31, 1962.

<sup>29</sup> Doğan Avcıoğlu (1963) Sosyalizmden Önce Atatürkçülük, *Yön*, 69, April 10, 1963.

<sup>30</sup> See Aydemir, Türk Sosyalizmi ve Fikir Atatürkçülüğü.

<sup>31</sup> Behzat Ay (1962) Ekonomide Atatürkçülük, *Yön*, 48, November 14, 1962.

<sup>32</sup> *Yön* generally accepted the official perspective of history formed during the first years of the Republic. An individual study of the reading of history by *Yön* may reveal very efficient findings, especially on the evaluations of Ottoman society, economy and the structure of government.

<sup>33</sup> For example see Doğan Avcıoğlu (1962) Kaynağa Dönüş, *Yön*, 47, November 7, 1962.

aporia, the 1960s revolutionists would embrace Kemalism and come out into the light. However, the process that foresaw revolutionary changes in terms of Atatürk's social, political, cultural and economic understanding had been interrupted. The reason why this process failed/was made to fail was the Republican Peoples' Party (RPP)'s loss of its revolutionary character, which had been deep-seated during Atatürk's tenure as leader.<sup>34</sup> *Yön* writers dutifully stressed the point that it was necessary to finalize the process that Atatürk had started, but that had been interrupted. It was necessary to fulfill the reforms introduced by the 'sincere revolutionists.'<sup>35</sup>

In the articles that appeared in *Yön* it can be seen that the First Grand National Assembly, established on April 23, 1920, was viewed as an ideal assembly and it was claimed that the Kemalist understanding of populism also was revealed there.

The Grand National Assembly was constituted of military officers, state officers, small town traders, and various ecclesiastics. There was no one in the assembly who represented the world of big trade and industry . . . This assembly gathered around the longing for a populist Turkey. The First Grand National Assembly's declaration, dated 21 October 1920, reveals this populism so well.<sup>36</sup>

The populist program in this declaration is against capitalism, the *agas*' and rich peoples' administration. It wants the public to take control of the power hand in hand with the working class. It seems that the equivalent of the words 'social brotherhood and cooperation' today is SOCIALISM . . . The First Grand National Assembly also made it clear through its actions that it was committed to these principles."<sup>37</sup>

*Yön* writers, while insisting on Kemalism's relationship to socialism, mostly emphasized the concept of 'populism.' In their opinion, populism meant opposition to capitalism, the *agas* and the rich class's hegemony and that the working classes would assume direct power. They equated populism with socialism.<sup>38</sup> Populism, which was one of the basic principles during the early years of the Republic, no longer was a philosophy of the state by the 1960s because of the abusive policies of RPP. In effect, the alliance established between the bureaucracy and the wealthy caused the formation of a division between the state and the public, and the reforms launched in the early years of the

<sup>34</sup> As an example see Sırrı Hocaoğlu (1961) *Rejimin Gizli Hastalıkları: CHP Devrimcilikten Nasıl Uzaklaştı?*, *Yön*, 2, December 27, 1961: 'In spite of this, the principles introduced by Mustafa Kemal will survive for so many years. Whomever possesses them, is bound to be successful.' Şevket Süreyya Aydemir explains how Kemalism was demoted to 'form and appearance' in the process of the RPP's losing its revolutionary character just like Aristotle's logic formed the basis of scholastic thought in Christianity during the Middle Ages; see Şevket Süreyya Aydemir (1962) *Fikir Atatürkçülüğü ve Kelime Atatürkçülüğü*, *Yön*, 6, January 24, 1962.

<sup>35</sup> For example, see Turhan Tokgöz (1962) *Halkçılığın Hikayesi: II Mustafa Kemal ve Halk Partisi Devri*, *Yön*, 25, June 13, 1962.

<sup>36</sup> Avcıoğlu, *Kaynağa Dönüş*.

<sup>37</sup> Turhan Tokgöz (1962) *Halkçılığın Hikayesi: I Kuvvayı Milliye Devri*, *Yön*, 24, June 6, 1962.

<sup>38</sup> Avcıoğlu, *Kaynağa Dönüş*. The positive references to Ziya Gökalp on the topic of populism in the journal are noteworthy. 'Gökalp sets the objectives of populism in his series of articles titled Objectives of New Turkey: Populism is an ideal which attempts to demolish the servitude, feudalism, imperialism, slavery and fanaticism, namely all the institutions against freedom and equality.' Tokgöz, *Halkçılığın Hikayesi: II Mustafa Kemal ve Halk Partisi Devri*,

Republic were left incomplete. For instance, a permanent land reform could not be achieved, so a total social and economic transformation could not be achieved either. Similarly, Village Institutes, which pioneered the modernization of the public, were closed and ‘the movement’ that the Village Institutes had launched was left incomplete.<sup>39</sup>

No matter how obvious was the effort to establish a direct correlation between socialism and Kemalism, Niyazi Berkes, who tried to put Kemalism into a theoretical framework, approached this matter more conservatively in his articles in *Yön*. The importance of Berkes’s articles in this context lies in the fact that he took Kemalism as the main problem and elaborated on it. In Berkes’s opinion, ‘what makes Mustafa Kemal successful and Kemalism a revolution is the fact that he enabled Turkey to be established as a national state and ended a medieval age-like regime.’<sup>40</sup> Berkes, who thought the significance of Kemalism was emancipating itself from the negativities of the past and having the courage fundamentally to change society, mentioned three main principles of Kemalism. The first one is populism, a doctrine that was manufactured against the reign of the caliphate within the country and Western imperialism abroad. The second principle was nationalism, which to Berkes was fundamentally different from nationalist understandings of Turanism and Islamism. Berkes stressed that Atatürk, although stating that socialism should remain as an ideal, harshly criticized all other nationalisms. The third principle of Kemalism is revolutionism. According to Berkes, in Kemalist philosophy revolutionism means ‘the abolishment of traditional ideas, values, and institutions that stand in the way of social change.’<sup>41</sup> The reason why the principle of revolutionism exists is that it curbs reactionism. Thus, Berkes argued that Kemalism should not be treated as an ‘ideology,’ rather, that Kemalism is above all ideologies. He stated that if a serious socialism is to embody itself in Turkey in the future, it will not be substantiated by mere rejection of Kemalism; instead Kemalism should be taken as a reference point. However, claiming that socialism is equivalent to Kemalism does not correspond with historical facts.<sup>42</sup>

### *Socialism and Statism*

*Yön* defined itself as socialist. Its understanding of socialism is in parallel with the national socialist movements that emerged in the 1950s and 1960s in the non-Western world. In this context, there are very close similarities between the political stands called Arabic socialism or African socialism and *Yön*’s socialist ideology. It can easily be followed through the pages of *Yön* how the scholars around the journal followed these socialist movements closely and established sympathy with them. For example, with respect to the policies of Egypt under Gamal Abdülnasir, *Yön* stated: ‘The success of Nâsır’s socialist program, called the “National Law,” may be able to activate the oppressed and exploited

<sup>39</sup> The 17th issue of *Yön* was called Special Edition: Village Institutes. On its cover there appears a picture of a girl and a boy aged between 10 and 12; written in upper case, it says: ‘These two children were [the] first students of Village Institutes... Now they teach in Samsun... If it were not for the Institute, they would be lost and illiterate in villages’; see further, *Yön*, 17, April 11, 1962.

<sup>40</sup> Niyazi Berkes (1963) 200 *Yıldır Neden Bocahyoruz: VII – Atatürkçülük Nedir Ne Değildir?», Yön*, 63, February 27, 1963.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*

masses in the Middle East.<sup>43</sup> One goal of *Yön* was to create a ‘domestic socialism.’ At this point, even though it only was being stressed as an universal ideal, the need to construct a socialism in compliance with the current circumstances in Turkey is also stated. According to Türkaya Ataöv, ‘every regime flourishes in its own soil and in its best circumstances.’<sup>44</sup> This idea also stemmed from *Yön*’s cold and distant stance toward the socialist understanding of the Soviet Union. *Yön*, which did not find the Soviet socialist practice to be ‘democratic,’ believed in the need for the development of a national socialism appropriate for the current circumstances in Turkey and defended the idea that ‘socialism is the greatest nationalism.’<sup>45</sup>

The major emphasis in *Yön* was that socialism is not a destructive ideology, does not pose a threat to the security of the country, but rather it merely is a search for a system that would establish social justice. In this context, *Yön* frequently discussed the dissimilarity between socialism and communism, claiming that socialism was a totally different ideology from communism and even against it.<sup>46</sup> It was the case not seldom brought forward that the prevention of communism was only possible by means of socialism. These sorts of arguments can not be considered without taking into consideration the anti-communist discourse prevalent in the national and international discourse of the era. Such discourse played an effective role for both the Turkish right and the left. The tendency in *Yön* to view socialism, which the journal defined as a social order originating from and dependent on society, as a local element brings forth the concept of ‘Turkish socialism.’ As a matter of fact, this concept first was mentioned by Şevket Süreyya Aydemir in *Yön*, and it came to represent the dominant understanding of socialism in the journal, despite the objections of Sadun Aren. According to Aydemir:

Turkish Socialism is based on the Turkish National Independence movement. The maxims of Turkish Socialism are: 1) Anti-imperialism: Pro-independence; 2) Anti-capitalism: National and populist economy; 3) Progressive statism: Does not reject a mixed economy but rather parasite-like exploitation; 4) Populism for people: Utilizing the state to benefit for people, in other words providing social justice; 5) A notion of motherland just like Mustafa Kemal’s comprehension of the concept and standing up to aggression and invasion; 6) A nation much like Mustafa Kemal perceived it: Scientific nationalism in language, history and culture; 7) A differentiation of nationalism in state,

<sup>43</sup> (1962) Arap Birliği, *Yön*, 40, September 19, 1962. Accordingly, in issues 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46 and 48, Gamal Abdülnasır’s revolutionary National Law appeared and was presented as a socialist program. *Yön* closely followed political developments in Egypt, the rest of the Middle East and Africa. In this context, flash news and close observations were featured in the journal. For example, Melih Tümer, a distinguished economist, visited Cairo to observe socialism and to talk with Egyptian economists and bureaucrats; see Melih Tümer (1961), 30 Milyonluk Orduda 40 Bin Yaralı!, *Yön*, 1, December 20, 1961. There also were articles about Cuba; see Türkaya Ataöv (1962) Castro Sosyalizmi, *Yön*, 7, January 31, 1962; and Doğan Avcıoğlu (1962) Sosyalist Cezayir, *Yön*, 15, March 28, 1962.

<sup>44</sup> Türkaya Ataöv (1962) Türk Sosyalizmine Doğru, *Yön*, 12, March 7, 1962.

<sup>45</sup> Doğan Avcıoğlu (1962) Yapıcı Milliyetçilik, *Yön*, 4, January 10, 1962.

<sup>46</sup> For example, see Şevket Süreyya Aydemir (1962) Komünizm İle Mücadele, *Yön*, 34, September 5, 1962; Halil Özyörük (1962) Komünizm Nedir?, *Yön*, 9, February 14, 1962; Doğan Avcıoğlu (1967) Batıda Ortanın Solu Sosyalizm ve Komünizm, *Yön*, 205, March 3, 1967; İlhan Selçuk (1962) Şantaj İflas Edecektir, *Yön*, 4, January 10, 1962; Abdi İpekçi (1962) Sosyalizm Komünizmin Zehiri Mi, Panzehiri Mi?, *Yön*, 5, January 17, 1962; and İlhami Soysal (1962) İftira Eden Namussuzdur, *Yön*, 42, October 3, 1962.

government, foreign policy and economy; 8) To instill a Social State into the Democratic order and create its organs; 9) Planning, which encompasses all branches of national life; 10) Protection and organization of labor and service and strong and independent unionism; and 11) A strict separation of state and the religious affairs: laicism.<sup>47</sup>

Discussions on socialism in the journal consistently emphasized its two aspects:<sup>48</sup> socialism as a 'life style' and socialism as a 'way of development.' Although there were fewer discussions on socialism's first aspect, the developmental character of socialism in general was in the spotlight. According to Sadun Aren, '... while such a separation is useful in exposing the true rationale of socialism, it is not correct. This is because there is a strong tie between socialism as a life style and as a means of development. Moreover, these two are by no means to be abstracted.'<sup>49</sup> In this context, statism is a frequently discussed subject. *Yön* writers asserted that attempting development through private enterprise in an 'underdeveloped country' like Turkey not only would take too long, but also would lead to a surge in social injustice. Thus, they stressed the necessity to generate a statist philosophy. A development strategy set around a central structure would not entail capitalist businesses making profits, but rather would enable society to develop steadily and rapidly. Likewise, 'imperialist policies' would be confronted with a systematic statist policy:

While other nations continue to develop, fooling around [and] waiting for corrupt imperialists and blood-sucking capitalists to help us ... serves the interests of capitalists and exploiters inside and outside the country [and] leads people to poverty and hunger.<sup>50</sup>

Ironically, while emphasizing the importance of statism, the 'civilized nations of the world' are held up as examples.

Look at the civilized countries of the world. They treat statism with great respect. Recent history is a history of a passage from liberalism to socialism. Peoples aim for the notions of a social state and social reform. Statism is considered a natural course for the welfare and happiness of individuals.<sup>51</sup>

<sup>47</sup> Şevket Süreyya Aydemir (1963) Türk Sosyalizminin İlkeleri, *Yön*, 56, January 9, 1963. For further information on Turkish socialism see Şevket S. Aydemir (1962) Kemalizm Ortâ Mâlî Değildir!, *Yön*, 17, April 11, 1962; Aydemir, Türk Sosyalizmi ve Fikir Atatürkçülüğü; and Ataöv, Türk Sosyalizmine Doğru.

<sup>48</sup> For articles that demonstrate the journal's understanding of socialism, see Erdoğan Alkan (1962) Sosyalizm ve Köy Kalkınması, *Yön*, 45, October 24, 1962; Sadun Aren (1962) Devrimcilik Nedir?, *Yön*, 48, November 14, 1962; Sadun Aren (1962) Nasıl Bir Sosyalizm, *Yön*, 13, March 14, 1962; Doğan Avcıoğlu (1962) Niçin Sosyalizm, *Yön*, 7, January 31, 1962; Doğan Avcıoğlu (1962) Sosyalizm Anlayışımız, *Yön*, 36, August 22, 1962; Doğan Avcıoğlu, et al. (1962) Yön'ün Sosyalizm Konusunda Açık Oturumu: Üç Profesör Sosyalizmi Savunuyor, *Yön*, 7, January 31, 1962; Adnan Çalıkoğlu (1962) Köyde Sosyalizm Kooperatifçilik, *Yön*, 6, January 24, 1962; Kemal Kurdaş (1963) Eğitimde Sosyalizm, *Yön*, 65, March 13, 1963; and John Strachey (1962) Sosyalizm Nedir Ne Değildir?, *Yön*, 7, January 31, 1962.

<sup>49</sup> Sadun Aren (1962) Demokrasi ve Sosyalizm, *Yön*, 34, August 8, 1962.

<sup>50</sup> Ay, Ekonomide Atatürkçülük.

<sup>51</sup> İlhan Selçuk (1962) Bizim Milliyetçiliğimiz, *Yön*, 3, January 3, 1962.

*Yön* writers who believed that Turkey's economic development could be realized through industrialization believed that this only would be possible with the help of the state.<sup>52</sup> To Avcıoğlu,

the first subject matter of statism is on creating a political establishment and environment that favors statism. The main objective in statism is to replace private interest with public interest. For this reason, a fully public-oriented statism never can be considered apart from populism. Without an absolute populist government, statism cannot properly fulfill what is expected of it. Therefore, the state should be saved from private interest, which only would be possible through preventing money-oriented economic power from capturing the state. In order to diminish the powerful influence of private interest, sectors like banking, insurance and foreign trade should be nationalized, inland trade should be saved from brokers, the political power of landlords should be broken through a radical land reform and wide cooperative action should be taken . . . Statism, a means of implementing democracy, is also a rational way of economic development. . . . A thorough planning of economic life is a natural outcome. Planning without a rational development doctrine would steer away from its course. Socialism, as a populist and a rational development doctrine, establishes an environment most suitable for statism and planning.<sup>53</sup>

As for *Yön* writers, they did not believe it possible for society to internalize modern values without the presence of statism. Furthermore, they held that political freedom would be meaningless without economic independence, the absence of which would hold back society from developing. This particular consideration provides a very important theoretical basis that helps us understand the political position *Yön* writers represented.

### Nationalism

There is a striking, common point among writers in *Yön* on the subject of nationalism. They differentiated between true nationalism and false nationalism. This differentiation either explicitly or implicitly was present in almost every written piece on nationalism in *Yön*. In comments, 'those calling themselves nationalists' are criticized, while *Yön* writers are claimed to be 'true nationalists.' In many articles 'phony nationalists' are caricaturized and accused of abusing religion and the nation. For example, according to a 1962 editorial,

[n]ationalism in today's Turkey only will gain respect when love for the nation becomes synonymous with love for the people. The first condition of this love for the people is to work for the welfare of the people, to endure certain sacrifices and to

<sup>52</sup> Sadun Aren (1962) Devletçilik: Sanayiinin Himayesi, *Yön*, 4, January 10, 1962.

<sup>53</sup> Doğan Avcıoğlu (1962) Kalkınma Programı: Devletçilik, *Yön*, 25, June 13, 1962. Regarding statism in *Yön*, see also Nermin Abadan (1962) Azgelişmiş Ülkelerde Devlet, *Yön*, 28, July 4, 1962; Çetin Altan (1961) Yaşasın Liberalizm, *Yön*, 1, December 20, 1961; Sadun Aren (1962) Devletçilik: Plan ve Kalkınma, *Yön*, 3, January 3, 1962; Sadun Aren, "Kalkınma, Demokrasi ve Metod . . ." *Yön*, n. 2, December 27, 1961; Doğan Avcıoğlu (1963) Devletçilik Nasıl Dejenere Oldu?, *Yön*, 47, April 10, 1963; Doğan Avcıoğlu (1962) Kalkınma Stratejisi, *Yön*, 13, March 14, 1962; Muzaffer Karan (1962) Özel Teşebbüs Mü? Devletçilik Mi?, *Yön*, 25, June 13, 1962; Kemal Kurdaş (1963) Nasıl Kalkınabiliriz?, *Yön*, 64, March 6, 1963.

seek ways to bring welfare to the masses through systematic development. To lead the nationalist movement vehemently, then to sidestep the self-sacrifice, work and ramifications of systematic development that is part of the movement, is behavior that one sees too often in Turkey.<sup>54</sup>

*Yön* writers argued that true nationalists are those who seek solutions for the difficulties Turkey is experiencing. 'In this status of depression, the duty of real nationalists and patriots is to struggle to find a way out from an *aporia*. *Yön* has come forward with such a case.'<sup>55</sup> Furthermore, *Yön*'s writers' central view of nationalism was that nationalism meant revolutionism and anti-imperialism and thus was the exact opposite of capitalism: 'Nationalist movements in all North Africa, the Near and Middle East, and underdeveloped Asian and African countries started as rebellions against the colonialist character of capitalism. The first and greatest saga of this chain, Atatürk's revolution, was against the imperialist nature of capitalism.'<sup>56</sup>

İlhan Selçuk's view summarized *Yön*'s position on nationalism:

I remember the huddle we had on the course to take in *Yön*'s early days. *Yön* was for those who embraced Kemalism and located the economic meaning of nationalism far from its daily and literary context . . . In the bright nights of Çankaya in Ankara, our discussions always ended with decisions to uncover truths about those who served the interests of foreign capital by abusing the concept of nationalism. Events [that] unfolded since then prove us successful. *Yön* has aired the dirty laundry of foreign organizations in public and made known what real nationalism means. . . . In underdeveloped countries nationalism is not only about literature, it is an indispensable means of independence and economic development. Nationalism does not mean playing, singing in marches and delivering speeches while offering our oil to foreign companies as a present. The scientific principles of Atatürk's nationalism, which guide all Asian and African nations, are clear and precise. These principles set a straight course for Turkish nationalism. *Yön* is an advocate of this course and a pilgrim on this course.<sup>57</sup>

*Yön* writers argued that nationalism had emerged in underdeveloped countries as a necessity for development. 'Socialism is simply a way of rapid development in social

<sup>54</sup> (1962) *Yön*, 4, January 10, 1962. See also İlhan Selçuk (1962): 'Empty nationalism and religious rhetoric . . . Presenting these together with foreign aid handouts to the poverty stricken ignorant masses you will collect votes . . . Pulling the same tricks when you come to power; pulling them again when you come to power again. . . . The age of rhetoric is coming to a close. The age of reason, the age of logic, the age of science is about to begin,' in 1962 de Türk Milliyetçiliği, *Yön*, 24, June 6, 1962.

<sup>55</sup> Doğan Avcioğlu (1962) Yapıcı Milliyetçilik, *Yön*, 4, January 10, 1962; also see Doğan Avcioğlu (1964), Milliyetçilere Sesleniş, *Yön*, 78, September 25, 1964.

<sup>56</sup> Selçuk (1962), Bizim Milliyetçiliğimiz. 'The socialist view is reformist, it is secularist, and it believes that reforms should not take place despite the people, but with the people, and by the people's hand. This path leads to the source of Kemalism. Our socialists are evolutionists. They aspire to surpass Atatürk's deeds on the road he set. In short, real nationalism is socialism.' *Yön*, 31 (1962). The cover page headline of *Yön*, 216, is 'Sosyalist Milliyetçilik Teorisi' [Socialist Nationalist Theory], May 19, 1967.

<sup>57</sup> İlhan Selçuk (1965) Milliyetçiliğin Temelleri, *Yön*, 96, January 29, 1965.

justice. Rapid development in social justice is the only way to save our country from a dead end. For this reason, socialism is nationalism at its best.<sup>58</sup>

### Democracy

Democracy was a sensitive topic of discussion in *Yön*. The debates on democracy in *Yön* were intended to prove that socialism is not against democracy. To illustrate, Mümtaz Soysal gave the example of their enemies' endless attempts to hold out socialism as 'a fierce and murderous tyranny' while explicating the urgency to voice their opinion of democracy. Soysal's analysis of democracy, which was embraced by the writers, was a product of a defensive approach and formulized in a rather narrow framework. To Soysal,

[i]f democracy, in its etymological sense, is a regime of 'public government,' socialism, deeming populism as one of its basic principles, should correlate on all counts with regard to a true democracy. In a state run by 'the people,' every affair will involve 'people.' Yet, among all past and present economic systems socialism always has valued and cared about the masses and the people the most. The others take a roundabout way to the people and their welfare, for instance, by trying to prove that the people eventually will benefit from others' desires for prosperity and profits. Socialism, in contrast, avoids making detours, establishes ties of ownership directly with the people, and arranges the businesses in accordance with and for the people in the process of economic life. In that case, a true democracy is theoretically the same as socialism.<sup>59</sup>

To Aren,

[s]ocialism is not against democracy. Further, it considers democracy as its most natural and essential tool and aid. It is only possible through democracy, namely, people's involvement in government [by] electing and supervising their own rulers, to prevent mutual abuse in the society. If not, if people are ignored, [and] inevitably abusive groups will continue to replace one another.<sup>60</sup>

Taner Timur also clarified the problem, in its most basic form, as a question of whether a democratic regime is a cause of certain problems or an instrument to rely on when solving certain problems. According to Timur, the crisis of confidence in beliefs that followed May 27 coup

arose eminently from doubts regarding the true nature of democracy. As long as our economic problems remained far from being solved, it is unsound to think that the fundamental organizations of our political regime will be adequately respected. . . . Democracy is not merely a political organization but also a philosophy and lifestyle. In this respect, it is not right to regard a democratic regime as an instrument. Nevermore, it is not likely to cherish democracy as an instrument unless it arises as a tangible lifestyle and as long as it remains as a formal order of life obligated by

<sup>58</sup> Avcıoğlu, Yapıcı Milliyetçilik. See also, İsmail H. Oğuz (1962) Sosyalizm ve Milliyetçilik, *Yön*, 31, July 18, 1962.

<sup>59</sup> Mümtaz Soysal (1962) Demokrasi Anlayışımız, *Yön*, 29, July 11, 1962.

<sup>60</sup> Aren, Demokrasi ve Sosyalizm.

philosophical preferences... If today democracy exists not only as formal organizations but also as a tangible lifestyle in Turkey, democracy, by no means, can be dubbed an instrument. On the contrary, if democracy exists only formally and antagonizes us in this battle for development, such a regime cannot be considered a cause. It seems to us that all difficulties we have arise from our hesitation in handling our issues in underdeveloped countries terms. Somehow we cannot accept the reality as it is.<sup>61</sup>

According to *Yön*'s writers, in order to establish a real democracy, a socialist way of thinking should be spread and organized. The comments made in the journal from a general humanist perspective discuss the subject of democracy by drawing analogies between socialism's respect for humanity and democracy.

### *Active (Armed) Forces*

Democrat Party policies in the second half of 1950s gave rise to a growing distance, especially between the intelligentsia and the bureaucrats, with respect to multi-party political life. The main reason behind this distance was the idea that members of parliament in Turkey were deprived of the ability to represent the nation. The leading cadre in *Yön* was among the major advocates of this idea. The main development that encouraged this attitude among *Yön*'s leaders was the political climate prior to the 27 May military coup and the coup itself. The atmosphere created by the Democrat Party's opponents in the armed forces attached new components to the political climate of the era.<sup>62</sup> Leftist intellectuals who thought leftist ideas had attracted sympathy within the armed forces began arguing that the armed forces' influence on politics should be enhanced because a parliament-centered political regime brought harm to the country. The thesis that sees political liberty in an underdeveloped country like Turkey as meaningless without economic liberty is the basis of such ideas.

*Yön* considered the Democrat Party era as the golden age of the imperialism-landlord-comprador trio.<sup>63</sup> This perspective does not view Democrat Party policies negatively, but rather sees the nature of multi-party life as negative. *Yön*'s literary life started with the idea that socialists had a lot of work to do, and it was essential to make structural changes after the May 27 coup, which was regarded as 'a reaction of the armed forces to a deteriorating course of events.' Thus, the journal published articles that called on the armed forces to take a more active role in Turkish politics. Even though the notion of 'active forces' in the journal is said to mean the 'dynamic sections of the public' including the intelligentsia, in reality the term 'active forces' is a term for the armed forces.

<sup>61</sup> Taner Timur (1962) *Demokrasi ve Demokrasi*, *Yön*, 24, January 6, 1962.

<sup>62</sup> For comprehensive information on this subject see: Orhan Erkanlı (1987) *Askeri Demokrasi 1960–1980* [Military Democracy 1960–1980] (İstanbul: Güneş Publications); Orhan Erkanlı (1972) *Anılar... Sorunlar... Sorumlular* [Memories, Troubles, Responsibilities] (İstanbul: Baha Press); Hadi Hüsmen (1975) *Hatırladıklarım, Düşündüklerim* [Memories, Thoughts] (İstanbul: Baha Press); Muhsin Batur (1985) *Anılar ve Görüşler: Üç Dönemin Perde Arkası* [Memories and Opinions: Backstage of Three Periods] (İstanbul: Milliyet Publications), and Müşerref Hekimoğlu (1975) *27 Mayısın Romanı: İhtilâlciler, Olaylar, Düşünceler, Anılar* [The Novel of May 27: Revolutionaries, Events, Thoughts, Memories] (İstanbul: Çağdaş Publications).

<sup>63</sup> Doğan Avcıoğlu (1966) *Bir Sosyalist Stratejinin Esasları*, *Yön*, 185, October 14, 1966.

*Yön* did not adopt the classic Marxist concept of class struggle. Its opinion viewed the development of the Turkish society as the main political issue, and it found both liberal society and economic theory and Marxist society and economic theory as insufficient in this respect. *Yön* writers did not believe in the transformative characteristics of social forces like ‘the proletariat.’<sup>64</sup> This may have stemmed from the *Yön* theoreticians’ lack of a Marxist background.

In *Yön*’s perspective, development of an underdeveloped society like Turkey is possible neither with the liberal economic doctrine nor the classical Marxist economic doctrine. Social development and transformation in Turkey should be carried out by the active forces, from above, in a rapid and stable way. The engine of this transformation would be the ‘army,’ as first mentioned in *Yön* and later in its formulized form in *Yön*’s heir—a more political version—*Devrim*. It would be noticed with some attention that *Yön* gradually put more emphasis on the importance of the army. For the journal, the army would become the engine for a ‘national revolutionist development’ process.<sup>65</sup> It was only the active forces that had the power and the ability to fight the war for independence and to make development possible.<sup>66</sup> *Yön* writers drew on two points when arguing that the army should play a more active role in political life. First, they considered the army’s role in Turkey to be different from that in Europe; and second, they believed that Atatürk had an absolute trust in the Turkish military. *Yön* writers stated that in Western history the military acted as the armed forces of the bourgeoisie and represented a conservative force, whereas in Turkey the military was a people’s army and undertook the mission of being the leader (progressive force) of transformation.

Interestingly enough, in order to prove this thesis, *Yön* published articles by prominent American modernization theorists on the role of the Turkish army in the modernization process.<sup>67</sup> According to Avcioğlu,

Today, one of the most important subjects is the question of how and by which means socialism can be realized. ... An artificial schism such as ‘RPP and RPP opponents’ should be replaced by a realistic progressive-obscurantist schism, ... and the progressive forces within today’s conservative political parties should find their level. ... The military, coming from poor and humble families, is one of the strongest forces to rely on in Turkey’s progressive steps. In our country’s Westernization moves, the military always has aligned with the progressives. Today, as well, the military is a more powerful guarantor for the progressive forces than the Constitution. ... As a matter of fact, the military in the West has been a real instrument for the bourgeoisie. The Western bourgeoisie made their children

<sup>64</sup> This view led to the Turkish Labour Party, together with *Yön* magazine, receiving the most criticism in the history of the radical Turkish left. For example, Hikmet Kıvılcımlı, criticized *Yön* thusly: ‘In Turkey, where class is decided by the “national chief”, the supra-classed “Intellectual and Active Forces” have only statism to pursue.’ According to Kıvılcımlı, *Yön*’s goal is to push its ‘no class, just state’ motto into active political discourse; see Kıvılcımlı, *27 Mayıs ve Yön Hareketinin Sınıfsal Eleştirisi*, p. 27. According to Kıvılcımlı, *Yön* is trying to use ‘the state against the state,’ p. 105. See also, Mihri Belli (1988) *Tabuları Yıkan Anti-Amerikan Doğan*, in: Yalçın Küçük (ed.), *Aydın Üzerine Tezler – 5 1830–1980* (İstanbul: Tekin Pub.).

<sup>65</sup> Accordingly, Avcioğlu had the interesting suggestion of establishing worker armies on the road to development; see Doğan Avcioğlu (1962) *Kalkınma Programı: IV – İş Orduları*, *Yön*, 15, March 28, 1962.

<sup>66</sup> 27 Mayıs.

<sup>67</sup> See Daniel Lerner and et al. (1962) *Değişen Toplumlarda İlerici Kuvvet: Ordu*, *Yön*, 43, October 10, 1962; and Fahrettin Altun (2005) *Modernleşme Kuramı: Eleştirel Bir Giriş* (İstanbul: Küre Pub.).

soldiers, raised them as protectors of their class interests, and kept out peasant and worker children from the military profession. For this reason, the military in the West always has been there for the obscurantist forces and to shed bullets on workers seeking their rights. It is true for South America as well. Yet, in Turkey there is a Kemalist army stemming from the people. It is an absolute mistake to think of this army as an obedient instrument in the hands of the ruling classes.”<sup>68</sup>

*Yön* writers expressed the idea that the social sectors should gather around the military.<sup>69</sup> In light of facts in Turkey, they asserted, parliament-centered politics will downgrade the country, for ‘in a society that is not even free of its feudal ruins and in which workers are still under the influence of regional affiliations, parliamentarianism helps obscurantist elements dominate the country.’<sup>70</sup> The journal often argued that a Western sort of political culture did not develop in Turkey and therefore parliamentarianism had no future in Turkey. In this respect, Niyazi Berkes’s words are explanatory:

In the history of Turkish development and modernization, the pressure from obscurantist forces always has prevented the intelligentsia, who longed for transformation to a modern civilization, from adopting liberal or socialist ideologies. This always has been the case from Namık Kemal to Ziya Gökalp. Therefore, Turkish political thought has remained ‘atrophied’ with regard to Western ideological measurements. Ideological tendencies like liberalism, populism and socialism always have remained weak and non-influential against flat Islamist, Ottomanist and Turanist rhetoric. For this reason, political thought in its real sense never has been established in Turkey and real political thought never has been anything more than simplemindedness. Imagined thoughts that do not carry any value for the society’s economic development and civilization process always have perplexed the social classes and masses of people in political matters and prevented them from taking an intellectual point of view. Political party life has come to rely on opportunism restrained by those imagined thoughts instead of political philosophies. This is the case today as it was in the past.<sup>71</sup>

*Yön* writers often referred to Atatürk’s trust in the military, which, according to Berkes, explains the Turkish intelligentsia’s trust in the military. ‘If it wasn’t for Mustafa Kemal and the military, obscurantist forces would do away with them. For this reason, Turkish intellectuals are so bound to Mustafa Kemal, and the military and progressivism has been linked parallel together.’<sup>72</sup> In discussing all these matters, *Yön*’s objective was to influence the armed forces. Despite the justifications for the coup published by *Yön*, however, *Yön* writers thought that the 27 May coup was untimely. While it was ‘a progressive movement,’ 27 May had occurred without sufficient preparations and the necessary cadre; therefore the ‘DP-minded’ politicians soon replaced the military government. However,

<sup>68</sup> Doğan Avcıoğlu (1962) Sosyalist Gerçekçilik, *Yön*, 39, September 12, 1962.

<sup>69</sup> İlhami Soysal (1962) Ordu, *Yön*, 43, October 10, 1962.

<sup>70</sup> Doğan Avcıoğlu (1965) Cumhuriyet’ in 42. Yılında, *Yön*, 135, October 29, 1965; see also (1966) Parlamentoculuk, *Yön*, 158, April 8, 1966.

<sup>71</sup> Niyazi Berkes, 200 Yıldır Neden Bocalıyoruz.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid.

by the mid-1960s both the internal conditions and the cadre by the mid-1960s were ‘now’ ripe. The belief that the armed forces was the only element capable of building a socialist order and a developed Turkey and a progressive society pushed *Yön*’s publishers and writers to keep the subject of the active forces continuously on the agenda. *Yön* publishers believed that this subject should be discussed at greater length and started planning a more homogenous weekly journal with a better focused agenda. On 30 June 1967, *Yön* closed down and its editorial cadre began planning the *Devrim* journal which would start on 21 October 1969. Members of this group, including Doğan Avcıoğlu, were arrested shortly after the 12 March memorandum for their attempt at a coup *d’état*, which was known as the 9 March junta, in collaboration with Turkey’s National Unity Committee member General Cemal Madanoğlu.<sup>73</sup> They gave up on making their political demands heard by gathering and organizing around a publishing organ. However, the insight this perspective brings about Turkish political thought still continues to be represented today.

### Unidimensional Modernization and Development

*Yön* always assigned a central significance to the issue of development during its literary life. Such significance not only is seen in the articles of those writers who show direct consideration of the issue of development, but also in articles discussing education, foreign policy, economy, industry, military, youth, bureaucracy, Kemalism, democracy, responsibilities of the intelligentsia, planning, landlord establishment, anti-communism, religion, social structure, women, social justice, villages, urbanization, the Third World, the Middle East, the West, Westernization, the Asiatic mode of production, Arab socialism, imperialism, underdevelopment, nationalism, etc. In articles on these topics the significance of development’s objective is made known to the reader explicitly or implicitly. The discourse of development is virtually integral to the pages of *Yön*.

The issue of development emerged during the Cold War years. First, integral to its post-1945 foreign policy, the United States raised the question of development in non-Western societies. It advocated what were termed universally legitimate ‘development practices’ to solve social problems in many non-Western countries, including Turkey, to help them catch up with the economic levels reached by developed nations. In such a process, development came into focus as an ideal objective to accomplish. Western developmental practice was taken into account not as a historical process, but as a universal path to follow and a target to reach. In this period, many organizations were founded, especially in the United States, in order to help underdeveloped countries develop and to allocate significant funds for this purpose.<sup>74</sup> For example, an American technical committee visited

<sup>73</sup> The March 12 Memorandum was an ultimatum by Turkish armed forces which demanded that the current government end the anarchical situation and economic unrest in the country and threatened to take over power if those demands were not met. It is also known as the ‘coup by memorandum’ in modern Turkish history. Shortly after March 12, 1971, members of the 9 March junta, including Doğan Avcıoğlu, were arrested, martial law was imposed for the next two years and the civil political arena was surrounded by military discourse.

<sup>74</sup> The establishment of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development is also particularly important in this period. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is one of the most significant and effective among these establishments as well. USAID especially focused on the Near East, Asia, Africa and Latin America, where it provided technical assistance and guidance on economic and agricultural development, population, health, environment, democracy, regimes, education and humanitarian aid projects. For a critical perspective regarding the work of agency, see Vasili Vahrusev (1978) *Yöntemleriyle*

Turkey in 1946 and prepared the Thornburg Report, which Turkey used to formulate its development plan in 1947.<sup>75</sup> In 1948, Turkey signed the Economic Cooperation Treaty with the United States. In 1952, it signed a Public Administration Institute for Turkey and the Middle East agreement with the United Nations Technical Administration Services and established the Public Administration Institute for Turkey and Middle East one year later. Both the Planning Bureau and State Planning Organization were founded in 1960, and they set up five-year development plans.<sup>76</sup> The issue of development was considered a supra-ideology objective in Turkey in the post-1945 period. Developmental discourse spread from the central government to all ideological groups. Intellectuals and social scientists were quick to take the issue into close consideration and development found a niche in the Turkish intellectual history as a new interpretation of Westernization.

In the 1950s and 1960s, almost 100 books and 300 articles discussing development were published, and many of these works that emphasized the importance of development were translated into Turkish as well as into other languages.<sup>77</sup> Moreover, several Western 'development specialists' were invited to conferences in Turkey. Consequently, the American model of development shaped Turkish development views and policies during the 1950s and 1960s. Although the American model was recognized in many non-Western countries, the Soviet model was no less influential and it became official state policy in some countries. Even in countries where the American model was adopted, opposition groups supported the Soviet model.<sup>78</sup> In post-World War II Turkey, some policy-makers argued that the Soviet model was more 'realistic and correct' 'reached' by 'developed' than the American one. The intellectual circles around *Yön* defined and continuously criticized the American model for being a 'capitalist method of development.' However, even though *Yön* writers stressed the need for 'a non-capitalist method of development,' they did not refer to the Soviet model. It should be noted that the development model advocated by *Yön* adopted a different course from these two models. The *Yön* group seems to have been influenced by a development method outlined by Oscar Lange, a Polish-American economist who authored several significant works on the theory of a social economy. In his works, Lange tried to prove that a social economy is possible. As a University of Chicago professor who had been Poland's minister of economy after World War II, he tried to develop a theory of 'market socialism.' According to Lange, there should be a balance between the planners and the market, and the planners should decide

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Footnote 74 continued

ve Manevralarıyla Yeni Sömürgecilik [New Imperialism with its Methods and Manoeuvres] C. Arslan (trans) (İstanbul: Konuk Publications), p. 102.

<sup>75</sup> Regarding the scope of the program see İlhan Tekeli & Selim İlkin (1974) *Savaş Sonrası Ortamında 1947 Türkiye İktisadi Kalkınma Planı* [In the Wake of World War II, 1947 Progress Plan] (Ankara: METU Publications).

<sup>76</sup> For the full text of the Economic Cooperation Treaty signed with America, see Kenan Mortan & Cemil Çakmaklı (1987) *Geçmişten Geleceğe Kalkınma Arayışları* [From Past to Present: The Search for Economic Development] (İstanbul: Altın Kitaplar Publications), p. 63.

<sup>77</sup> See Cavit Orhan Tütengil (1971) *Az gelişmiş Ülkeler ve Gelişme İktisadi Konularındaki Türkçe Kitaplar ve Yazılar Bibliyografyası* İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası (Special Issue) 28(1-4), p. 2. Chief works by thinkers such as W. W. Rostow, D. C. Stone, R. König, R. Nurkse, R. J. Alexander, M. Dobb, R. Emerson, J. Timbergen, Oscar Lange and S. S. Goodman regarding the development issue were translated into Turkish.

<sup>78</sup> See further regarding models of development, Björn Hettne (1982) *Development Theory and the Third World* (Helsingborg: Sarec Report), 10-15.

which product to produce and in what quality in the light of market signals. Apparently, the model Lange foresaw was neither a liberal market economy nor a Soviet-style economy. Because he had resigned from his position in Poland due to Stalin's pressure on that country and later contributed to discussions on how to improve the American economy, Lange's ideas influenced *Yön*'s publishers. The point should be stressed, however, that all models of development refer to the 'Western level of development'; even though *Yön*'s writers identified the capitalist development model with imperialism and the dominance of the private sector, they still considered the Western process of development as a historical model and a path to follow. Besides, there is no radical difference between these development models in practice. All these models considered industrialization essential for non-Western societies and were based on a top-down intervention policy regardless of a society's authentic historical, cultural, geographic, social, and economic conditions. In this sense, whether such models favored state capitalism or stemmed from liberal sources, they basically adopted similar policies. A good example is the planning policies in Turkey. The practice of planning was first raised as an issue during İsmet İnönü's visit to the Soviet Union as Turkey's prime minister; subsequently, Turkey's first five-year plan (1933–38) was prepared by Soviet economists. After the creation of the Planning Bureau and the State Planning Organization in the 1960s, planning policies once again were on the agenda, this time, shaped in accordance with American political economy.

Yet, from the 1930s to the 1960s and later, the characteristics of the statist economy in Turkey continued on a steady course without radical alterations. The economic policies in question did not necessarily offer divergent remedies to the modernizing elite of the non-Western countries. As the philosophy and content of *Yön* are examined, it easily can be observed that *Yön* recognized the top-down modernization idea in Turkey's history of modernization and associated the modernization of society with the stripping off of 'old' values and the deconstruction of its traditional structure. This is the main reason behind the presence of articles and the thought of major names in modernization theory in the *Yön* journal.

There are two common points *Yön* intellectuals and America-centered modernization theorists agreed upon: Modernization of Turkish society only could be possible through a decline in its traditional structure, and the main actor behind the modernization process should be the armed forces. The approach which regards modernization in Turkey as possible only through the deconstruction of its traditional structure remained a common point for the political elite, regardless of the source of their ideologies, until the 2000s. This approach, which had been advocated by Turkish politicians for decades, also contributed to the formation of a conservative political language and led to the production of a conservative political philosophy in the name of modernization.

As is apparent in the case of *Yön*, a movement that defined itself as 'socialist' can contribute to the formation of such political conservatism. In this frame, the most noticeable social project *Yön* put forward as a Kemalist ground for communication followed a radical dissolution of traditional values instead of the modernization of the society from which it stemmed. However, while putting forward innovative and revolutionary claims, *Yön* absolutized the political culture of the 1930s, thus contributing to the conservatism of Turkish political culture. This case refers to another important characteristic of *Yön*: It did not consider Kemalism as but one of many other ideologies, but rather as an unquestionably sacred path to follow. Nonetheless, *Yön* did not abstain

from giving a new interpretation of Kemalism and eventually claimed its place in the history of the Turkish press which was also the most important medium in the left-Kemalist tradition. *Yön* brought Kemalism to the political stage once again, and set the boundaries for left-Kemalism's political communication language which drew on an autocratic interpretation of historiography, state and society. From this point on, *Yön* became Kemalism's main channel of communication and a source of left-Kemalist traditions of political communication which created *Devrim* and then *Cumhuriyet* newspaper. Particularly after İlhan Selçuk's name became influential in *Cumhuriyet*, it can be observed that the modernization and development ideology of *Yön*, the left-Kemalist perception of politics and its language of communication had come round the track again within modern Turkey. Today *Yön*'s attitude still is being represented by actors trying to play an active role in Turkish politics and by certain sections within the state bureaucracy. For that reason, and for a better understanding of Turkish thought and the political structure of the era, studies from different perspectives about the *Yön* journal/movement are crucial. Understanding the basic dynamics and main discursive features of the language of political communication set by *Yön* is essential for understanding the history of the Turkish press and the current polarization of its political culture.

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